Education and Employment References Committee—Jobactive: failing those it is intended to serve

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Education and Employment References Committee—Jobactive: failing those it is intended to serve—Report, dated February 2019

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February 2019

The Senate

Education and Employment References Committee

Jobactive: failing those it is intended to serve

ISBN 978-1-76010-910-3 (Printed Version)

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Members

Chair Senator Gavin Marshall ALP, VIC

Deputy Chair Senator Slade Brockman LP, WA

(from 10 September 2018, Deputy Chair from 12 September 2018)

Members Senator Catryna Bilyk ALP, TAS

Senator Mehreen Faruqi AG, NSW

(from 21 August 2018) Senator Deborah O'Neill ALP, NSW

Senator James Paterson LP, VIC

Substitute Members Senator Rachel Siewert AG, WA

(for Senator Faruqi from 21 August 2018) Senator Jim Molan LP, NSW

(for Senator Paterson from 5 November to 7 December 2018) Senator Lucy Gichuhi LP, SA

(for Senator Brockman on 20 November 2018)

Participating Members Senator the Hon. Doug Cameron ALP, NSW

(on 17 October 2018 and 28 November 2018) Senator Jim Molan LP, NSW

(on 17 October 2018) Senator Anne Urquhart ALP, TAS

(on 17 October 2018)

Former Members Senator Lucy Gichuhi LP, SA

(Deputy Chair until 10 September 2018) Senator Sarah Hanson-Young AG, SA

(until 21 August 2018)

Secretariat Mr Stephen Palethorpe, Committee Secretary Ms Natasha Rusjakovski, Principal Research Officer Ms Kate Campbell, Senior Research Officer Ms Ariane Lloyd-Pitty, Senior Research Officer Mr Matthew Hughes, Research Officer Ms Jade Monaghan, Administrative Officer

Committee web page: www.aph.gov.au/senate_eec

PO Box 6100 E-mail: eec.sen@aph.gov.au

Parliament House Ph: 02 6277 3521

Canberra ACT 2600 Fax: 02 6277 5706

Table of Contents

Members ............................................................................................................................................. iii

Recommendations .............................................................................................................................. ix

Support Services ................................................................................................................................ xv

Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................... xvii

Foreword ............................................................................................................................................ xix

Chapter 1—Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

Inquiry terms of reference .................................................................................................................. 1

Conduct of the inquiry ........................................................................................................................ 2

Structure of the report ......................................................................................................................... 2

Acknowledgement .............................................................................................................................. 3

Notes on references .............................................................................................................................. 3

Chapter 2—Participant voices ........................................................................................................... 5

Overview ............................................................................................................................................... 5

Participant voices ................................................................................................................................ 6

Chapter 3—Background ................................................................................................................... 13

Overview ............................................................................................................................................ 13

Australia's labour market.................................................................................................................. 13

Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia ............................................................................... 15

Methods by which Australians gain employment ........................................................................ 29

Employment services in Australia: an outsourced model ........................................................... 31

Consultation with unemployed workers ....................................................................................... 40

Chapter 4—Assessment and streaming ........................................................................................ 45

Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 45

Overview of assessment and streaming ......................................................................................... 45

Effectiveness of the assessment process ......................................................................................... 46

Re-assessment .................................................................................................................................... 49

Chapter 5—Services and support for participants ...................................................................... 53

Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 53

Overview of service requirements .................................................................................................. 53

Meeting the needs of diverse participants ...................................................................................... 59

Spending on employment services .................................................................................................. 76

Changing providers ........................................................................................................................... 77

The Employment Fund ..................................................................................................................... 78

Wage subsidies .................................................................................................................................. 83

Work experience ................................................................................................................................. 87

Place-based and local approaches .................................................................................................. 88

Restoration of public service delivery of employment services .................................................. 90

Chapter 6—Employment services consultants ............................................................................ 93

Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 93

High turnover ..................................................................................................................................... 93

Large caseloads .................................................................................................................................. 94

Training ............................................................................................................................................... 95

Mistreatment of participants ............................................................................................................ 96

Engagement with employers ............................................................................................................ 97

Chapter 7—Mutual obligation requirements ............................................................................ 101

Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 101

Overview of mutual obligation requirements ............................................................................ 101

The Job Plan ...................................................................................................................................... 105

Job search requirements .................................................................................................................. 110

Provider appointments ................................................................................................................... 114

Overview of Work for the Dole and other annual activity requirements ................................ 117

Work for the Dole ............................................................................................................................. 118

Training and courses ....................................................................................................................... 130

Approved volunteering................................................................................................................... 133

Drug or alcohol treatment ............................................................................................................... 135

Chapter 8—Targeted Compliance Framework .......................................................................... 139

Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 139

Overview of the Targeted Compliance Framework ................................................................... 139

An overemphasis on compliance ................................................................................................... 141

Negative impacts of the compliance framework ......................................................................... 144

Complexity of the compliance framework ................................................................................... 148

Impacts of compliance on work readiness .................................................................................. 150

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The proper role of providers ......................................................................................................... 152

Reasonable excuse rules .................................................................................................................. 156

The future of compliance ................................................................................................................ 160

Chapter 9—Complaints and appeals ........................................................................................... 163

Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 163

Appropriateness of the complaints and appeals processes ....................................................... 164

Employment services ombudsman ............................................................................................... 167

Chapter 10—Outcome driven funding ....................................................................................... 169

Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 169

Overview of funding model ........................................................................................................... 169

Precarious employment and churn ............................................................................................... 173

Creaming and parking .................................................................................................................... 176

Fees for training and other programs ........................................................................................... 178

Outcome payments and payslips .................................................................................................. 179

Other impacts on service delivery ................................................................................................. 182

Coalition Senators' Dissenting Report........................................................................................ 185

Australian Greens Senators' Additional Comments ................................................................ 191

Appendix 1—Submissions and Additional Information ........................................................ 203

Appendix 2—Public Hearings and Witnesses ........................................................................... 211

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

3.98 The committee recommends that the government undertake a review of the adequacy of the rate of Newstart, with respect to keeping people out of poverty and getting people back into work as soon as possible.

Recommendation 2

3.106 The committee recommends that the government review the Youth PaTH program and ensure that any future program provides adequate worker protection and payment.

Recommendation 3

3.115 The committee recommends that the government consider the recommendations of this report in its response to the review of employment services.

Recommendation 4

3.131 The committee recommends that the government consult in a meaningful way with jobactive participants (including participants from disadvantaged groups) and other unemployed and underemployed Australians, as well as employment services providers, in designing future employment services.

Recommendation 5

4.25 The committee recommends that the government investigate how it can better encourage people to disclose personal barriers and make it easier for participants to move between different levels of service.

Recommendation 6

4.26 The committee recommends that employment services participants with mutual obligations should have the right to opt out of online self-servicing and instead receive direct services from their employment services provider.

Recommendation 7

5.91 The committee recommends that the government consider appropriate ways to support providers that have developed expertise in labour market programs targeted towards young people, including mentoring programs.

Recommendation 8

5.92 The committee recommends that the government investigate options to ensure that employment services meet the needs of First Nations people and people with disabilities and other health barriers.

Recommendation 9

5.93 The committee recommends that the government examine the merits of providing career counselling and support services for those who may need it, such as people who are entering the paid workforce for the first time or returning after caring for a child or family member, and people who are over 40 years of age who are struggling to reset their careers.

Recommendation 10

5.98 The committee recommends that the government review the adequacy of funding levels for employment services.

Recommendation 11

5.120 The committee recommends that the government examine options to improve access to the Employment Fund.

Recommendation 12

5.137 The committee recommends that the government consider options to encourage greater work experience opportunities for employment services participants.

Recommendation 13

5.155 The committee recommends that the government review the costs and benefits of restoring public service delivery of employment services for certain cohorts of unemployed people.

Recommendation 14

6.17 The committee recommends that the government consider allocating additional funding for employment consultant/staff training and professional development.

Recommendation 15

7.22 The committee recommends that the government improve mutual obligation requirements to better promote work readiness and effective job searches.

Recommendation 16

7.23 The committee recommends that the government consider broadening the range of activities participants can undertake to meet mutual obligation requirements.

Recommendation 17

7.43 The committee recommends that the government investigate how it can meaningfully improve the negotiation process for, and content of, Job Plans.

Recommendation 18

7.55 The committee recommends that the government consider allowing for default job search requirements to be adjusted in regions and for cohorts where employment prospects are well below-average.

Recommendation 19

7.56 The committee recommends that the government consider expanding the activities that people can use to meet mutual obligation requirements, including attending an interview.

Recommendation 20

7.71 The committee recommends that the government examine ways to improve provider awareness of approved activities including Adult Migrant English Program language courses for mutual obligations.

Recommendation 21

7.123 The committee recommends that the government strengthen obligations for providers to inform participants about appropriate alternatives to Work for the Dole and remove incentives for providers to refer participants to Work for the Dole in preference to other programs.

Recommendation 22

7.124 The committee recommends that the government consider extending eligibility for other labour market programs, such as Transition to Work, to allow those required to undertake Work for the Dole to choose other programs (if available in their area) as an alternative.

Recommendation 23

7.125 The committee recommends that the government investigate how to ensure that Work for the Dole does not in practice displace people from paid work and volunteer work.

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Recommendation 24

7.126 The committee recommends that the government review Work for the Dole with a view to improving the employability of participants.

Recommendation 25

7.127 The committee recommends that the government review the safety requirements for Work for the Dole and consider whether current insurance arrangements are adequate.

Recommendation 26

7.162 The committee recommends that the government take steps to improve provider awareness of recent policy changes for participation in drug or alcohol treatment programs counting towards annual activity requirements.

Recommendation 27

7.163 The committee recommends that the government investigate if doctors are being inappropriately pressured to change medical certificates due to the recent policy changes for participation in drug or alcohol treatment programs counting towards annual activity requirements, and to address this situation as necessary.

Recommendation 28

8.24 The committee recommends that the government ensure that Centrelink has the discretion over penalties (including demerit points) which are either unfairly punitive in nature or affected by administrative error.

Recommendation 29

8.69 The committee recommends that the government consider the merits of transferring responsibility for the compliance framework, including the imposition of demerits, to the Department of Human Services or another public body.

Recommendation 30

8.83 The committee recommends that the government ensure the 'reasonable excuse' rules protect the welfare of unemployed people.

Recommendation 31

8.88 The committee recommends that the government conduct thorough testing of the new online compliance system before implementation is rolled out nationally.

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Recommendation 32

9.17 The committee recommends that the government examine the appropriateness of existing appeal rights for participants and how to improve the accessibility of the appeals and complaints processes.

Recommendation 33

9.18 The committee recommends that the government implement a maximum turnaround period for the handling of complaints and appeals from participants.

Recommendation 34

9.24 The committee recommends that the government consider establishing an employment services ombudsman, to provide an independent review mechanism.

Recommendation 35

9.25 The committee recommends that the effectiveness of employment services be regularly independently evaluated.

Recommendation 36

10.27 The committee recommends that the government examine the funding model to ensure that the funding model does not inappropriately incentivise the attainment of short-term or insecure employment outcomes at the expense of more sustainable medium and long-term outcomes. This should include consideration of whether outcome payments are desirable, whether payment timeframes are too short and whether a portion of payments should be clawed back if a participant re-enters the system, and whether outcome payments should be less for insecure jobs.

Recommendation 37

10.35 The committee recommends that the government consider options to improve the funding model to ensure it contains sufficient incentives for providers to properly assist harder-to-place participants.

Recommendation 38

10.41 The committee recommends that the government review funding arrangements for non-work activities to ensure integrity in the system.

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Recommendation 39

10.42 The committee recommends that the government review the funding model to ensure it promotes activities that improve the employability of participants.

Recommendation 40

10.51 The committee recommends that the government take additional action to prevent providers from contacting employers to obtain payslips without the permission of the participant.

Recommendation 41

10.56 The committee recommends that the government examine options to improve the funding model to ensure that it promotes high-quality service provision to participants and employers.

Support Services

If you or anyone you know needs help you can contact one of the services below:

Lifeline 13 11 14

www.lifeline.org.au

Kids Helpline 1800 551 800 www.kidshelpline.com.au

MensLine Australia 1300 789 978 www.mensline.org.au

Suicide Call Back Service 1300 659 467 www.suicidecallbackservice.org.au

Beyond Blue 1300 224 636 www.beyondblue.org.au

headspace 1800 650 890 www.headspace.org.au

Head to Health www.headtohealth.gov.au

Emergency Services

000 (triple zero) if you are in immediate danger

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Acronyms

ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics

ACCI Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry ACOSS Australian Council of Social Service

ANAO Australian National Audit Office

AUWU Australian Unemployed Workers' Union

CPSU Community and Public Sector Union

ESAt Employment Services Assessment

GSANZ Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand

JSCI Job Seeker Classification Instrument

NESA National Employment Services Association

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development TCF Targeted Compliance Framework

VCOSS Victorian Council of Social Service

WANADA Western Australian Network of Alcohol and other Drug Agencies WfD Work for the Dole

YACSA Youth Affairs Council of South Australia

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Foreword

Jobactive is the government’s generalist employment service and the largest program through which employment services are delivered to Australians. People of working age not serviced by specific programs, such as Disability Employment Services, are generally required to participate in jobactive to receive income support.

The stated objectives of the jobactive program, in addition to jobactive organisations delivering quality services, are to help job seekers find and keep a job, help job seekers move from welfare to work, and help job seekers meet their mutual obligations.

The committee was tasked with examining the appropriateness and effectiveness of jobactive. The committee also considered the recent report of the Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel into the future of employment services. The committee's deliberations were informed by submissions received from many jobactive participants, jobactive providers, employment services consultants and other stakeholders. The committee heard directly from jobactive providers, charities, community organisations, and most importantly, unemployed people, at five public hearings held across Australia.1

Through the evidence the committee received, it became clear that the jobactive program is not fit for purpose. It is not delivering on its stated objectives. Participants are gaining employment in spite of jobactive, not because of it. And many participants are suffering because of the program's punitive compliance arrangements. Providers are overburdened with red-tape and consultants are struggling to help participants whilst also policing compliance requirements.

Four key themes emerged during the inquiry. The first is that the services and support arrangements that should be a part of an effective employment services system simply aren’t there. People are assessed as 'job ready', when they have multiple serious barriers to employment, such as homelessness and substance abuse. This mis-categorisation limits the services and support available to disadvantaged participants. Even when people are assessed properly, there is often insufficient support. People are not receiving the basic job-readiness services that jobactive is meant to provide, such as assistance with resumes and interview practice. Employment services consultants have average caseloads of around 150 participants which means they simply don't have the time to provide tailored support and services.

1 References to unemployed people throughout the report should be taken to include

underemployed people unless otherwise indicated.

The second theme that emerged during the inquiry is that the government's job search and other mutual obligation requirements are poorly designed and often inappropriate. Participants are missing paid employment to attend appointments with their jobactive provider. The requirement to apply for 20 jobs every month burdens employers who are receiving masses of poor quality applications often from people who are not suited for the position. Participants are approaching the same employers over and over because there are insufficient jobs. People who have to do Work for the Dole are not guaranteed a safe work environment—and there's no workers' compensation if they are injured.

The third theme that emerged is that jobactive's compliance framework is punitive and in some cases grossly unfair. In 2018, the government imposed harsh new penalties under the Targeted Compliance Framework (TCF). Under the TCF, jobactive providers, rather than public servants, are responsible for monitoring compliance and suspending a person's income support if they do not meet their mutual obligations. As at 31 December 2018, six months into the TCF, 42.5 per cent of jobactive participants have at least one demerit point resulting in support payment suspension. In addition, over 4000 participants have more than five demerit points and are already in the 'penalty zone'—resulting in reduction or cancellation of their payment. Worryingly, more than half of all homeless jobactive participants have at least one demerit point. In addition, almost 20 per cent of participants who are in the penalty zone are homeless. Indigenous Australians are also highly overrepresented in the compliance data. Only about 13 per cent of jobactive participants are Indigenous, however almost 28 per cent of those in the penalty zone are Indigenous.

People who have done nothing wrong are having their income support suspended because of administrative errors. The committee heard that the 2015-16 error rate for penalties was around 50 per cent. Yet because of recent action by the government, now when this happens, participants have their support payments suspended without proper recourse. This is because in 2018 the government restricted the power of Centrelink to overturn penalties. All of this means that people who may have done nothing wrong are having their income support suspended, suddenly and without any warning.

When defending jobactive's performance, the government often states that the program has achieved more than 1.2 million job placements. However, it is important to consider the kind of work that participants are doing—is it a job that will give people the opportunity to move off income support and into lasting employment, or is it a short-term placement that keeps a person in the revolving welfare system?

xxi

In this regard, the last main theme that emerged during the inquiry is that the current funding model incentivises jobactive providers to churn people through short term work, rather than helping them to secure sustainable longer-term employment. Jobactive providers receive payments when a person has remained in employment for four, 12 and 26 weeks. There are no further payments after 26 weeks. However, when people cycle in and out of short term work, their jobactive provider can continue to receive outcome payments. Providers are rewarded financially for churning people through jobs that don't last.

Disturbingly, the funding model also disadvantages the most vulnerable job seekers. The average length of time spent in jobactive for the most disadvantaged job seekers is five years. Funding based on employment outcomes means that these highly vulnerable people can be 'parked', receiving no support from their provider, because they are less likely to get a job.

Jobactive is not welfare to work, it is welfare to nowhere.

The government's punitive and paternalistic approach to employment services has failed. It goes against international and Australian evidence about what works. In designing the future system to replace jobactive in 2020, the government must get back to basics: the future system must help all job seekers find and keep a job.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Inquiry terms of reference 1.1 On 15 August 2018, the Senate referred the inquiry into the appropriateness and effectiveness of the objectives, design, implementation and evaluation of jobactive to the Education and Employment References Committee (the

committee) for report by 5 December 2018.1 On 29 November 2018, the Senate granted an extension of time to report until 13 February 2019.2 On 13 February 2019, the Senate granted a further short extension of time to report until 14 February 2019.3

1.2 The terms of reference for the inquiry are:

(a) the nature and underlying causes of joblessness in Australia; (b) the methods by which Australians gain employment and their relative effectiveness; (c) the extent of consultation and engagement with unemployed workers in

the design and implementation of jobactive; (d) the ability of jobactive to provide long-term solutions to joblessness, and to achieve social, economic and cultural outcomes that meet the needs and

aspirations of unemployed workers; (e) the fairness of mutual obligation requirements, the jobactive Job Plan negotiation process and expenditure of the Employment Fund; (f) the adequacy and appropriateness of activities undertaken within the

Annual Activity Requirement phase, including Work for the Dole, training, studying and volunteering programs and their effect on employment outcomes; (g) the impacts and consequences of the job seeker compliance framework; (h) the appeals process, including the lack of an employment services ombudsman; (i) the funding of jobactive, including the adequacy of the ‘outcome driven’ funding model, and the adequacy of this funding model to address barriers to employment; (j) alternative approaches to addressing joblessness; and (k) any other related matters.4

1 Journals of the Senate, No. 108, 15 August 2018, pp. 3480-3481.

2 Journals of the Senate, No. 133, 29 November 2018, p. 4324.

3 Journals of the Senate, No. 139, 13 February 2019, p. 4631.

4 Journals of the Senate, No. 108, 15 August 2018, pp. 3480-3481.

Conduct of the inquiry 1.3 Notice of the inquiry was posted on the committee’s website.5 The committee also wrote to key stakeholders to invite submissions.

1.4 The committee received 169 submissions, including 45 name withheld submissions and 20 confidential submissions. Public submissions are listed at Appendix 1. The confidential and name withheld submissions were largely from jobactive participants who did not want their circ*mstances to be disclosed publicly.

1.5 The committee held five public hearings:

ï 1 November 2018 in Melbourne, Victoria; ï 14 November 2018 in Canberra, ACT; ï 20 November 2018 in Terrigal, NSW; ï 29 January 2019 in Perth, WA; and ï 1 February 2019 in Canberra, ACT.

1.6 A list of witnesses who appeared at these hearings is at Appendix 2.

Structure of the report 1.7 During the course of the inquiry, the committee identified a wide range of matters relating to the objectives, design, implementation and evaluation of jobactive.

1.8 Chapter 2 of this report sets out a selection of jobactive participant voices in an attempt to convey the significant challenges and experiences of participants. These voices highlight the profound impact of government policies on the lives of participants and the need for appropriate and effective employment services.

1.9 Chapter 3 provides background information on Australia's labour market and a brief overview of the government's employment services policies and programs.

1.10 Chapter 4 examines the assessment and streaming process for participants.

1.11 Chapter 5 examines the services and supports available to participants.

1.12 Chapter 6 examines issues related specifically to employment services consultants, including their capacity to engage with employers.

5 Senate Education and Employment References Committee, The appropriateness and effectiveness of

the objectives, design, implementation and evaluation of jobactive,

www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Education_and_Employment/JobA ctive2018 (accessed 10 September 2018).

1.13 Chapter 7 examines the mutual obligation requirements for participants, including requirements to apply for jobs and attend appointments with their jobactive provider.

1.14 Chapter 8 considers the compliance framework, which determines the penalties applied to participants if they fail to meet their mutual obligations.

1.15 Chapter 9 considers the appropriateness of the complaints and appeals processes for participants.

1.16 Chapter 10 turns to matters relating to outcome-based funding arrangements for jobactive providers.

Acknowledgement 1.17 The committee thanks those individuals and organisations who contributed to the inquiry by preparing written submissions and giving evidence at public hearings. In particular, the committee acknowledges the detrimental

experiences of many participants under jobactive and sincerely thanks those individuals for their courage and strength in sharing their stories and concerns for the purpose of informing the committee's deliberations on this very important topic.

1.18 The committee also acknowledges the difficult burden placed on employment services consultants under jobactive. The committee thanks those individuals with experience working in the industry for speaking out and bringing their concerns to the committee's attention.

Notes on references 1.19 References in this report to the Hansard for the public hearings are to the proof transcript. Page numbers may vary between the proof and official Hansard transcripts.

Chapter 2 Participant voices

We’re not considered. We are not respected. We’re painted with the same brush, as though for some reason we’re criminals because we’re in need. Where are the jobs?1

Overview 2.1 In addition to receiving many written submissions from individuals, throughout the inquiry the committee heard deeply-personal verbal testimony from individuals with direct experiences of jobactive, unemployment and

underemployment. Many of these individuals who provided powerful evidence to the inquiry do not feel that their voices are heard under the current system. At a time when employment services are being redesigned, Australia's peak social services organisation has highlighted the importance of these voices being heard:

It is absolutely vital that governments and employment services, and peak bodies and advocates such as ACOSS [Australian Council of Social Service], listen to the voices of people who are unemployed when redesigning employment services. These services can make a crucial difference to people's prospects of securing paid work, especially for people facing disadvantages such as long-term unemployment. The way in which employment services, Centrelink, governments and the media treat people - especially in monitoring compliance with activity requirements - also makes a huge difference to people's experience of unemployment.2

2.2 By setting out direct quotes, this chapter aims to build a picture of the challenges faced by participants in finding work and engaging with jobactive. These voices serve to highlight the profound impact of government policies on the lives of participants and the need for appropriate and effective employment services.

2.3 A common theme for many jobactive participants is that requirements under jobactive did not assist them to find work and in some cases operated as a barrier to employment.

1 Ms Tracey Ashmore, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 54.

2 Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), Voices of Unemployment, October 2018,

www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Voices-of-Unemployment_October-2018_web.pdf (accessed 3 February 2019), p. 4.

2.4 There are approximately 631 000 jobactive participants across Australia.3 The following quotes therefore represent only a sample of the experiences of all participants. Further testimonials are included throughout this report.

Participant voices 2.5 Ms Jaki Wilson, a job seeker from the New South Wales Central Coast, gave evidence about the difficulties she faced finding work after taking a voluntary redundancy:

I applied for a job at the ATO [Australian Taxation Office], which was touted as a great thing for employment on the Central Coast—and I'm sure it was for the people who did secure work there—but I got a rejection email from that application, which is unusual. This one was particularly unusual in that it told me how many applicants there had been—1,048 applicants—and of those the email said 19 would be progressed in the selection process. I don't actually know how many roles there were, but let's say they were going to interview three people for each of the roles. That makes about 170 applicants for each role. I maintain that there are just not enough jobs for all of the people. I am sure that there is regional variation and skill mismatches and so on, but overall there are not enough jobs for all of the people who are looking for work.4

2.6 A jobactive participant with a background in retail and a Certificate III in Hospitality, who lives in Adelaide, described the destructive impact of being unemployed since 2013:

The thing that holds me back more than anything is my lack of self-esteem. My confidence is completely shattered. Due to my poor diet, my looks are rapidly fading, my skin is dull, my hair is thinning, the bags under my eyes look like I have black eyes some days. I have mental health issues that I cannot afford to get treatment for, even with the rebate. I haven't updated my prescription glasses in over 5 years. I am stressed constantly. I feel isolated, judged and incredibly alone…

Nobody wants to hire a person who looks dishevelled and malnourished…

I would rather have a job and support myself than to live like I do now.5

2.7 Mr Shae Dwyer, a young man who works in the kitchen at Northern Community Church of Christ, located in inner Melbourne, spoke about the barriers to employment he faces:

I'm someone who really wants to work. I've got qualifications. But one of my barriers is not driving, not having a licence—which is somewhat understandable, but there's public transport. I'm reliable. I'm never late to

3 As at 30 December 2018. Department of Jobs and Small Business, jobactive Caseload Data -

September 2015 to December 2018,

http://lmip.gov.au/default.aspx?LMIP/Downloads/EmploymentRegion (accessed 3 February 2019).

4 Ms Jaki Wilson, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 48.

5 Name Withheld, Submission 82, pp. 3-4.

work—my Work for the Dole—always on time, and I get knocked back just because I don't drive. I had a call not long ago and was asked a list of questions by someone who called me up for a job I applied for. The last question was, 'Do you drive?' And they said that they don't need me, just because of that…

I know that getting a job first is hard enough. I want to get a job first so I have the money to get a car and pay for lessons, because I don't know anyone that can really teach me, even if I did. There is the cost of running a car and everything—I can barely afford to live as it is—and paying rent before I can think of getting a car. So, really, I need work before I can get my licence and get a car. I could get my licence, but I wouldn't be able to drive and it would make things a lot harder…

Job agencies are not connecting well enough with the places that are set up for people to go to and work for the dole. They're not connecting enough to know exactly what kind of work people are doing and exactly where to place them. I've got a set amount of jobs to apply for each month; that's 20. I even have to apply for some jobs that I don't necessarily want to do, and even my job provider will apply for jobs for me at places I don't necessarily want to work at.6

2.8 Ms Kim Pendlebury, a jobactive participant who works at the op-shop and in the office at Northern Community Church of Christ, gave evidence about her frustrations with jobactive:

I think there are many frustrations associated with being a jobseeker these days, especially being an older jobseeker, like dealing with job service providers whose main interest, despite what we're told, I believe, is not helping you but ensuring their own pockets are fully lined with the cash they receive for their services. Why is it that the JSP [Job Service Provider] is still paid an amount by the Commonwealth when you source your own employment independently? I can understand their getting paid if they referred you for a role which you then get, but how is it fair if an external agency has done all the legwork and they get the credit for it—and I've heard that that is the case.

Also, the high staff turnover within the JSPs is often incredibly frustrating. You deal with one person for a few months only to be informed on one visit that they're moving on, and you've got to get to know a new consultant. I reckon that in my almost six years I've dealt with at least half-a-dozen consultants, if not more, at one agency.7

2.9 The Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU) provided the following testimonial, from a de-identified jobactive participant who works casually, about the excessive rigidity of the current system:

I was inappropriately cut off from Newstart. I had phoned to say I was unable to attend an appointment because I would be working so they cut me off. This then took more time and stress phoning the relevant

6 Mr Shae Dwyer, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, pp. 41, 45 and 46-47.

7 Ms Kim Pendlebury, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 40.

government departments to get reinstated... As I have casual work I often have to try to reschedule appointments but there is no flexibility and I always just get another appointment automatically set for me without checking with me to see if I can make it, which almost always I cannot... I have had increasing amounts of work but the agency wanted me to come in every week for an hour at their designated time irrespective of my change in circ*mstances. It seems the only way to stop these job providers from trying to harass me is to turn down work so I can jump through their inflexible hoops that don't lead me to employment anyhow. I have been bullied, and I don't use that word lightly, by an agency trying to make me sign a job plan that was not suitable for my circ*mstances.8

2.10 Mr Michael Smart, a creative artist who lived and worked in the United States for several years, gave evidence to the committee. He has been unemployed for five years after moving back to Australia. Mr Smart informed the committee that he was badly injured whilst completing Work for the Dole:

I am a creative artist—a graphic web designer, photographer, videographer, writer and musician. I have an associate degree in visual communications and social sciences, which is basically a fancy way of saying IT and graphic design. I have worked in multiple industries: building, construction, warehousing, forklift operator, furnace cleanout, building maintenance—pretty much, you name it and I've been there.

Three years ago I suffered an injury during Work for the Dole activities. I have suffered major mobility issues. Basically, my life has been destroyed and I'm a shadow of my former self. I have a chronic pain condition. I have mobility issues and I now walk with a cane and my partner now takes care of me...9

2.11 Mr Smart explained the catastrophic impact of his injury on his physical and mental health:

I have had a diagnosis of disc herniation, disc protrusion and nerve impingement. It has given me sciatica and loss of bowel and bladder sensation. I have internal bleeding. I pass blood with every bowel movement. I also have abnormal straightening of the cervical spine in my neck and possible radiculopathy, which causes nerve pain through my shoulder and numbness and tingling in my left hand. And I don't sleep anymore. With my first injury, I fell down a retaining wall. I reported it. I thought I was okay. I kept working into the next week. I lifted a heavily loaded wheelbarrow and a sharp shooting pain went up my spine and dropped me down on my knees. Pretty much from that point on, I have been losing the ability to walk. I thought I would lose my legs. I was going to end my life, if not for my partner at the time. I ended up getting a walking aid. I have basically been my own physiotherapist, my own doctor and my own psychologist since this occurred, because there is no WorkCover under the Work for the Dole program. Basically, I have taken out advance payments to pay for my own specialists and waited six to

8 Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), Submission 27, p. 43.

9 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 49.

eight months in between. And there have been issues. I've had to continue getting medical certificates to sustain the new exemption since my condition was neither stabilised or treated. It is classed as permanent and I have been told I am going to be dealing with this for the rest of my life. So it has been pretty catastrophic to my life. I am basically a different person because of this. I have had to learn to live within limitations. It has been pretty catastrophic.10

2.12 Ms Tracey Ashmore, a jobactive participant and advocacy officer for the AUWU, gave evidence to the committee about the calls she receives from other participants. These include calls from participants who are suicidal:

I hear a lot of stories. People call me each week about the struggle—not only struggling to survive on Newstart but the added pressure and abuse that is dealt to them by the job service providers, these agencies who don't even help us find work. In fact they hinder us. Their unrealistic demands don't take into account our location or our circ*mstances. They don't consider our goals. For instance, somebody might have started studies in something, and they'll cancel that because they want them to go off into some other area. All I can say is that call after call that I've received as an advocacy officer is the same story over and over. People are driven into severe depression. I'm talking to people who want to kill themselves because they feel like they're worthless. I can honestly say, from my own experience, that I know that feeling. That's why I became an advocacy officer.

Years ago I started an apprenticeship. This was through a job agency. As a mature-age woman, this was quite an achievement for me. It was like a dream come true. I'm going to be a chef. I can start to see my future. I'm excited about this and I'm so passionate because I really want this to work. They changed the cook to someone who was not qualified to train me. Instead of finding me another restaurant to carry on my apprenticeship, the job service provider made me cancel my apprenticeship and hand in all my cooking tools and equipment and my uniform. When I questioned them on this, they said it was because the restaurant is happy to keep me on as a kitchen hand. Can you imagine what that did to me?11

2.13 Mr Thomas Studans, a jobactive participant from New South Wales, provided the following evidence about how his job search requirements do not reflect his circ*mstances or how he finds work:

I have major depressive, anxiety and panic disorders so assessed by a range of treating professionals, which limit my ability to participate in the labour market as it exists. However, the biggest obstacles I have faced in accessing this market comes not from my mental illness, but the Employment Services industry itself…

Frequently, the jobs that I apply for to satisfy Centrelink or 'jobactive' requirements are unrelated to the real and measurable work that I do, because it pays cash, or because Employment Services or Centrelink

10 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 52.

11 Ms Tracey Ashmore, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, pp. 53-54.

doesn't see it as 'a real job'. This arrangement is inflexible, and doesn't take into account realities of the modern labour market, let alone for those with severe mental illness who have to make do.12

2.14 Mr Jeremy Poxon, a jobactive participant from Melbourne, provided the following evidence about the severe consequences of being unable to reschedule an appointment due to casual work:

A few weeks ago, I was cut off my payments for “failing to attend an appointment” with my agent. I was unable to attend that appointment, because I had been called in, last minute, to work a shift at my casual job--a job I got, mind you, without any help from a job agent. I tried to call and call my agency but nobody there every answers the phone. (I brought this up at a later date and my [Job Services Provider] said they’re too understaffed to answer the phones). Because I couldn’t get through to re-schedule my appointment (i.e. my compliance demand) I received a text message to say that I was immediately stripped of payments.13

2.15 According to Mr Joel Reynolds, another jobactive participant, jobactive is unhelpful and actually gets in the way of finding employment:

I have been on Newstart for around 2 years, and my job agency has done little to nothing to help me find work. My appointments and obligations they make me do are more pointless busy work that is a waste of time then anything helpful.

They are almost always late when I go to appointments. Between 15 mins to an hour, as well as every time I go to an appointment, I see a different person, and most of my time there is spent repeating basic information about myself and my work history that I have told them at every other appointment. This is on top of once being cut off of my payment for being 10 minutes late to my job agency due to issues with buses, then having to spend 3 hours going between there and centrelink to get it back on, both of them insisting it is the others responsibility.

Any courses I have done through my agency has not been in the fields of work I have experience in, despite my requests.

They offered no help in the cost of transport to get to my obligations, nor did they help at all with my required work for the dole, which I organised myself in order to get further experience in work I have already done, rather than the work for the [dole] site they tried to make me do.

I have found them to be pointless and more of a hindrance to finding work than anything else.14

2.16 Ms Karen Jennings, a jobactive participant, described the challenges of balancing jobactive requirements with casual employment:

The main issue I had with my job active provider (I’m now with a different one) is that they did not consult with me, when doing a new assessment

12 Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, pp. 1-2.

13 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Submission 34, p. 1.

14 Mr Joel Reynolds, Submission 37, p. 1.

for my updated job active pathway plan, as to what days I was working, hours, etc, as to what works best with me when attending the job activities at their office. This had resulted in my Newstart payments suspended several times, after I’d called in to let them know the day before, sometimes 2-3 days before, that I was unable to attend, due to work commitments. They had me down in their job activity plan, to attend 3 days a week, 2 hours each time, when I was already doing a 13-14 hour week of work every week. Their job activities consist of sitting at one of their computers doing “job research.” Either that, or it’s go on a Work For The Dole Activity Program, I was told by them, which I’d done twice before in the past few years. I’m 49 years of age now and this is just ridiculous. These job activity requirements need to be consistent with the job seeker and made to fit in with their working schedules (for those already working).15

2.17 The following heart-breaking account of a participant's first day doing Work for the Dole was provided to the committee:

I believe they think I am crying because of how long it took me to get there, as this is all I have told them so far. In fact I am crying because the pervasive sense that I can’t get a job, therefore nobody wants to pay me to do anything, therefore I have no value to my society, therefore I am worthless, has just been experientially confirmed.16

2.18 A 57 year old jobactive participant from Western Australia who has worked the majority of her life, felt as though she was treated like a ‘dole bludger’:

I have been unemployed since 2014 and have had four different Job Search Providers due to them losing their contracts for not meeting the so-called Government Targets. I have received no assistance at all from them except to jump through hoops. I am currently doing a Cert 3 in Business course as part of my work for the dole program, yet it will not help me get a job at all. The JSP has admitted it is just to meet the Government idea of earning my unemployment benefit. I am now 57 years old and have worked the majority of my life paying taxes, and I am now treated like a dole bludger who does not want to work. For four years, I have been applying for 20 jobs per month and have not had one interview.17

2.19 Ms Kylie Wright, an employment services consultant from a remote area of Tasmania, provided the following account about the deleterious consequences of jobactive for a young participant:

We have in our midst a dynamic young fellow (aged 23) who is working hard for youth engagement through his volunteer work at our local Neighbourhood House. He is a Youth advisor on the Neighbourhood House Tasmania committee , and is also employed in a part time paid role within the house through it's thrive program. He also recently stood for local Council and is on the Youth Advisory committee for local Council.

15 Ms Karen Jennings, Submission 77, p. 1.

16 Confidential, Submission 148, p. 5.

17 Name Withheld, Submission 97, p. 1.

He is also studying part time. His job service provider demanded that he take on a low paid traineeship, which would have prevented his involvement in the important work he is doing in youth services in our community, plus lost his position on the board, and his paid role, which will ultimately lead him to working with the community in an area that he is passionate. He would also have had to cease his study, which he travels to Launceston for. His provider insisted that he take on this traineeships, and when he refused to, he was penalized by his provider and cut off his centrelink payments, and forced to re-apply after a waiting period of 4 to 6 weeks, and has been forced to live on his meager income of just $300 per fortnight. This to me is disgraceful. The traineeship would never have lead him to sustainable long term employment as his current work will, and he should never have been forced into this situation. He has his future mapped out for himself. He stuck to his guns and stood up for what he knows is right for this community and was penalised for it. Despite the manager of the Neighbourhood House writing to an appeal for him. He is still waiting on the outcome of the appeal. He has been without any Centrelink assistance for more than 8 weeks now.18

2.20 These personal experiences demonstrate that many jobactive participants feel punished by the program, rather than assisted and supported to find long-term and meaningful employment. These issues are explored in more detail throughout this report.

18 Ms Kylie Wright, Supplementary Submission 71.1, p. 1.

Chapter 3 Background

Australia’s employment services caseload continues to feature a high proportion of job seekers with low educational attainment, low levels of literacy (digital and language)/numeracy and no post-secondary qualification. Economic and social observers alike predict the technological revolution will increase in momentum. As such, those already displaced, face greater barriers to securing work; with less skilled workers likely to experience the most significant displacement and risk of long-term unemployment as technology continues to change the nature of work.1

Overview 3.1 Australia has a strong and dynamic labour market which provides the backdrop for this inquiry into jobactive. Despite the recent growth in employment, challenges remain: wage growth has been stagnant and the rise

of non-standard employment means more Australians are likely to move in and out of the employment services system.

3.2 This chapter is structured according to the following topics:

ï Australia's labour market ï Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia ï Methods by which Australians gain employment ï Employment services in Australia: an outsourced model ï Consultation with unemployed workers

3.3 The committee's recommendations are set out throughout the chapter.

Australia's labour market 3.4 While the Australian economy has experienced a record-breaking period of growth, it is also fundamentally changing, with some industries and occupations expanding while others shrink. In the current labour market, more

Australians are likely to change jobs and careers more often.2 As noted in a recent Senate inquiry into the future of work, one of the clearest trends impacting the workforce is the ageing population.3 Another major change to the labour market is the rise of non-standard employment arrangements,

1 National Employment Services Association (NESA), Submission 54, p. 6.

2 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/next-generation-employment-services-discussion-paper (accessed 4 February 2019), p. 6 (all references are to the word version).

3 Senate Select Committee on the Future of Work and Workers, Hope is not a strategy—our shared

responsibility for the future of work and workers, September 2018, p. 6.

including the gig-economy.4 In addition, structural changes to the labour market over past decades have resulted in the loss of employment opportunities for many low-skilled workers:

…the share of the low-skilled jobs which many unemployed people seek is gradually shrinking, and those jobs are increasingly offered on a part-time or casual basis...5

3.5 Despite these changes, most Australians are able to participate in the labour market without government assistance. The proportion of working age Australians in employment today is higher than at almost any other time in the nation's history.6 At the time of writing, 670 900 people are unemployed in Australia. The unemployment rate in Australia is five per cent, the lowest since early 2012.7

3.6 However, some submitters pointed out that the definition of 'employed' used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) captures persons who worked for as little as one hour in the reference week.8 One submitter noted that 'unemployment figures may be quite unrelated to the reality of living for many people'.9 The Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU) suggested that:

Counting people as employed when they work as little as one hour per week is so inadequate a measure that huge reductions in the aggregate number of hours people are working can appear as an increase in jobs and employment, particularly when permanent full-time work fragments into casual and part-time jobs.10

3.7 In addition to the official unemployment figures, there is some spare capacity in Australia's labour market. As at December 2018, there were an estimated 1.1 million underemployed workers (persons who are not fully employed and want, and are available for, more hours of work).11 The National Employment

4 Senate Select Committee on the Future of Work and Workers, Hope is not a strategy—our shared

responsibility for the future of work and workers, September 2018, p. 65.

5 Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment,

September 2018, p. 5.

6 Senate Select Committee on the Future of Work and Workers, Hope is not a strategy—our shared

responsibility for the future of work and workers, September 2018, p. 3.

7 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Labour Force, Australia, December 2018, cat. no. 6202.0,

24 January 2019.

8 See for example, Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), Submission 27, p. 6; and

Mr Marcus L'Estrange, Submission 44, pp. 4-5.

9 Dr Arthur Chesterfield-Evans, Submission 60, p. 3.

10 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 6.

11 ABS, Labour Force, Australia, December 2018, cat. no. 6202.0, 24 January 2019.

Services Association (NESA) pointed out that the proportion of underemployed workers is growing:

Of all working Australians, 8.8% (approximately 1.1 million workers) are underemployed, growing from an estimated 6.6% a decade ago.12

3.8 Individuals who are considered by the ABS as not in the labour force are not counted for the purposes of determining the rate of unemployment. NESA described these people as the 'hidden jobless':

…it is incumbent on policy makers to look beyond headline data to ensure its policy responses recognise the full extent and circ*mstances of jobless Australians, who want work but cannot find it.13

3.9 However, it should be noted that not all people categorised as not in the labour force want to work and some are unable to, for example, due to full-time study or caring responsibilities.14

3.10 Australia's long-term unemployment15 rate sits at 1.2 per cent—which amounts to about 24 per cent of all unemployed people. This rate is below Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) averages.16 However, according to NESA, long-term unemployment is a 'significant and growing problem, particularly given the exclusion of the hidden jobless in these figures'.17 Similarly, Social Ventures Australia suggested that Australia's low unemployment rate obscures the problem of long-term unemployment.18

3.11 Further information on demographic and employment trends in Australia and the impact of technology on work is available in a recent report by the Senate Select Committee on the Future of Work and Workers.19 The following section considers the causes of joblessness in Australia.

Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia 3.12 Joblessness is a broad term, capturing unemployed persons and persons not in the labour force.20 There is a large amount of commentary and analysis on the

12 NESA, Submission 54, p. 4 (citations omitted).

13 NESA, Submission 54, p. 4 (emphasis in original).

14 ABS, Labour Force Statistics: Concepts, Sources and Methods, February 2018, cat. no. 6102.0.55.001,

19 September 2018.

15 A person is considered long-term unemployed if they are unemployed for 12 months or more.

16 ABS, Labour force, Australia, Detailed, electronic delivery, December 2018, cat. no. 6291.0.55.001,

31 January 2019.

17 NESA, Submission 54, p. 4.

18 Social Ventures Australia, Submission 42, Attachment 1, p. 3 (citations omitted).

19 Senate Select Committee on the Future of Work and Workers, Hope is not a strategy—our shared

responsibility for the future of work and workers, September 2018, pp. 3-58.

20 NESA, Submission 54, p. 3.

causes of unemployment and underemployment in Australia and the issues that contribute to joblessness.21 Explanations for joblessness usually take two forms: the first form concentrates on economic drivers of unemployment, whilst the second explanation considers why particular groups are more vulnerable to unemployment than others. This chapter provides a brief overview of the factors contributing to joblessness in Australia.

Economic drivers of unemployment 3.13 The Reserve Bank categorises unemployment according to three main types: cyclical, structural and frictional unemployment. In practice these types of unemployment can overlap.22 Cyclical unemployment refers to trends in the

business cycle that generally occur over the medium term:

During an economic downturn, a shortfall of demand for goods and services results in a lack of jobs being available for those who want to work. Businesses experiencing weaker demand might reduce the amount of people they employ by laying off existing workers, or hiring fewer new workers. As a result, people looking for work will also find it harder to become employed.23

3.14 In contrast, structural unemployment relates to a mismatch in skills and can be longer lasting:

Structural unemployment occurs when there is a mismatch between the jobs that are available and the people looking for work. This mismatch could be because jobseekers don’t have the skills required to do the available jobs, or because the available jobs are a long way from the jobseekers.24

3.15 Frictional unemployment is generally shorter and occurs when people move between jobs or when people move in and out of the work force:

…people may not find jobs immediately and need to invest time and effort in searching for the right job. Businesses also spend time searching for suitable candidates to fill job vacancies. As a result, people looking for jobs are not matched immediately with vacancies and may experience a period of temporary unemployment.25

3.16 Submissions to this inquiry emphasised competition for jobs as a major cause of joblessness. According to the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), there is only one job available for every eight applicants who are unemployed

21 UnitingCare Australia, Submission 24, p. 3.

22 Reserve Bank of Australia, Unemployment: Its Measurement and Types,

www.rba.gov.au/education/resources/explainers/pdf/unemployment-its-measurement-and-types.pdf?v=2019-01-14-09-47-14 (accessed 10 January 2019), p. 4.

23 Reserve Bank of Australia, Unemployment: Its Measurement and Types, p. 4.

24 Reserve Bank of Australia, Unemployment: Its Measurement and Types, p. 4.

25 Reserve Bank of Australia, Unemployment: Its Measurement and Types, p. 5.

or underemployed.26 As at February 2018, 89 per cent of unemployed Australians reported having difficulty finding work. The main reason given as a barrier to finding work was 'too many applicants for available jobs'.27 Other prominent reasons included: 'insufficient work experience', 'own ill health or disability', 'lacked necessary skills or education' and 'no vacancies in line of work'.28

3.17 NESA submitted that a central cause of involuntary joblessness is the balance of supply and demand for labour.29 In September 2018, ACOSS reported that growth in jobs was 'almost stagnant' from the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 to 2017, with many new jobs being part-time.30 More recently there has been a slight increase in trend employment of 2.3 per cent over 2018 (above the average year-on-year growth of two per cent over the past 20 years).31

3.18 ACOSS pointed out that the relatively low rate of unemployment does not mean it is easy for job seekers to find work:

In May 2018 there were 723,700 people unemployed (5.4% of the labour force)… this does not mean it is easy for unemployed people to secure paid work. For instance, another 1,102,700 (8.3% of the labour force) were under-employed (employed part-time and seeking more paid hours).

Altogether, in May 2018, there were eight unemployed or under-employed people for every job vacancy, down from ten a year earlier. When employed people changing jobs are added in, the number applying for each vacancy almost doubles (for example, to 16 in 2016).32

3.19 Additionally, ACOSS suggested that casualisation and the gradual reduction in low-skilled work means 'more people are cycling between unemployment payments and jobs'.33

26 ACOSS, Getting a job on Newstart is harder than you think, 14 September 2018,

www.acoss.org.au/media_release/getting-a-job-on-newstart-is-harder-than-you-think/#_edn1 (accessed 9 January 2019).

27 ABS, Participation, Job Search and Mobility, Australia, February 2018, ABS cat. no. 6226.0,

22 March 2018.

28 ABS, Participation, Job Search and Mobility, Australia, February 2018, ABS cat. no. 6226.0,

22 March 2018.

29 NESA, Submission 54, p. 5.

30 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ACOSS_JA_Faces-of-Unemployment_14-September-2018_web.pdf (accessed 3 January 2019), p. 4.

31 ABS, Labour force, Australia, December 2018, cat. No. 6262.0, 24 January 2019.

32 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, p. 5.

33 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, p. 5.

Barriers to employment for certain groups 3.20 During the inquiry, a number of stakeholders emphasised the specific barriers to employment experienced by particular groups. Certain groups are more vulnerable to unemployment and underemployment, based on factors such as

education, skills, health, disability, place of residence, access to transport, and employer discrimination.

3.21 The varying rate of employment across different regions is well documented. In this regard, Jesuit Social Services observed that 'complex and entrenched disadvantage continues to be experienced by a small but persistent number of locations in each state and territory across Australia'.34 For example, the area of Brimbank in Melbourne's west has an unemployment rate of 10.3 per cent,35 which is well above Victorian and national averages.36 The unemployment rate in outback Queensland is even higher, at 13.6 per cent.37

3.22 According to ACOSS and Jobs Australia, the groups most at risk of long-term unemployment include:

ï mature age job seekers; ï people with disability; ï principal carers of children; ï people of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander background; ï people residing outside metropolitan areas; and ï people of culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds.38

3.23 ACOSS and Jobs Australia reported that there are three main reasons for the entrenched unemployment of the above cohorts:

First, the profile of recipients of these payments [Newstart and Youth Allowance] has become more disadvantaged. One reason for this is as unemployment falls (it is much lower than it was after the recession in 1991), those who are less disadvantaged in the labour market find jobs more quickly, leaving behind the more disadvantaged groups.

Another reason…is the growing share of unemployment payment recipients who would previously have received pension payments: people with disabilities and sole parents with school age children. The welfare ‘reforms’ of the mid 2000s and 2010s were designed to boost workforce

34 Jesuit Social Services, Submission 57, p. 4.

35 As at September 2018. Department of Jobs and Small Business, LGA Data tables — Small Area

Labour Markets — September quarter 2018, 18 January 2019, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/lga-data-tables-small-area-labour-markets-september-quarter-2018 (accessed 9 February 2019).

36 Victorian Council of Social Service, Submission 49, p. 4.

37 ABS, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, electronic delivery, December 2018, cat. no. 6291.0.55.001,

31 January 2019.

38 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, p. 4.

participation, but in many cases they simply shifted people from higher to lower social security payments…

Second…Australia under-invests in employment services for people who struggle to secure paid employment.

Third, the labour market has changed so that jobs that were previously available to people with similar characteristics to today’s recipients of unemployment payment (especially those with lower qualifications and skills) are either harder to get, or harder to keep.39

3.24 UnitingCare Australia submitted that in addition to the factors identified by ACOSS and Jobs Australia, further barriers to employment include:

ï lack of technical and professional skills and education; ï lack of prior work experience; ï feelings of discouragement, poor confidence and motivation; and ï the inappropriate or unsuitable nature of work opportunities available, with

regard to flexibility of working arrangements, hours offered, and lacking flexibility to balance work with family commitments.40

3.25 UnitingCare categorised these barriers to employment as follows:

Human capital barriers such as inadequate skills, education, experience and training. This also includes lack of work experience, poor work history, inadequate education, inadequate qualifications and skills, and not finding work that is suited to individuals’ skills and experiences;

Personal barriers such as poor confidence, discouragement and not knowing how to go about finding work, and

Unsuitability and lack of work available.41

3.26 A 2017 OECD report into joblessness in Australia found that long-term unemployed individuals were potentially constrained from full participation in the labour market by one or more barriers:

Australia has a substantial group of out-of-work individuals that could benefit from targeted labour market activation policy interventions. These persistently unemployed or inactive individuals, as well as workers with very low work intensity, are potentially constrained from (fully) participating in the labour market by one or multiple employment barriers.

39 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, p. 10 (emphasis in original).

40 UnitingCare Australia, Submission 24, pp. 4-5.

41 UnitingCare Australia, Submission 24, p. 5 (emphasis in original).

Many of the individuals with no, or weak, labour-market attachment have low levels of employability because of lack of work experience or because of existing care responsibilities or health limitations, while others might lack motivation because of high levels of non-labour income or replacement benefits. Understanding the combination of employment barriers that individuals are facing is crucial for targeting and tailoring successful activation policies.42

3.27 The OECD report categorised barriers to employment in terms of motivation, employability and opportunities:

Lack of motivation: Benefits may reduce the financial incentive to look for a job, e.g. because of low potential pay, relatively generous out-of-work benefits (and potentially missing mutual obligations), or access to high levels of income independent of their own work effort.

Employability barriers: Even motivated jobseekers may struggle to find work due to a lack of skills, limited work experience, care responsibilities and health-related limitations.

Scarce job opportunities: Bringing more people into employment requires addressing demand-side barriers like a shortage of vacancies in the relevant labour market segment, frictions in the labour market due to information asymmetries, or discrimination in the workplace.43

3.28 Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, the OECD report found that the most common barriers for people that are long-term unemployed or weakly attached to the labour market are low relative work experience, low skills, and health limitations. Other barriers included care responsibilities and high levels of non-labour income.44

3.29 A number of submitters also emphasised that many disadvantaged individuals experience multiple barriers to employment, which can compound employment issues.45 For example, Mr Kevin Piggot, a member of the AUWU from Perth, gave evidence about the barriers faced by his wife. His wife has a hearing disability, sciatica in the left leg and severe anxiety. Mr Piggot said

42 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Connecting people with jobs: key

issues for raising labour market participation in Australia, OECD Publishing, Paris, www.oecd.org/australia/connecting-people-with-jobs-key-issues-for-raising-labour-market-participation-in-australia-9789264269637-en.htm (accessed 3 February 2019), p. 43 (emphasis in original).

43 OECD, Connecting people with jobs: key issues for raising labour market participation in Australia, OECD

Publishing, Paris, p. 47.

44 OECD, Connecting people with jobs: key issues for raising labour market participation in Australia, OECD

Publishing, Paris, p. 50.

45 See for example, Youth Action, Submission 56, p. 10; and Mr Kevin Piggot, Member, AUWU; and

private capacity, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 14.

that his wife’s experience of trying to find work had taught him ‘just how much harder life is for people with disabilities’.46

3.30 The OECD's analysis of joblessness in Australia found that that 'individuals often face more than one barrier to employment'.47 The OECD report identified seven distinct clusters of individuals with no or weak labour market attachment:

ï low education women with limited work experience and health limitations; ï experienced early retirees with health limitations; ï mothers with care responsibilities and few other employment obstacles; ï underemployed workers with weak work incentives; ï long term unemployed with limited work experience and low education; ï women with limited work experience living in higher-income households;

and

ï mothers with multiple employment obstacles.48

3.31 Some of the main barriers to employment for particular groups are discussed below in more detail. These are only a sample of the many barriers people face.

Youth 3.32 Youth in Australia have higher unemployment rates compared to adults and are more likely to bear the brunt of economic downturns. Young people are overrepresented in relation to unemployment and also underemployment

rates. Young people are also more likely to experience long-term unemployment.49 The rate of youth unemployment in Australia is 11.3 per cent, more than twice that of the general population.50 The rate of youth underemployment is 17.4 per cent.51 Currently, about 629 900 young Australians are unemployed or underemployed, which is approximately 19.5 per cent of the youth population.52

3.33 In the last two years there has been some improvement in the youth labour market: the trend unemployment rate for youth aged 15-24 years has fallen

46 Mr Kevin Piggot, Member, AUWU; and private capacity, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019,

p. 14.

47 OECD, Connecting people with jobs: key issues for raising labour market participation in Australia, OECD

Publishing, Paris, p. 56.

48 OECD, Connecting people with jobs: key issues for raising labour market participation in Australia, OECD

Publishing, Paris, p. 57.

49 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Australian Jobs 2018, May 2018, p. 3.

50 ABS, Labour force, Australia, December 2018, cat. no. 6262.0, 24 January 2019.

51 ABS, Labour force, Australia, December 2018, cat. no. 6262.0, 24 January 2019.

52 ABS, Labour force, Australia, December 2018, cat. no. 6262.0, 24 January 2019; ABS, Australian

Demographic Statistics, June 2018, cat. no. 3101.0, 20 December 2018.

from 13 per cent in September 2016 to 11.3 per cent in December 2018.53 However, youth unemployment rates are higher in certain areas, such as the Southern highlands and Shoalhaven in New South Wales.54

3.34 A 2017 report by the Brotherhood of St Laurence found that youth underemployment was at its highest level in 40 years. When the report was released in 2017, the rate of youth underemployment for 15-24 year olds was 18 per cent.55

3.35 Young people are overrepresented in jobactive. People aged 15-24 make up about 12.9 per cent of the general population.56 However, there are approximately 114 800 young people (aged 15-24) on the jobactive caseload, representing around 18 per cent of the total caseload.57

3.36 Youth Action emphasised the disproportionate impact of several dominant economic developments on young Australians:

Young people today are navigating new and different challenges to past generations. The employment context for young people today is challenging. Increasing rates of underemployment, the rise of casual and insecure work, as well as automation and globalisation have impacted young people significantly. This is coupled with a reduction in the number of entry-level positions and apprenticeships, with less than 1% of jobs advertised with no experience necessary.58

3.37 Importantly, youth unemployment trends are not explained by rising participation in education and training.59

Mature age workers 3.38 Barriers to employment for mature age job seekers vary substantially depending on the circ*mstances of the individual. The reduced workforce participation of mature age Australians can be explained by factors such as

weaker financial incentives to work, reduced job opportunities due to age discrimination and less access to training and development opportunities.

53 ABS, Labour force, Australia, December 2018, cat. no. 6262.0, 24 January 2019.

54 Youth Action, Submission 56, p. 10.

55 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Generation Stalled: Young, underemployed and living precariously in

Australia, March 2017,

http://library.bsl.org.au/jspui/bitstream/1/9409/1/BSL_Generation_stalled_young_underemployed_ 2017.pdf (accessed 4 February 2019), p. 2.

56 ABS, Australian Demographic Statistics, June 2018, cat. no. 3101.0, 20 December 2018.

57 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Employment region data: jobactive Caseload by selected cohorts

time series, December 2018, http://lmip.gov.au/default.aspx?LMIP/Downloads/EmploymentRegion (accessed 9 February 2019).

58 Youth Action, Submission 56, p. 9.

59 Youth Action, Submission 56, p. 10.

Some mature age workers may face employment barriers due to lower levels of education or outdated skills. For many mature age workers, disabilities and health issues can also limit employment options. For example, Mr Rod Shehan who is 54 years of age, said that his age made it increasingly difficult to find work. Mr Shehan was diagnosed with cancer in 1995 and said that his age and disability means that he has 'little hope of a good [employment] outcome in the near future'.60

3.39 As noted by Dr Kay Patterson, the Age Discrimination Commissioner, many older Australians would like to work but are unable to do so.61 The 2016 Willing to Work report by the Australian Human Rights Commission found that negative stereotypes about older people were prevalent in Australian society, and that this has an impact on the willingness of businesses to hire older workers.62 Dr Patterson reported that a survey in 2018 found that up to 30 per cent of employers are still reluctant to hire workers over a certain age, and for more than two thirds of this group, that age was over 50.63

3.40 Dr Kay Patterson highlighted that it can be harder for older people who become unemployed to find a new job, compared to younger people:

…it takes significantly longer for an older person to get a job if they are out of employment.64

3.41 According to the ABS, older job seekers have a higher median duration of job search in comparison to the average duration for all age groups. On average, people aged 55-64 years spend 36 weeks looking for work, compared to 14 weeks for all age groups.65

3.42 Older Australians also make up a significant proportion of 'discouraged job seekers', which refers to people who are willing and able to work but not actively looking for work as they believe they will not find a job. As at

60 Mr Rod Shehan, Submission 104, p. 1.

61 Dr Kay Patterson, Age Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 9.

62 Australian Human Rights Commission, Willing to Work: National Inquiry into Employment

Discrimination against Older Australians and Australians with a Disability, May 2016, p. 5.

63 Dr Kay Patterson, Age Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 10.

64 Dr Kay Patterson, Age Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 9.

65 ABS, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, electronic delivery, December 2018, cat. no. 6291.0.55.001,

31 January 2019.

February 2018, approximately half of all discouraged job seekers were aged 55 and over.66

3.43 The committee received a number of submissions from older Australians who struggled to find work. The following extract illustrates this struggle:

I am in my 50s and have aged out of the job market. Fifty is the average age where job applicants have their application binned. Worse, I have a research PhD in science. I am long-term unemployed, more than four years now; I live in poverty and my life is unending grey.

I apply for jobs but rarely hear back, when I do the reply is usually an anodyne form letter. If I get to an interview, I sense that my age is a factor; I have dyed my hair to hide the grey, but that is a shallow mask. I always seek feedback and the most usual reply is that I am ‘overqualified’ or that with my qualifications the employer thinks I would not find the job satisfying or fulfilling.67

First Nations People 3.44 First Nations people have significantly higher rates of unemployment compared to the general population and face multiple barriers to employment. In 2016, the unemployment rate for Indigenous people of working age was

18.4 per cent—2.7 times the non-Indigenous unemployment rate (which was 6.8 in 2016).68 The 2018 Closing the Gap report found that the government's target to halve the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians is not on track.69

3.45 There is a strong correlation between education attainment and employment for First Nations people.70 High incarceration rates for First Nations men also have a large impact on their employment prospects.71 Additionally, there is a strong relationship between major chronic diseases, health status, carer responsibilities, disability status and labour force participation.72 Employment

66 ABS, Participation, Job Search and Mobility, Australia, February 2018, ABS cat. no. 6226.0,

22 March 2018.

67 Confidential, Submission 131, p. 2.

68 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's Report 2018,

February 2018, p. 78.

69 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's Report 2018,

February 2018, p. 76.

70 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's Report 2017,

February 2017, p. 53.

71 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's Report 2017,

February 2017, p. 56.

72 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's Report 2017,

February 2017, pp. 56 and 61.

rates are also significantly lower in remote areas.73 There is also evidence to indicate that First Nations job seekers have lower rates of job retention.74 First Nations people also experience high rates of discrimination in the workforce. This may 'mean that some Indigenous Australians decrease their labour supply in order to avoid potentially adverse (discriminatory) situations'.75

3.46 Around two thirds of all First Nations job seekers receiving Commonwealth employment assistance participate in the jobactive program.76 First Nations people make up around 2.8 per cent of Australia’s population,77 but make up 11.3 per cent of the jobactive caseload.78

People with disability 3.47 There are a number of barriers to employment for people with disability, although these barriers vary depending on the nature of the person's disability and other factors. For example, people with disability often have increased

costs associated with education and employment participation, in addition to everyday expenses.79

3.48 The loss of many low-skill employment opportunities over past decades has had a disproportionate impact on people with disability who on average have lower education levels, compared to the general population.80 People with disability also often experience discrimination in the workforce.81 Employers

73 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's Report 2017,

February 2017, p. 54.

74 Matthew Gray, Boyd Hunter and Shaun Lohoar, Increasing Indigenous employment rates, Issues

paper no. 3, Closing the Gap Clearinghouse, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare/Australian Institute of Family Studies, March 2012, www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/71bb346a-1b83-4038-a2f7-647e65a21445/ctg-ip03.pdf.aspx?inline=true (accessed 4 February 2019), p. 12.

75 Nicholas Biddle, Monica Howlett et al., 'Labour Market and Other Discrimination Facing

Indigenous Australians', Australian Journal of Labour Economics, vol. 16, no. 1, 2013, pp. 91-113.

76 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's Report 2018,

February 2018, p. 82.

77 ABS, 2016 Census QuickStats, 23 October 2017,

http://quickstats.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2016/quickstat/036?ope ndocument (accessed 9 February 2019).

78 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Employment region data: jobactive Caseload by selected cohorts

time series, December 2018.

79 Sophie Mitra, Michael Palmer et al., 'Extra costs of living with a disability: A review and agenda

for research', Disability and Health Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, 2017, pp. 475-484.

80 OECD, Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers, OECD, Paris, 2010, p. 27.

81 Australian Human Rights Commission, Willing to Work: National Inquiry into Employment

Discrimination against Older Australians and Australians with Disability, May 2016, pp. 169-186.

can also be ignorant of disability issues, which can operate as a barrier to workforce participation.82

3.49 In 2015, only 53.4 per cent of people with disability were working or actively looking for work. In comparison, 83.2 per cent of people with no reported disability were working or actively looking for work.83

3.50 Aspergers Victoria highlighted the specific barriers that people with Aspergers experience, despite their 'higher-than-average IQ, specialised knowledge and often extraordinary creative talent and productivity'.84 These barriers include challenges with communication and social skills and also difficulty adapting to change.85

Migrants and refugees 3.51 The Settlement Council of Australia submitted that 'new Australians from a migrant and/or refugee background represent some (though clearly not all) of the most vulnerable job seekers'.86 As a result, they 'encounter significant

difficulty in entering the Australian labour market'.87 The Settlement Council described the barriers to employment experienced by this group:

It is accepted that overall, it takes time for newly arrived migrants to achieve the same levels of labour market engagement as persons born in Australia. Similarly, within the broader class of migrants, different groups, such as migrants from a refugee background, report lower levels of economic participation than others. This is a result of a number of different factors that impact a migrant’s employability and economic independence on their arrival in Australia, including lack of Australian work experience, difficulties in obtaining skills assessments and challenges faced as they develop their English language skills.

Research clearly demonstrates that migrants, including those from a refugee background, possess a strong desire to work and a resourcefulness and resilience which is fundamental to long term job outcomes. However, the settlement process is complex and highly variable, meaning that not every new Australian is ready to start job-hunting immediately upon their arrival in Australia.88

82 Australian Human Rights Commission, Willing to Work: National Inquiry into Employment

Discrimination against Older Australians and Australians with Disability, May 2016, pp. 187-199.

83 ABS, Disability, Ageing and Carers, Australia: Summary of Findings, 2015, cat. no. 4430.0,

18 October 2016.

84 Aspergers Victoria, Submission 36, p. 1.

85 Aspergers Victoria, Submission 36, p. 1.

86 Settlement Council of Australia, Submission 30, p. 2.

87 Settlement Council of Australia, Submission 30, p. 2.

88 Settlement Council of Australia, Submission 30, p. 2.

3.52 According to the Refugee Council of Australia, longstanding barriers to employment for refugees include de-skilling, a lack of opportunities to attain relevant Australian work experience, and difficulties in the recognition of prior qualifications and experiences.89

Mental health issues 3.53 People with mental health issues experience multiple and significant barriers to participation in employment. According to Beyondblue, these barriers include:

…issues specific to the nature of mental illness; stigma and discrimination; the perceptions, attitudes and understanding of employers; and structural issues associated with poorly coordinated services and financial disincentives to participate in work.90

3.54 The committee heard from submitters with mental health issues. For example, Mr Thomas Studans, who is 27 years of age, noted that his major depressive, anxiety and panic disorders limit his ability to participate in the labour market. Mr Studans also noted that mistreatment in employment caused further harm to his mental state.91

Women 3.55 The barriers to employment for women vary considerably according to their circ*mstances. Barriers to employment are amplified for women 'who have increased experiences of discrimination and reduced agency'.92 This includes

women with disabilities, women who are ethnically, culturally, or linguistically diverse, and First Nations women.93

3.56 Single mothers face particular difficulties participating in the workforce, especially if they have minimal or no assistance with unpaid work duties. Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ) interviewed 26 single mothers about their experience of the employment services system. GSANZ reported that the women they interviewed 'expressed the difficulty of being both the sole provider for their household and sole parent to their children'.94 In this regard, GSANZ submitted that:

89 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 2.

90 Beyondblue, Mental Health and Workforce Participation Submission, April 2011,

www.beyondblue.org.au/docs/default-source/policy-submissions/bw0100-policy-submission---mental-health-and-workforce-participation.pdf?sfvrsn=cb4fa9e9_2 (accessed 5 February 2019), p. 2.

91 Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, p. 1.

92 Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ), Submission 47, p. 12.

93 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 12.

94 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 10.

For single mothers, the lack of supportive policies to ensure a safe and effective method for collecting child support is a critical barrier to their economic security.95

3.57 Women disproportionately experience all forms of intimate partner violence, which includes physical, sexual and psychological attacks and economic coercion.96 In addition to having a detrimental impact on the physical and mental health of women, intimate partner violence can operate as a barrier to employment:

Experiences of intimate partner violence therefore leads to reductions in women’s ability to engage in employment through a range of negative outcomes, which can include ongoing reductions in physical and mental health and experiences of trauma; the need to relocate; increased days off or workplace-situated harassment from perpetrators; reduced job-ready history (including reduced access to education and/or career-track positions); and increased overall financial insecurity which leads to housing stress, lack of ready transportation, inability to pay for child care, reduced access to internet, and other deficits which make finding and engaging in paid employment challenging.97

3.58 ACOSS and Jobs Australia submitted that another barrier to employment for women relates to their economic security:

Workplace discrepancies persistently undermine women’s economic security, through the gender pay gap (currently averaging 14.6 per cent); the under-representation of women in senior and leadership roles; the high levels of women who are in precarious (casual, seasonal, insecure, and affording little or no organisational voice or decision-making) or part-time employment; and low levels of superannuation balances compared to their male counterparts.98

3.59 ACOSS and Jobs Australia also highlighted that the burden of unpaid work also continues to fall disproportionately on women. Women work more hours than men; however the majority of those hours are unpaid:

The Workplace Gender Equality Agency reports that women work a total of 56.4 hours per week—of which 64.4 per cent is unpaid work, with only 35.6 per cent of those hours paid; this compares poorly to men, who work only 55.5 hours per week—of which 36.1 per cent is unpaid, with 63.9 per cent of those hours paid.99

Long-term unemployment

95 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 11.

96 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 10.

97 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 11 (citations removed).

98 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 11 (citations removed).

99 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 11 (citations removed).

3.60 Long-term unemployment can itself be considered a barrier to employment. People who have been unemployed for a long time generally experience greater difficulty finding subsequent work. Additionally, the longer people are unemployed, the more their paid work prospects diminish.100 Reasons for this include skill depreciation, loss of motivation, screening out by employers and marginalisation from the labour market:

Long-term unemployment (defined as longer than one year unemployed) itself puts people at a disadvantage as they lack recent work experience and references, and employers often use this to screen them out of job interviews.101

3.61 Causes of long-term unemployment are diverse. Long-term unemployed people are 'more likely to belong to groups who struggle to secure paid work'.102

Committee view 3.62 The committee acknowledges that while the majority of Australians enjoy fulfilling and productive employment arrangements, headline unemployment statistics can obscure the difficulties faced by many unemployed and

underemployed Australians to find and sustain work. Further, the committee notes that securing work is particularly difficult for various categories of disadvantaged Australians who face a highly competitive labour market and often experience multiple barriers to employment. The services and support available to participants in jobactive are discussed in Chapter 5.

Methods by which Australians gain employment 3.63 Most recruitment activity in Australia occurs without the involvement of the government.103 According to the ABS, the most common methods used by unemployed Australians to find work, as at February 2018 were:

ï Looked at advertisem*nts for jobs on the Internet, in a newspaper or on notice boards (89.2 per cent). ï Wrote, phoned or applied in person to an employer for work (86.2 per cent). ï Answered an advertisem*nt for a job on the Internet, in a newspaper or on

notice boards (75.6 per cent). ï Contacted friends or relatives (51.6 per cent). ï Had an interview with an employer (42.6 per cent).104

100 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, p. 8.

101 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, p. 9.

102 ACOSS and Jobs Australia, Faces of Unemployment, September 2018, p. 9.

103 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 38.

104 ABS, Participation, Job Search and Mobility, Australia, February 2018, cat. no. 6226.0, 22 March 2018.

3.64 The ABS found that similar methods were commonly used by underemployed Australians to find work, but at lower percentages:

ï Looked at advertisem*nts for jobs on the Internet, in a newspaper or on notice boards (40.4 per cent). ï Wrote, phoned or applied in person to an employer for work (34 per cent). ï Asked current employer for more work (32 per cent). ï Answered an advertisem*nt for a job on the Internet, in a newspaper or on

notice boards (31.2 per cent). ï Contacted friends or relatives (22.6 per cent).105

3.65 Online recruitment is increasingly used by Australians as a method to gain employment. Approximately 60 per cent of job vacancies are advertised online.106 In some industries, employers are 'increasingly using social media or mobile apps as a way of connecting with potential workers'.107 The Department of Jobs and Small Business noted that:

Recruitment is increasingly being done online, with more and more job seekers and employers using a range of platforms such as SEEK and Indeed to fill jobs.108

3.66 My Pathway, a jobactive provider, observed that the increasing use of online recruitment can further disadvantage people that lack digital skills.109 NESA supported this view, highlighting research that:

…indicates that disadvantaged job seekers (e.g. unemployed job seekers who are low income and live in low-SES areas) are being ‘left behind’ and will continue to be ‘left behind’, as the Internet takes on a more significant role in the employment process.110

3.67 Despite the popularity of online recruitment, for some individuals, other methods of finding work may be more effective. A facilitator for the Career Transition Program (a pilot program), submitted that the jobactive participants they interacted with could have improved their chances of securing employment by engaging with community networks:

Given the requirement to meet jobactive obligations, this cohort applied for jobs using Seeks online system so they could manage job application records and report to their Job Search Provider accordingly, which is

105 ABS, Participation, Job Search and Mobility, Australia, February 2018, cat. no. 6226.0, 22 March 2018.

106 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 39, citing Department of Jobs and Small Business, Survey of Employers’ Recruitment Experiences 2016-17.

107 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Australian Jobs 2018, May 2018, p. 29.

108 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 5.

109 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 3.

110 NESA, Submission 54, p. 6 (emphasis and citations removed).

contrary to the way the majority of jobs are gained. During the program we looked at data showing the number of jobs that come through personal networks. It became clear to the majority of participants that they needed to make efforts to connect with networks more effectively. We explored ways to do this via volunteer work and other work in community organisations to build relationships, rapport and trust so they are in the minds of employers when job opportunities become available.111

3.68 In a similar vein, My Pathway commented that across the Tasmanian regions in which they operate 'many positions are filled through word-of-mouth, existing networks or door stopping. Most of all, employers are drawn to job seekers who demonstrate proactivity'.112

Employment services in Australia: an outsourced model 3.69 Australia is unique in its approach to public employment services. It was one of the first countries to contract out employment services and it is the 'only OECD country to outsource the entire delivery of its publicly funded

employment services'.113 In 1998 the Howard government created the Job Network, 'a fully subcontracted employment placement market', which evolved over the following decade.114 In 2009, the Job Network was replaced by Job Services Australia.115

3.70 On 1 July 2015, Job Services Australia was itself replaced by jobactive.116 The Department of Jobs and Small Business advised that 'the balance between service and outcome fees was changed to place greater emphasis on employment outcomes and provide a stronger incentive for jobactive providers to achieve them'.117

3.71 Jobactive is the government’s generalist employment service. There are also a number of complementary programs for specific groups and particular objectives.118 For example the government funds several related employment services including Disability Employment Services and the Community

111 Name Withheld, Submission 117, p. 2 (emphasis in original).

112 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 2.

113 Dan Finn, Sub-contracting in Public Employment Services: Review of research findings and literature on

recent trends and business models, May 2011, p. 8.

114 Dan Finn, Sub-contracting in Public Employment Services: Review of research findings and literature on

recent trends and business models, May 2011, p. 34.

115 Dan Finn, Sub-contracting in Public Employment Services: Review of research findings and literature on

recent trends and business models, May 2011, p. 36.

116 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 4.

117 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 1.

118 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 18.

Development Programme. Another example is the Transition to Work service which provides 'pre-employment assistance to young people who have disengaged from work and study and are at risk of long-term welfare dependency'.119 The Department of Jobs and Small Business has acknowledged that ‘there is a risk that disadvantaged job seekers could fall between the cracks if they are not part of the cohorts targeted by the complementary programs.120

3.72 The government also runs an employment services program, ParentsNext, for unemployed parents of children under 6 years of age who receive the Parenting Payment.121 The ParentsNext program is currently subject to an inquiry by the Senate Community Affairs References Committee.122

3.73 Several other related government programs, such as Newstart, the Youth Jobs PaTH internships program and wage subsidies are outlined below.

Overview of Jobactive 3.74 Jobactive is the largest program through which employment services are delivered and is administered by the Department of Jobs and Small Business. The Department oversees the delivery of contracted services including through

compliance and performance monitoring. According to the Department, jobactive has achieved over 1 million job placements since July 2015 and has more than 650 000 people engaged at any time.123

3.75 There are 42 jobactive providers operating over approximately 1 700 sites in Australia. The jobactive program is delivered in 51 employment regions across Australia.124 Job seekers who are eligible for employment services, but reside outside the employment regions, are serviced by the Community Development Programme.125

119 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 2.

120 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 27.

121 Department of Jobs and Small Business, ParentsNext, www.jobs.gov.au/parentsnext (accessed

14 January 2019).

122 Parliament of Australia, ParentsNext, including its trial and subsequent broader rollout,

www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/ParentsNext (accessed 14 January 2019).

123 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 1.

124 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 1.

125 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), jobactive: Design and Monitoring, Audit Report No. 4,

2017-18, p. 16.

3.76 Over $6 billion in funding has been allocated for jobactive employment services over the forward estimates period (2018-19 to 2021-22).126 The adequacy of current spending on employment services is discussed in Chapter 5 under 'Spending on employment services'.

Jobactive objectives 3.77 The stated objectives of jobactive are:

ï helping job seekers find and keep a job; ï helping job seekers move from welfare to work; ï helping job seekers meet their mutual obligations; and ï jobactive organisations delivering quality services.127

Participants 3.78 Participation in jobactive is compulsory for people who receive income support, such as the Newstart Allowance or the Disability Support Pension, and who have been assessed as being able to actively look for work.

3.79 People not receiving an income-support payment, or those in receipt of income support that do not have compulsory requirements, are able to voluntarily access one period of jobactive services for up to six months. Volunteer participants comprise approximately 1.4 per cent of total participants.128

Assessing the needs of participants 3.80 The Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI) is a statistical tool used to measure the capacity and needs of job seekers. The tool allocates points based on answers to questions and ‘determines a job seeker’s relative level of

disadvantage and their likelihood of remaining unemployed’.129 The assessment process is used to place a participant in one of three streams of service:

ï Stream A—these participants are the most job ready and require minimal support from their provider; ï Stream B—for these participants, jobactive providers play a greater role in helping participants become job ready; and ï Stream C - these participants require the most support to secure

employment, often due to multiple barriers.130

126 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Portfolio Budget Statements 2018-19, Budget Related Paper

no. 1.13B, p. 23.

127 ANAO, jobactive: Design and Monitoring, Audit Report No. 4, 2017-18, p. 7.

128 ANAO, jobactive: Design and Monitoring, Audit Report No. 4, 2017-18, p. 13.

129 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 44.

130 NESA, jobactive, https://nesa.com.au/jobactive/ (accessed 8 February 2019).

3.81 If the JSCI identifies that a job seeker has multiple or complex barriers to employment, they may need to complete an Employment Services Assessment (ESAt). The ESAt is used to refer job seekers to jobactive Stream C or Disability Employment Services.131

3.82 Chapter 4 of this report considers the effectiveness of the assessment process in more detail.

Compliance framework 3.83 Jobactive's new compliance framework, the Targeted Compliance Framework, gives employment services consultants responsibility for imposing demerit points. The compliance framework applies when a participant does not meet

their mutual obligations (such as applying for jobs and attending appointments with their provider). The new framework was criticised by many stakeholders for being unnecessarily punitive and unfair (see discussion in Chapter 8).

3.84 The Targeted Compliance Framework was introduced in the 2017-18 Budget. The new framework increases penalties for persistent and deliberate non-compliance. The framework includes a ‘warning zone’ for participants that are not meeting requirements, and a ‘penalty zone’ for repeated non-compliance.132

Wage subsidies 3.85 Jobactive uses wage subsidies, which operate as ‘a financial incentive to help overcome employers’ reluctance to hire certain groups by compensating employers for real or perceived lower levels of productivity’.133

3.86 The Department of Jobs and Small Business has reported that:

Over 100,000 wage subsidy job placements have occurred under jobactive, which offers employers that hire an eligible job seeker up to $10,000 over six months. Wage subsidies have experienced significant growth in uptake since changes were introduced in January 2017 to make them easier for businesses to access and manage.134

131 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 44.

132 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 52.

133 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 41.

134 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 41.

3.87 However, wage subsidies can introduce deadweight costs, for example, paying a wage subsidy for a person who would have been hired anyway.135

3.88 The effectiveness of wage subsidies for employment outcomes is considered in Chapter 5.

Employment services providers 3.89 Jobactive participants either choose or are allocated an employment services provider. The government engages employment services providers through periodic open tender rounds.136

3.90 Under jobactive, the performance of providers is largely assessed by a relative comparison of provider performance. Performance is measured by a star rating system comparing actual outcomes achieved and other performance indicators to expected performance based on regression analysis that factors in caseload and local labour market conditions.

3.91 The lowest performers face a potential loss of market share. The Department of Jobs and Small Business is responsible for monitoring the conduct of providers and determining penalties for non-compliance. The Department conducts regular performance reviews and action may be taken under the deed if a provider is not meeting their obligations or if their performance is poor.

3.92 The performance of providers is published via Star Ratings on the Department's website and the jobactive.gov.au website. Star Ratings are calculated at both Employment Region level and site level. The Star Ratings are designed to help improve employer and participant choice of provider and assist the Department in relation to business review and reallocation processes.137

Related programs

Newstart 3.93 The Newstart Allowance (Newstart) provides basic financial support to unemployed people while they look for work. Approximately 727 500 people receive Newstart. Additionally, about 94 000 people receive youth

allowance.138 The single rate of Newstart is currently $275 per week. The rate

135 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 41.

136 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 64.

137 ANAO, jobactive: Design and Monitoring, Audit Report No. 4, 2017-18, p. 56.

138 Department of Human Services, Annual Report 2017-18, p. 49.

has not substantially increased in real terms since 1996.139 Newstart is designed to 'supplement other savings which would help unemployed Australians and their families through periods of unemployment'.140 However being on Newstart is not temporary for many recipients. Around 67 per cent of Newstart recipients have been on the payment for 12 months or more,141 and approximately 70 per cent have been unemployed for 12 months or more.142

3.94 A number of organisations and individuals submitted that the low rate of Newstart operates as a barrier to employment and advocated for an increase in the rate.143 For example, GSANZ submitted that the low rate of Newstart 'creates additional barriers for single mothers to enter employment'.144 Ms Emma King, the Chief Executive Officer of the Victorian Council of Social Service advocated for a $75 dollar increase in the Newstart rate:

…we need to raise the woefully low Newstart allowance. It is so low that it stops people from finding work. People can't afford to pay rent and feed themselves, let alone pay for transport to attend a job interview.145

3.95 This point was also been made by ACOSS:

…unemployment payments of $38 a day do not provide people with the minimum income they need to cover the most basic living expenses and undertake job search, which adds to the stress and anxiety faced by people who are unemployed.146

3.96 A report by Deloitte Economics in September 2018 found that increasing the rate of Newstart and Youth Allowance payments by $75 per week would

139 Peter Whiteford, Gerry Redmond, 'Election FactCheck Q&A: is it true that Australia’s

unemployment payment level hasn’t increased in over 20 years?', The Conversation, 16 May 2016, https://theconversation.com/election-factcheck-qanda-is-it-true-australias-unemployment-payment-level-hasnt-increased-in-over-20-years-59250 (accessed 8 February 2019).

140 Deloitte Access Economics, Analysis of the impact of raising benefit rates, ACOSS, September 2018,

p. 3.

141 Department of Social Services, DSS Payment Demographic Data, June 2018,

https://data.gov.au/dataset/ds-dga-cff2ae8a-55e4-47db-a66d-e177fe0ac6a0/details (accessed 8 February 2019).

142 ACOSS, Raise the rate, www.acoss.org.au/raisetherate/ (accessed 9 January 2019).

143 See for example, ACOSS, Submission 17, p. 4; and GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 5.

144 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 5.

145 Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, Victorian Council of Social Service, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 30.

146 ACOSS, Submission on Future Employment Services, August 2018, www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ACOSS_submission-on-future-employment-services_FINAL.pdf (accessed 2 February 2018), p. 13.

'boost wellbeing in regional communities doing it the toughest, lifting the incomes of people most in need, as well as delivering 12 000 new jobs'.147

Committee view 3.97 The committee is persuaded by evidence that the low rate of Newstart can act as a barrier to recipients securing employment. The committee considers that the adequacy of the rate of Newstart must be reviewed.

Recommendation 1

PaTH 3.99 Youth Jobs PaTH is an employment program for young people aged 15-24. PaTH provides employability skills training for participants (this includes training in work skills, career development and job preparation).

Employability skills training is available for young people who are on income support, are registered with jobactive and have mutual obligation requirements.148

3.100 The PaTH internship program is for young people aged 17-24. The internships run for four to 12 weeks and include 30 to 50 hours of unpaid work. Instead of receiving a wage, the participant receives an extra $200 per fortnight in addition to their normal income support payment. To be eligible, participants must be on income support with mutual obligation requirements and have been registered with jobactive, Transition to Work or Disability Employment Services for at least six months. Employers receive a payment of $1000 for hosting an intern.149

3.101 According to Youth Action, PaTH in its current form is 'inadequate to support young people who experience additional barriers to employment'.150 The

147 ACOSS, Raising Newstart and Youth Allowance would boost jobs, wages and inject millions into local

communities, 17 September 2018, www.acoss.org.au/media_release/raising-newstart-and-youth-allowance-would-boost-jobs-wages-and-inject-millions-into-local-communities/ (accessed 11 January 2019).

148 Australian Government, Youth Jobs PaTH Resources & FAQs,

https://jobsearch.gov.au/path/resources (accessed 11 January 2019).

149 Australian Government, Youth Jobs PaTH,

https://jobsearch.gov.au/content/documents/WEB_Youth%20Jobs%20PaTH%20fact%20sheet%20-%20information%20for%20employers.pdf (accessed 11 January 2019).

150 Youth Action, Submission 56, p. 16.

committee also heard that under the PaTH program there is a risk of exploitation151 and for genuine positions to be replaced by short-term subsidised placements. Additionally, participants in PaTH receive low pay for the internship.152

3.102 Ms Anne Maxwell, a jobactive participant who gave evidence to the committee, described PaTH as an opportunity to showcase her skills, however, the placement did not lead to further employment:

I signed up and did a PaTH internship for three months—admin reception. I had a great opportunity to offer up extra skills in Photoshop, only to be kicked out by the end of the internship.153

3.103 According to Ms Sally James, Head of Youth Programs at the Brotherhood of St Laurence, the design of PaTH is flawed:

…PaTH had good intentions but flawed models from the beginning. It had good intentions. Yes, paid work experience is a good way to go, particularly for young people who are disadvantaged and don't have the networks to get into work experience. It needs to be managed and regulated. Having a training bit and a work experience bit and being fragmented and not together is a big issue, and that's why it's not working.

3.104 However some stakeholders considered that PaTH, whilst having issues, was an improvement compared to jobactive.154

Committee view 3.105 The committee notes concerns raised by submitters around the design of PaTH. The committee is not convinced that the PaTH program has proved its worth for young job seekers. The program has failed to live up to expectations

that it would help young people get a foot in the door. Instead, it has put young people at risk of exploitation, without sufficient protections if something goes wrong. The committee is of the view that the government must consider options to better protect and support young participants.

Recommendation 2

3.106 The committee recommends that the government review the Youth PaTH program and ensure that any future program provides adequate worker protection and payment.

151 Ms Sally James, Head of Youth Programs, Brotherhood of St Laurence, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 17.

152 Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, Victorian Council of Social Service, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 31.

153 Ms Anne Maxwell, Administration Officer and General Member of Committee of Management,

AUWU, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2019, p. 18.

154 See for example, Ms Jacqui McKenzie, Policy and Advocacy Manager, Youth Action, Committee

Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 12.

New Enterprise Incentive Scheme 3.107 The New Enterprise Incentive Scheme is an initiative aimed at assisting eligible job seekers to create and run their own business. It is delivered as part of jobactive. Under the scheme, the government provides assistance to

individuals not currently in employment, education or training who are interested in starting a business. The assistance includes:

…accredited small business training, helping to develop a business plan, business support and if eligible, income support (NEIS allowance) to encourage entrepreneurship.155

3.108 Access to the scheme is restricted, with only 8 600 places available per annum.156

The government's review of employment services 3.109 The government is currently reviewing employment services, with the current jobactive deed due to expire in 2020. As part of the review, the government established an Expert Advisory Panel to inform the design of future

employment services.

3.110 In a June 2018 discussion paper, the government acknowledged that more needed to be done to assist the most disadvantaged job seekers (Stream C) to find work and move off income support.157 Research commissioned by the Department of Jobs and Small Business in 2017 found that:

ï some employers are averse to employing jobactive candidates due to a perceived lack of reliability ï employment services consultants felt it was difficult to provide quality service to more vulnerable job seekers within the time constraints they

work ï employment services consultants felt they spent more time on administration (and compliance) than on securing job seeker

outcomes.158

3.111 In December 2018 the government released the report of the Expert Advisory Panel. The report made 11 recommendations for the future of employment services. The government is currently considering the report and

155 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, pp. 1-2 (citations omitted).

156 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Start your own business, https://jobsearch.gov.au/jobseeker-info/start-your-own-business (accessed 4 February 2019).

157 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 4.

158 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 5, citing Deloitte, Mobile Consumer Survey 2017: The Australian Cut, 2017.

recommendations.159 The Panel's recommendations are discussed throughout this report.

3.112 Additionally, the government is undertaking a number of trials to inform future policy decisions. The government's Online Employment Services Trial began in July 2018 and runs for two years.160

3.113 The government is also undertaking a Regional Employment Trials program, which commenced on 1 October 2018:

In selected regions, employment facilitators will work with Regional Development Australia committees to develop local employment projects. A grant program will provide $1 million to each of the ten regions to develop local employment projects. For eligible job seekers, the trial will also examine how earlier access to relocation assistance to take up a job can assist with securing employment.161

Committee view 3.114 The committee notes the Expert Panel's review into the future of employment services. The committee considers that the recommendations in this report should be considered by government, as part of the government's response to

the review.

Recommendation 3

3.115 The committee recommends that the government consider the recommendations of this report in its response to the review of employment services.

Consultation with unemployed workers 3.116 The following section considers the extent of consultation with unemployed people in the design and implementation of jobactive and in the government's review into the future of employment services.

3.117 During the initial design phase of jobactive, stakeholders had opportunities to provide feedback. In late 2011 the Advisory Panel on Employment Services Administration and Accountability consulted with stakeholders, including employment services participants, on ‘opportunities for streamlining administration and industry-supported solutions to reduce unnecessary administration’.162 In 2013, following the release of an employment services

159 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The future of employment services, www.jobs.gov.au/future-employment-services (accessed 11 January 2019).

160 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 33.

161 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 61.

162 ANAO, jobactive: Design and Monitoring, Audit Report No. 4, 2017-18, pp. 24-25.

issues paper, consultation sessions were held with stakeholder groups including employment services participants. In 2014, the then Department of Employment consulted on the exposure draft to the Request for Tender. The Department received submissions from community sector representatives.163 Finally, in mid-2015 the new jobactive arrangements were launched.

3.118 However, many submitters to this inquiry considered that there had not been adequate consultation with unemployed and underemployed workers in the design and implementation of jobactive. The AUWU expressed 'deep concern' regarding:

[the] government's ongoing refusal to meaningfully consult with and include unemployed workers and their representatives in the creation and implementation of unemployment policy in Australia.164

3.119 The AUWU suggested that employment policies were 'out of touch with the reality of unemployment' because participants were 'not given a seat at the table'.165 Similarly, Aspergers Victoria was concerned about the lack of consultation in the design of jobactive:

Aspergers Victoria was not consulted nor are we aware that any of our members were consulted. Because of the specific requirements of Aspergers job seekers, it is imperative that AV and our members are consulted in the design and implementation of jobactive services.166

3.120 In its submission, the Department of Jobs and Small Business referred to the audit of jobactive undertaken by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). Although the ANAO's overall conclusion was that stakeholders were adequately consulted on the design of jobactive,167 the ANAO audit did not specifically consider the adequacy of consultation with unemployed and underemployed workers. Additionally, NESA submitted that engagement with job seekers was low according to the ANAO report:

While job seekers and indeed other stakeholders had the opportunity to provide feedback, it is clear from the ANAO’s report that the level of engagement of job seekers was low and subsequently, their voice not heard proportional to other stakeholders.168

3.121 Furthermore, NESA submitted that consultations on the design of jobactive did not provide sufficient detail:

163 ANAO, jobactive: Design and Monitoring, Audit Report No. 4, 2017-18, p. 25.

164 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 5.

165 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 5.

166 Aspergers Victoria, Submission 36, p. 4.

167 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 4.

168 NESA, Submission 54, p. 9.

To illustrate, the Employment Services 2015-2020 Exposure Draft paper while providing an overview of the proposed jobactive program did not provide sufficient detail to enable informed discussion about the adequacy of services. Stream A is a basic service that is suited to job seekers with a high level of independence in their job search and designed for the ‘job ready’. It would not have been transparent to stakeholders that the proposed model would today result in Stream A consisting of 40% long and 25% very-long term unemployed, and that it would be the service level afforded to job seekers facing issues such as homelessness, mental health, disability, substance dependency, recently released prisoners or recent humanitarian arrivals.169

3.122 NESA submitted that the changes made to the jobactive model following consultation could be regarded as 'at the margins'.170 The committee also heard that stakeholders were not aware of any consultation with unemployed or underemployed people in the implementation phase of jobactive.171

3.123 There were mixed views on the adequacy of consultation for the current review of employment services. The Settlement Council of Australia was broadly supportive of the consultation undertaken as part of the review and more broadly:

SCoA notes that Australians from migrant and/or refugee backgrounds have traditionally had negligible involvement in the design and implementation of jobactive. However, we acknowledge the positive effort taken by jobactive providers and their peak bodies to engage with this community, and welcome the positive steps taken by the Expert Panel to take a range of diverse voices into account as they consider the future of employment services in Australia. We would hope that such commitment continues into the future and that the opportunity for all jobseekers to be heard be entrenched in both the design and implementation of employment services.172

3.124 As with consultation on the design of jobactive, NESA submitted that consultation for the future of employment services lacked sufficient detail:

The Next Generation of Employment Services Discussion paper regarding 2020 reform; contains similarly insufficient description of the cohort of job seekers likely to receive a digital only service in the next iteration of services proposed to replace jobactive... Additionally, these discussion papers reassuringly describe mechanisms for job seeker movement if their circ*mstance change, but fails to describe the complexity and restrictions imposed in the required processes.173

169 NESA, Submission 54, p. 11.

170 NESA, Submission 54, p. 11.

171 NESA, Submission 54, p. 11.

172 Settlement Council of Australia, Submission 30, p. 4 (citations omitted).

173 NESA, Submission 54, p. 11.

3.125 The AUWU pointed to the lack of representation of unemployed workers on the government's Advisory Panel:

The government’s Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel was created by Minister Cash to provide the government with advice on policies affecting unemployed workers. However, not one member of the panel is an unemployed person, nor is likely to have been on Newstart Allowance in the last decade, nor represents the views of unemployed workers.174

3.126 A jobactive participant submitted that they did not feel like they had a say:

It is completely unacceptable that there are no job seekers on the government's Department and expert Advisory Panel… This system should be tailored to our needs and wants. By excluding us from the design and implementation of the service like this, the government is sending a very clear message that it doesn't care about our perspectives and requirements at all.175

3.127 The AUWU suggested that the government's failure to consult has led to most participants losing all trust in the system. The AUWU submitted that involving unemployed people in the design, implementation and evaluation of future employment services would 'ensure both a more effective employment services system and its ongoing integrity'.176 This was also the position of NESA:

The unique perspectives of the consumer, they being those most affected and those delivering the service, are essential to understanding how elements of the framework individually and/or through interaction, either enhance or hinder achievement of objectives and the service experience at the point of delivery.177

3.128 Similarly, My Pathway, a jobactive provider, suggested that 'timely and clear consultation with job seekers, employers and providers will support the success of any program changes'.178 NESA also submitted that formalised ongoing consultation was necessary to ensure continuous improvement of employment services.179

Committee view 3.129 The committee notes that many jobactive participants and some providers do not feel that their voices have been heard during consultation on the design of

174 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 6.

175 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Submission 34, p. 1.

176 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 21.

177 NESA, Submission 54, p. 11.

178 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 3.

179 NESA, Submission 54, pp. 11-12.

jobactive. The committee also considers that consultation on the future of employment services did not include sufficient detail on the proposed reforms.

3.130 To restore trust in employment services, the government must consult in a meaningful way with jobactive participants (including participants from disadvantaged groups) and other unemployed and underemployed Australians in designing the future of employment services.

Recommendation 4

Chapter 4

Assessment and streaming

Stream A, no matter how you cut it, is not an adequate investment for people who are long-term unemployed, straight out of prison, homeless, with diagnosed mental health conditions, with drug and alcohol addiction—you name it.1

Overview 4.1 This chapter examines the assessment and streaming process of jobactive participants. The chapter is structured according to the following topics:

ï Overview of assessment and streaming ï Effectiveness of the assessment process ï Re-assessment

4.2 Services and support for participants are discussed in Chapter 5.

4.3 The committee's recommendations are set out at the end of the chapter.

Overview of assessment and streaming 4.4 The support available for jobactive participants depends on the assessed relative disadvantage of the participant. As noted in Chapter 3, the Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI) is a statistical assessment tool used to measure

the capacity and needs of jobactive participants. Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, from the Department of Jobs and Small Business, explained that the JSCI examines the 'relative possibility of people finding work'.2 According to the Department, the tool is not intended to identify the specific assistance a person might need to get a job.3

4.5 The JSCI assessment is conducted by Centrelink on first contact with income support applicants.4 If a person's circ*mstances change after completing the JSCI, their circ*mstances can be reassessed. The classification process is often done over the phone,5 and usually takes about five minutes.6 If the JSCI

1 Ms Sally Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer, National Employment Services Association (NESA),

Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 76.

2 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 33.

3 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 45.

4 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

5 Ms Rosemary Deininger, General Manager, Participation and Disability Division, Department of

Human Services, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 34.

6 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

identifies that a person may have multiple/complex barriers to employment, the person may need to complete an Employment Services Assessment (ESAt). The ESAt is used to refer people to jobactive Stream C or Disability Employment Services.7

4.6 Based on their assessed relative disadvantage, jobactive participants are placed into one of three streams of service:

Stream A job seekers are the most job-ready. These job seekers can access services to help them understand what employers want and how to navigate the local labour market, build a rÃ©sumÃ©, look for jobs and learn how to access self-help facilities.

Stream B job seekers need their jobactive provider to play a greater role to help them become job-ready and are referred to case management support.

Stream C job seekers have a combination of work capacity and personal issues that need to be addressed so that they can take up and keep a job.8

4.7 Currently, 38 per cent of the caseload are Stream A participants, 43 per cent are Stream B, and 17 per cent are Stream C. Volunteer Stream A participants make up one percent of the caseload.9

Effectiveness of the assessment process 4.8 The committee received substantial evidence that participants were not being streamed accurately under jobactive. If participants are inaccurately assessed, they are unlikely to receive the support that they need. According to jobactive

providers Matchworks and ESG, often it is the most disadvantaged participants that are streamed incorrectly.10

4.9 Submitters were particularly concerned about the increasing number of 'hard to place' participants in Stream A. The committee heard that 40 per cent of Stream A participants are long-term unemployed.11 A person is considered long-term unemployed if they are unemployed for 12 months or more. Additionally, 25 per cent of Stream A participants are very long-term unemployed.12 A person is classified as very long-term unemployed if they are unemployed for 2 years or more. As noted by the National Employment Services Association (NESA), a significant proportion of Stream A participants

7 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 44.

8 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 2 (bullet points omitted).

9 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no. 21, 6 December 2018

(received 2 January 2019), p. 2.

10 Matchworks & ESG, answers to questions on notice, 6 December 2018 (received

20 December 2018), p. 7.

11 Ms Sally Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer, NESA, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 76.

12 NESA, Submission 54, p. 15.

have 'complex issues such as (but not limited to) homelessness, mental health, refugee status and recently released prisoners'.13 Yet Stream A 'is designed to assist job seekers that have a high level of independence providing a very basic level of assistance'.14

4.10 Ms Janine Pitt from the Department of Jobs and Small Business outlined to the committee why people with significant barriers might end up in Stream A:

…we do get feedback that there are often quite hard-to-place people who find themselves in stream A, and that can be for a whole range of reasons. An example of that might be there might be somebody who is an ex-offender who is in stream A, but that ex-offender might have a university degree, be in a labour market in the city and have their own car. Because of that particular individual's skills, they'll end up in stream A versus a different stream.15

4.11 However a number of stakeholders considered that the JSCI assessment tool is flawed, even if it is considered to be operating 'correctly'. Jesuit Social Services submitted that the standardised assessment can 'fail to capture the nuances and depth of disadvantage that is often experienced by jobseekers'.16 Similarly, NESA contended that the outcomes of the JSCI indicate that the tool is not fit for purpose:

The fact that a newly released prisoner, a person experiencing homelessness or mental health issues, or a newly arrived refugee subject to trauma and torture can be ‘correctly’ allocated to Stream A should demonstrate that the tool and/or its settings is not identifying disadvantage in the manner in which the community would expect.17

4.12 The committee heard that the assessment process relies on self-disclosure. Ms Janine Pitt explained that the accuracy of the JSCI relies on people disclosing information.18 Stakeholders noted that this factor can hamper accurate streaming.19 For example, the Public Service Research Group at UNSW Canberra submitted that participants may not understand the ramifications of non-disclosure:

…current processes raise important questions about some jobseekers’ capacity to understand the ramifications of disclosure or non-disclosure in

13 NESA, Submission 54, p. 15.

14 NESA, Submission 54, p. 15.

15 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 33.

16 Jesuit Social Services, Submission 57, p. 9.

17 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

18 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 34.

19 See for example, NESA, Submission 54, p. 16; Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work

for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 34.

their assessment (for example in cases of cognitive impairment, undiagnosed disability, language and literacy issues, or substance use issues) and about accountability and duty of care to vulnerable citizens from the state’s end. Those with the most to lose in terms of mutual obligation for income support are the least equipped to navigate the assessment process.20

4.13 Mr Jeremy Poxon, a jobactive participant, described how his experience of being assessed was not conducive to self-disclosure of his personal issues:

I entered jobactive three years ago while undergoing therapy for suicidal depression… I was streamed by somebody who I had never met and, let's be honest, probably wouldn't be comfortable opening up to about those kinds of very personal issues I was having.

I was streamed directly into the stream A category, deemed ultimately fit for work and all 50 hours a fortnight of mutual obligations.21

4.14 Mr Poxon suggested that it was not possible to understand somebody's barriers, including psychological barriers, under the current streaming process.22 In this regard, NESA commented that it 'is not surprising that many job seekers do not disclose barriers until they have entered services and form trust with their consultant'.23 NESA observed that fear may discourage some participants from speaking about their personal issues:

For some job seekers, fear about having details of their disadvantage recorded in a government system is overwhelming.24

4.15 The committee heard that as the profile of jobactive participants becomes more disadvantaged, a greater proportion of participants receive inadequate service. Ms Annette Gill, Principal Policy Advisor for NESA, suggested that the true purpose of the JSCI is a rationing tool:

As concentration of disadvantage increases amongst the people left on unemployment, more people—the same percentage—just get pushed in there. It's a rationing tool; it's not an assessment tool.25

4.16 In its submission, NESA contends that the JSCI scoring and thresholds are 'set and are amended to contain or reduce expenditure'.26 Figure 4.1 depicts the

20 Public Service Research Group, UNSW Canberra, Submission 41, p. 3.

21 Mr Jeremy Poxon, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 21.

22 Mr Jeremy Poxon, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 21.

23 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16

24 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

25 Ms Annette Gill, Principal Policy Advisor, NESA, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 76.

26 NESA, Submission 54, p. 11.

proportion of participants in each stream since July 2015. Australia's unemployment rate was 6.3 per cent in July 2015.27

Figure 4.1 Proportion of caseload by Stream

Source: Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 6 December 2018 (received 2 January 2019), p. 2.

4.17 Submitters broadly supported making improvements to the assessment process.28 For example, NESA emphasised that the employment services sector supports the need for 'accurate assessment and streaming' to 'ensure an adequate and quality service'.29 According to the Centre for Policy Development, improving the assessment process 'requires the right set of questions, capable systems and experienced staff to assess need'.30

Re-assessment 4.18 During the inquiry, stakeholders emphasised that re-assessment of participants was difficult and was not done in a timely fashion, meaning many

27 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Labour Force, Australia, July 2015, cat. no. 6202.0,

6 August 2015.

28 See for example, Public Service Research Group, UNSW Canberra, Submission 41, p. 3; Jesuit Social

Services, Submission 57, p. 9; and Matchworks & ESG, answers to questions on notice, 6 December 2018 (received 20 December 2018), p. 7.

29 NESA, Submission 54, p. 15.

30 Centre for Policy Development, Submission 159, p. 4.

participants remain underserviced.31 NESA explained that there are a number of restrictions on re-assessment:

The controls imposed on completing a change of circ*mstance including requirements for documentary evidence verifying the job seeker’s circ*mstance often results in service eligibility remaining inadequate.32

4.19 The committee received evidence that there can be delays in appointments for an ESAt, which is used to refer job seekers to jobactive Stream C or Disability Employment Services. The Community and Public Sector Union informed the committee that its members report that there can be delays in participants undergoing an ESAt:

ESATs appointments are a rarity, therefore, if a customer has a possible medical barrier, which needs to be determined to reduce the standard obligated requirement or obtain an exemption, it will not be completed within a reasonable time frame.33

4.20 This point was supported by yourtown, who advised that there were 'lengthy delays' to obtain an ESAt appointment due to a lack of available appointment times at Centrelink.34 Yourtown also informed the committee that due to current contractual restrictions they were generally not able to update a JSCI for Stream A clients:

…current guidelines advise that Providers can only update a Stream A (or B) JSCI prior to 6 months of service if a Targeted Compliance Framework Capability Assessment is conducted by the Provider after 3 demerit points have been applied to the client’s record AND the client then discloses factors / changes that can be updated in ESS [Employment Services System] JSCI. Prior to this, the client must be referred back to DHS [Department of Human Services] for any updates. In other words, a Provider can only update the record prior to 6 months if the client is in a demerit compliance situation.35

Future assessment and streaming 4.21 In the discussion paper for the future of employment services, the government acknowledged that the comprehensiveness of the assessment process could be

31 See for example, Jesuit Social Services, Submission 57, p. 9; Ms Karen Rainbow, Chief Executive

Officer, Employment Services, Advanced Personnel Management, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 67; and yourtown, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 20 November 2018), p. 1.

32 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

33 Community and Public Sector Union, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received

19 November 2018).

34 Yourtown, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 20 November 2018), p. 1.

35 Yourtown, additional information received 22 January 2019, p. 1; see also Yourtown, answers to

questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 20 November 2018), p. 1.

improved.36 The Employment Services 2020 Report by the Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel recommends a three staged assessment process, covering individual needs, goals, strengths, barriers and digital and career literacy.37 The three stages would be a pre-screen, comprehensive upfront assessment and follow-on assessment:

ï First stage: assessment to see if a job seeker is job-ready and can self-service online. If so, job seeker enters digital first and moves to the third stage of assessment.

ï Second stage: comprehensive assessment to decide the most appropriate level of services. Job seeker enters digital first, digital plus or enhanced services.

ï Third stage: in-depth assessment of skills, capabilities and needs, to personalise services they will receive while in the system.38

4.22 According to the Advisory Panel, the assessment would identify participants that may require help to use digital services and connect them to training.39 Reassessments would occur over time and when a participant's circ*mstances change.40

Committee view 4.23 The committee is very concerned around inaccurate streaming of participants under jobactive. The committee notes that the assessment process determines the level of assistance that employment services participants will receive.

Therefore the committee considers that it is crucial that participants are assessed correctly. In this regard, the committee strongly supports making the assessment process more comprehensive. Additionally, the committee is of the view that the government should investigate how it can better encourage people to disclose personal barriers and make it easier for participants to move between different levels of service.

4.24 The committee remains concerned about the potential for incorrect assessment to continue under the future system proposed by the Expert Panel. The committee is also concerned that the government will push people who have difficulty using digital services into training on how to use the services, rather

36 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 45.

37 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 20.

38 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 51.

39 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 51.

40 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 51.

than providing them with more appropriate assistance. The committee considers this approach could be particularly problematic for refugee participants, including those with limited English, who are often inappropriately assessed as 'job ready'. The committee considers that participants should always have an option to opt-out of digital services.

Recommendation 5

Recommendation 6

Chapter 5

Services and support for participants

…in my experience, the main outcomes of the jobactive system is generating income and employment within service providers, rather than outcomes for unemployed workers…1

Overview 5.1 This chapter examines the services and supports available to jobactive participants. The chapter is structured according to the following topics:

ï Overview of service requirements ï Meeting the needs of diverse participants ï Spending on employment services ï Changing providers ï The Employment Fund ï Wage subsidies ï Work experience ï Place-based and local approaches ï Restoration of public service delivery of employment services

5.2 Mutual obligation requirements, annual activity requirements (including training and Work for the Dole) and the Job Plan negotiation process are considered in Chapter 7.

5.3 The committee's recommendations are set out throughout the chapter.

Overview of service requirements 5.4 The following section provides an overview of existing service requirements under jobactive. The extent to which these services meet the needs of participants is considered below under 'Meeting the needs of diverse

participants'.

5.5 Providers are required to deliver services to participants under the jobactive deed.2 During an initial interview with a jobactive participant, providers must:

ï explain the services that the provider is obliged to provide; ï identify their strengths and any issues they may have relating to find employment;

1 Mr Rod Shehan, Submission 104, p. 2.

2 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, 18 July 2018,

https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/jobactive-deed-2015-2020-incorporating-gdv-no-7-changes (accessed 21 January 2019), p. 90.

ï for participants with mutual obligations, explain their rights and obligations under social security law and the consequences of not meeting their mutual obligation requirements; and

ï provide them with details of the current National Minimum Wage, the Fair Work Ombudsman website and contact details for the Fair Work Ombudsman.3

5.6 Providers must provide the following basic services to participants:

ï access to suitable vacancies; ï advice about the best ways to look for and find work; ï advice about local, regional, or national employment opportunities; ï assistance, as required, to apply for jobs; ï access to free Wi-Fi facilities at each site; ï information about skill shortage areas; and ï where appropriate, assistance with preparing a resume.4

5.7 Providers must also ensure that, at all times, participants who have mutual obligations have a current and up to date Job Plan.5

5.8 The government has set out the minimum level of service it expects of providers in Service Guarantees. Compliance with the Service Guarantees is required under the deed.6 The Service Guarantee for participants receiving income support states that participants can expect that their provider will:

ï work with you to develop your Job Plan. This sets out the services you will receive and the minimum requirements you need to meet while you are on activity tested income support

ï identify your strengths and any challenges you face to increase your job readiness ï refer you to suitable jobs ï match you to a suitable Work for the Dole placement (where

appropriate) ï reassess your needs if your circ*mstances change ï help you with wage subsidies or relocation assistance (where

appropriate) ï keep in contact with you and your employer once you have started a job ï provide the services that are set out in their Service Delivery Plan ï treat you fairly and with respect in a culturally sensitive way.7

3 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 98.

4 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 99.

5 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 99.

6 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 90.

7 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 169.

5.9 Volunteer job seekers can access jobactive services for up to six months. The Service Guarantee for volunteers states that the volunteer participants can expect that their provider will:

ï help you build your rÃ©sumÃ© ï provide advice on job opportunities in your area ï help you understand the skills local employers need ï refer you to jobs ï provide the services that are set out in their Service Delivery Plan ï treat you fairly and with respect ï provide services in a culturally sensitive way.8

5.10 Providers are required to prominently display the Service Guarantees in all offices and sites and make the Service Guarantees available to participants.9 Providers also have Service Delivery Plans, which set out any additional services they will provide. Providers are required to act in accordance with their Plan and upload a copy of their Plan to the jobactive website.10

5.11 As mentioned previously, jobactive participants receive different levels of support depending on their assessed relative disadvantage. Participants in Stream A are considered 'job ready' and receive fairly basic support from their provider, such as access to facilities to apply for jobs.11 The timing of services for Stream A participants is as follows:

Following their Initial Interview, Stream A (General) Participants generally enter a Self Service and Job Activity Phase for six months… Stream A (General) Participants who have not already commenced in the Stream A Work for the Dole Phase for the first time will, after the Self Service and Job Activity Phase, move into the Stream A Case Management Phase for six months …unless the Provider moves them into the Work for the Dole Phase earlier… They then generally move into the Stream A Work for the Dole Phase for six months, then into a Stream A Case Management Phase for six months and then back into the Stream A Work for the Dole Phase for six months. They then continue on this alternating six monthly pattern until they move into another Stream or Exit.12

5.12 Participants in Steams B and C receive increased support compared to Stream A. Stream B participants 'need their Employment Provider to play a greater role in making them job ready'.13 Participants in Stream C often have

8 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 171.

9 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 90.

10 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 90.

11 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 8.

12 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 116. Note: participants

undertake Work for the Dole (or another approved activity) for six months of each year, if they have been in jobactive for 12 months or more.

13 NESA, Employment Services Programme, https://nesa.com.au/jobactive/ (accessed 20 January 2019).

multiple barriers to employment, such as homelessness and addictions.14 The timing of services for Stream B and C participants is as follows:

Following their Initial Interview, Stream B (General) Participants and Stream C Participants generally enter the relevant Case Management Phase for 12 months …unless the Provider moves them earlier… They then generally alternate between six months in the relevant Work for the Dole Phase and six months in the relevant Case Management Phase until they move into another Stream (if in Stream B), or Exit.15

5.13 Providers are required to provide additional services to participants aged less than 30 years who have mutual obligation requirements ('Stronger Participation Incentives' or 'SPI Participants'). This includes monthly appointments to discuss job searches and referrals to jobs that the provider has identified.16 SPI Participants can be Stream A or Stream B. The timing of services for SPI Participants is as follows:

…all SPI Participants who have not already commenced in the SPI Work for the Dole Phase for the first time will, following their Initial Interview, enter a Case Management Phase for a total of 12 months. They then generally move into the SPI Work for the Dole Phase for six months, and then back into the SPI Case Management Phase and so on until they are no longer an SPI Participant.17

Future services and support 5.14 The report of the Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel recommends major changes to employment services:

Employment services providers will focus solely on helping those who need it most - ‘enhanced services’ job seekers and to a lesser extent ‘digital plus’ job seekers. Those job seekers who are job-ready — digital first — will no longer use the employment services provider network.18

5.15 The Panel also recommended that the future system should be 'grounded in digital':

A digital and data ecosystem which is personalised, simple to use yet highly sophisticated behind the scenes. A digital ecosystem which constantly evolves, becoming smarter each time a job seeker, employer or

14 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 34.

15 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 117.

16 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 116.

17 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 116.

18 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/i-want-work (accessed 9 February 2019), p. 21.

service provider logs on… It will match the right candidates for employers — for free. It will reduce administration and red tape.19

5.16 The proposed digital and data arrangements would match job seekers with suitable vacancies, recommend appropriate services to participants and include a digital toolkit 'using machine learning to recommend the best options and interventions to job seekers and providers'.20

5.17 In this inquiry, submitters were broadly supportive of greater use of digital services;21 however this support was generally qualified by the proviso that digital services are not appropriate for all participants. The Centre for Policy Development pointed out that whilst digital services provide a range of benefits, they are not a complete solution to better employment services:

Data transfer from providers to government has been poor, and commonly for compliance, not to learn more about what works.22

5.18 Dr Travers McLeod, the Chief Executive Officer of the Centre for Policy Development, emphasised that many job seekers do not have digital literacy:

…there can't be an assumption that everyone who interacts with the system is going to be able to satisfy their needs, and particularly their complex needs, through digital smart phone access.23

5.19 According to Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research at Anglicare Australia, the digitisation of services creates problems for more vulnerable participants:

…the assumption that people had the digital literacy to navigate the system, and the very deliberate reduction of face-to-face time with people trying to navigate the system, was resulting in many more suspensions of payments and a huge amount of stress on people who were unable to make the system work for them and who were having the experience of turning up to Centrelink offices, asking for help and either being turned away or being forced to use a computer when they didn't have the skills to do so.24

19 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 4 (emphasis in original).

20 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 64.

21 See for example, Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager—Operations, The Salvation Army

Employment Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 27.

22 Centre for Policy Development, Submission 159, p. 5.

23 Dr Travers McLeod, Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Policy Development, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 20.

24 Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research, Anglicare Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 3.

5.20 According to the Panel's report, the future system 'will allow more than half of all job seekers to get on with finding work themselves'.25 This implies that more than half of participants would be classified as 'job ready'.

5.21 The government is conducting an Online Employment Services Trial to inform the development of future employment services. The trial of online self-servicing involves 10 000 participants who have been assessed as 'job ready'. The online self-servicing includes approval of the job plan, self-managing mutual obligations and reporting job search contacts.26 According to the Expert Advisory Panel's report, less than 10 per cent of participants have decided to opt-out of the trial to instead receive services from a 'physical' provider.27

Committee view 5.22 The committee strongly supports the potential for digital services to improve the accessibility of employment services. Participants who are unemployed for a short period that do not require assistance to find a job will benefit from

being able to self-service online, provided that the online systems are effectively implemented, able to be tailored to meet individual needs and also user-friendly. There is also the potential to open up digital services to more job seekers, not just those on income support.

5.23 As noted previously, 40 per cent of Stream A participants are long-term unemployed. Additionally, 25 per cent of Stream A participants are very long-term unemployed. The committee received substantial evidence about incorrect assessment of participants. The committee is therefore concerned that the future system will mean even lower levels of service for many participants, particularly for those participants who would only have access to digital services. This is not an argument against the provision of effective and personalised online services, but instead about the appropriate assessment and Stream categorisation of jobactive participants.

5.24 In the move towards greater digital servicing, the committee is concerned that people who lack basic digital literacy or that do not have reliable access to the internet may be forced into using digital services. Currently, 86 per cent of Australian households have access to the internet.28 Certain cohorts such as

25 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 4.

26 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 32.

27 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 32.

28 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/next-generation-employment-services-discussion-paper (accessed 4 February 2019), p. 35.

First Nations people and homeless Australians are much less likely to have an internet connection. Employment services participants that do not have access to the internet or that lack basic digital literacy should be able to access face-to-face services. The committee considers that participants with mutual obligations should have the right to opt-out of online self-servicing (see Chapter 4).

5.25 The committee is also concerned about the adequacy of transition arrangements for moving to a new employment services system. The existing jobactive deed ends in 2020. The Expert Advisory Panel has however concluded that it would be 'unrealistic to expect full digital and data ecosystem functionality by this time'.29 The Panel has recommended that the future system should be fully operational by 2021, including the digital and data ecosystem.30

Meeting the needs of diverse participants 5.26 Jobactive participants are as diverse as the broader Australian population. Each participant has different needs and requires different levels of service. In its submission, the Department of Jobs and Small Business notes that 'the

assistance job seekers need to find work can vary considerably':31

While many job seekers who are assisted through jobactive are able to find work quickly, others face significant barriers to finding and sustaining a job.32

5.27 In its submission, the Department of Jobs and Small Business contended that jobactive participants are generally satisfied with the quality of jobactive services:

More than half of surveyed job seekers (56.9 per cent) reported being ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the quality of services they received. Job seekers in Streams B and C (the more disadvantaged), report higher levels of satisfaction (63.0 and 61.5 per cent respectfully) with the overall quality of services.33

5.28 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, from the Department of Jobs and Small Business, acknowledged that 'not every jobseeker's experience with employment services is positive'.34 The extent of dissatisfaction with the

29 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 31.

30 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, pp. 31, 34.

31 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 2.

32 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 2.

33 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 3 (citations omitted).

34 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

quality of service provided to participants is illustrated by the Department's survey results which imply that approximately 40 per cent of participants are dissatisfied. The level of dissatisfaction reported by participants increases to approximately 60 per cent when asked the more important question regarding the level of satisfaction with the help they received to find a job.35

5.29 Mr Smyth stated that the Department of Jobs and Small Business continually works with providers to ensure services are delivered in a manner that is responsive to the needs of users. Mr Smyth pointed to low numbers of complaints as an indicator of participant satisfaction:

In 2017-18 the national customer service line received just over 13,600 complaints, noting that participants may make more than one complaint. In a caseload of around 1.1 million jobseekers a year the proportion of jobseekers who made a complaint was, therefore, small.36

5.30 However, evidence given to the inquiry painted a very different picture. The committee heard that despite the streaming process, jobactive has a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to assisting participants.37 The committee heard that even in the correct stream, there is insufficient support to meet the needs of participants. The caseloads, qualifications and training of employment service providers which were also raised as concerns are considered separately in Chapter 6.

5.31 Mr Marcus Liddle, a jobactive participant from Victoria, described the minimal assistance he received from his provider:

I had just graduated from university, and was trying to find a job. I found one working as a web content writer/developer, but it fell apart in under a month. Unfortunately this was not long enough and in Centrelink's eyes it was as if I had never had a job, and was therefore required to undertake the "intensive" phase.

This phase involved me having to sit alone in front of a computer in a small grey room in the jobactive provider's office.

I was literally given the yellowpages and told to start cold-calling businesses.

The only resume advice I was given was to take my recently completed degree off my resume as it made me appear "overqualified". The jobactive employee attempted to help me do this, but was unable to use Microsoft

35 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 102.

36 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

37 Mr Matthew Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Sureway Employment and Training, Committee

Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 29.

Word to an appropriate level, and I ended up showing her how to do it instead.38

5.32 Similarly, Ms Rozie Hart, a jobactive participant, questioned the value of jobactive services:

My new job plan now states I must “take responsibility” for finding my own work & to report (online) my attendances at all required activities.

This begs the question. “What is the provider being paid to do?”39

5.33 Mr Brendan Taylor, a long-term job seeker and jobactive participant from New South Wales, submitted that the wording of the jobactive deed means that providers do not actually have to help people with their barriers to employment:

The jobactive deed does not state how JSP's [Job Service Providers] should go about focussing on barriers and only says they need to consider barriers which gives them a way out. At my current JSP the business manager told me that they only have to consider barriers and that means they don't have to help deal with them.40

5.34 Overwhelmingly, submitters considered that the jobactive program did not provide long-term solutions to joblessness or meet the needs of unemployed people.41 The committee heard that this was particularly the case for unemployed people with significant barriers to employment. According to the Edmund Rice Centre WA, a not-for-profit community service provider, jobactive has 'a very limited ability to provide long term solutions':

…Jobactive staff and caseworkers are not qualified or trained to interact successfully with people from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds or those suffering trauma and mental health issues. Clients are often confused about what they are expected to do when they attend appointments and why they should attend appointments in the first place.42

5.35 The National Employment Services Association (NESA) suggested that the ability of employment services to address joblessness was hampered by changes in policy:

The sector however also attributes some of the rise in LTU [long-term unemployment] to program changes implemented with the introduction of Job Services Australia [in 2009] which included greater controls to restrict movement of job seekers between Streams and which have continued in

38 Mr Marcus Liddle, Submission 111, p. 1.

39 Ms Rozie Hart, Submission 139, p. 3.

40 Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 4.

41 This point was contended by the National Employment Services Association (NESA) who

submitted that employment services have 'made a significant contribution to addressing joblessness' in the last two decades' (Submission 54, p. 15).

42 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 5.

jobactive. Amongst these changes was the removal of the contribution of duration of unemployment to the JSCI score affecting Stream eligibility and an increase in hurdles to obtain an Employment Services Assessment (ESAT).43

5.36 A number of individual submitters told the committee they did not have faith in the jobactive program. Mr Rod Shehan, a jobactive participant from Western Australia, submitted that there is 'no focus on the needs or aspirations of the unemployed'.44 Another name withheld submitter argued that jobactive was not designed for unemployed people:

Jobactive is not designed to meet the needs and aspirations of unemployed workers, it is designed to discourage people from applying for Newstart. It is also designed to appeal to a certain part of the electorate that believe all unemployed people are rorters, liars and cheats and undeserving of support.45

5.37 The committee also heard that the accountability framework for jobactive services may contribute to poor servicing of participants. Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ) was concerned about the lack of accountability to provide services to participants:

There is little to no accountability to provide quality services to the client; rather the accountability resides between the jobactive provider and the government.46

5.38 According to the Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), the government fails to enforce the jobactive code of practice and service guarantee.47 However, the Department of Jobs and Small Business informed the committee that it has taken a number of actions to address deed non-compliance, such as requiring providers to deliver targeted training to staff and imposition of additional reporting requirements.48

Dealing with complex needs 5.39 The committee heard that jobactive was not well placed to address more complex barriers, including by linking up with other services. Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy for SYC, a jobactive provider, advised

that services were not always available for people with complex needs:

43 NESA, Submission 54, p. 15.

44 Mr Rod Shehan, Submission 104, p. 2.

45 Name Withheld, Submission 118, p. 3.

46 Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ), Submission 47, p. 28 (emphasis in original).

47 Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), Submission 27, p. 22.

48 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 6 December 2018 (received

2 January 2019) p. 3.

…any jobseeker in stream B and C, which currently comprise about 60 per cent of the people on the jobactive case load nationally, has complex needs and yet there are not always service responses outside of employment services to meet their needs.49

5.40 My Pathway, another jobactive provider, reported that they often work with participants that have 'education and skills gaps, or they're the second or third generation in their family to be unemployed'.50 My Pathway submitted that the jobactive program is 'equipped to overcome these types of barriers through training, work experience, motivational and confidence-building activities'.51 However according to My Pathway, the jobactive program was not equipped to deal with more complex issues:

In circ*mstances where a job seeker is dealing with problems such as substance abuse or mental illness, the support they require is more complex. Non-vocational assistance to improve health, wellbeing, living arrangements or literacy aren’t reflected in the jobactive performance framework and only a few services are eligible for funding. In some cases, addressing social or personal issues may conflict with a client’s job search requirements.52

5.41 Submitters provided the committee with information about issues experienced by particular groups under jobactive. These groups are discussed below. The below discussion is non-exhaustive and does not cover all disproportionately disadvantaged groups.

Youth 5.42 The committee heard that jobactive does not adequately meet the needs of young people.53 According to Youth Action, the peak body for young people and youth services in New South Wales, youth are not well served under

jobactive’s universal approach:

There is a history of programmes using contracted employment providers that, while each may have their merits, have missed the mark for young people. Most recent iterations, Job Services Australia (JSA) (ended in 2015, replaced by jobactive) and jobactive, provided very little support for young people to achieve positive education and employment outcomes. Most significantly, in the move from JSA to jobactive, targeted support for young people was lost in favour of a universal approach. Complimentary

49 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 2.

50 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 2.

51 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 2.

52 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 2.

53 The barriers to employment experienced by young people are discussed in Chapter 3 under

'Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia'.

programs such as Transitions to Work were able to provide some level of support, but were limited in scope, and limited cohort support.54

5.43 The Youth Affairs Council of South Australia (YACSA) surveyed young people to identify which of the functions and services they had received from their provider. YACSA reported that:

Respondents to the survey were broadly damning of a sector that is focussed almost solely on ensuring compliance with Centrelink activity requirements rather than supporting and addressing the individual needs of young people.55

5.44 YACSA advised that survey respondents reported low levels of service provision in each of the key employment services functions:

Most responses centred on Centrelink obligations and indicated that providers had assisted them in developing a job plan (37%), gaining access to computers (29.6%), and helping respondents look for up to 20 jobs per month (25.9%). Only 18.5% of survey respondents reported employment service providers assisting them with referrals to job vacancies.56

5.45 Respondents to the YACSA survey reported particularly low levels of service related to personal and professional development:

Functions such as developing skills to get a job (11.1%), providing work related items, professional services, relevant training and support (11.1%), preparing for job interviews (11.1%) and, the provision of intensive support services such as counselling, homelessness services, mental health services, and other medical assistance (3.7%) all received a shortage of responses from young people.57

5.46 Youth Action pointed out that often young people are vulnerable members of the workforce and submitted that they need 'additional pre- and post-employment support, as well as education and training, to access career opportunities and remain engaged in employment into the long term’.58

5.47 The committee heard that a number of different youth-specific programs were delivering better results for young people, compared to jobactive. Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy at SYC, informed the committee about the Sticking Together project, which uses personal coaching:

The Sticking Together Project attaches a coach to a young person for 60 weeks. We partnered with the Australian Centre for Social Innovation to go through a co-design process with QUT to do our baseline data assessment. The program involves personal coaching of young people aged 18 to 24 who have been classified as stream B and C jobseekers…

54 Youth Action, Submission 56, p. 15.

55 Youth Affairs Council of South Australia (YACSA), Submission 29, p. 3.

56 YACSA, Submission 29, p. 4.

57 YACSA, Submission 29, p. 4.

58 Youth Action, Submission 56, pp. 15-16.

What we were testing through the pilot was whether we could get a greater proportion of that pool of available hours worked by those young people who have the coach working with them, compared with a controlled trial who did not and who only received standard jobactive servicing.59

5.48 The Sticking Together project resulted in increased average hours worked for its participants:

The participants on average had been unemployed for 2.1 years before commencing the project. Sixty-seven per cent were classified as long-term unemployed—that is more than 12 months unemployed. Twenty-seven per cent had been unemployed for more than three years. Most of those young people have never participated in work. Eighty-six of the 100 young people who started in the trial experienced work, with 96 jobs started. We had 50 young people in work at the end of the coaching period. The hours worked…increased on average from 11.9 hours per week at the beginning of the project to 26.3 hours at the project's end. Hours worked is not a measure that is looked at in jobactive.60

5.49 Mr Clark advised that 42 of the 100 participants in the Sticking Together pilot are now working and no longer receiving a Centrelink benefits.61

5.50 The committee also heard about the Transition to Work program. Transition to Work is a ‘program for young people who are experiencing disadvantage in the labour market’.62 The program is available to 15-21 year olds who meet certain criteria. The program provides ‘intensive, pre-employment support to improve the work-readiness of young people and help them into work (including apprenticeships and traineeships) or education’.63 Ms Sally James, Head of Youth Programs at the Brotherhood of St Laurence, advised the committee that Transition to Work was achieving better outcomes for its participants, compared to jobactive.64 The Brotherhood of St Laurence recommended that the program be expanded to cover young people aged up to 25 years.65

59 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC Jarvis, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 5.

60 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC Jarvis, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 5.

61 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC Jarvis, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 9.

62 Ms Sally James, Head of Youth Programs, Brotherhood of St Laurence, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 10.

63 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Transition to Work, www.jobs.gov.au/transition-work

(accessed 3 February 2019).

64 Ms Sally James, Head of Youth Programs, Brotherhood of St Laurence, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 14.

65 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission 16, Attachment 1, p. 30.

Migrants and culturally and linguistically diverse Australians 5.51 The committee heard that the jobactive program was particularly unsuited to the needs of migrants and culturally and linguistically diverse Australians.66 The Edmund Rice Centre WA highlighted the difficulties experienced by

participants who are not proficient in English:

We have many clients who have no English but attend their monthly appointments where they are talked at in a language they don’t understand, sign agreements they can’t read and given job diaries that they can’t complete.67

5.52 The Edmund Rice Centre WA reported that a number of providers in their area require participants who do not speak English and who cannot read and write in English to complete job diaries in English:

…this is compulsory policy and if not competed fully and in English they will have their payments cut. When reminded that the person cannot read or write the advice given is to get someone "to do it for you". This indicates that the process is not legitimate because filling the diaries by a third person is misrepresentation.68

5.53 Harmony Alliance, a women's alliance, suggested that jobactive is not equipped to help migrants and refugees, who often have additional barriers:

The one-size-fits-all approach of the current jobactive model is ill-equipped to overcome the additional barriers faced by many migrants and refugees, including conflicting demands on time posed by setting up a new household, navigating a new job market and learning English.69

5.54 Research conducted with women from migrant and refugee backgrounds by Harmony Alliance found that many were dissatisfied with the assistance they received:

…a high proportion of those who have used Centrelink or an employment agency to search for work in the last twelve months were dissatisfied with the services. Problems noted by users included experiences of discrimination based on ethnic or cultural backgrounds, insufficient understanding by staff when dealing with non-citizens, and insufficient assistance provided for writing applications or building networks.70

5.55 The committee heard that jobactive can be particularly problematic for refugees. According to the Refugee Council of Australia, refugees experience a number of problems with jobactive and are often incorrectly streamed.71 A

66 The barriers to employment experienced by migrants and refugees are discussed in Chapter 3

under 'Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia'.

67 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 6.

68 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 6.

69 Harmony Alliance, Submission 33, p. 1 (citations omitted).

70 Harmony Alliance, Submission 33, p. 2.

71 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, Attachment p. 9.

report by the Refugee Council and Fairfield Multicultural Interagency found that 'providers often miscategorise the support needs of migrant and refugee job seekers with little opportunity for reassessment, leaving them with insufficient support'.72 Ms Shukufa Tahiri, Policy Officer from the Refugee Council, advised that refugees experience a number of issues with jobactive, including:

ï lack of specialised service; ï choosing between learning English and looking for work; ï streaming and job seeker classification instrument issues; ï issues with compliance measures and implications that arise from that; ï limited support with resumes and interview skills; ï issues with job plans and lack of understanding of their rights and

responsibilities; ï underuse of interpreters and lack of translated materials; ï inappropriate Work for the Dole placements; ï overreliance on and lack of support for the use of technology to look for

work; and ï being mistreated and treated with disrespect.73

5.56 Despite the fact that providers are obliged to provide access to an interpreter,74 the committee heard that interpreters are often not used and this underuse is contributing to participants being streamed incorrectly.75 The Edmund Rice Centre WA reported that some providers have been asking participants to bring a friend, rather than booking an interpreter.76 According to the Refugee Council, providers are not sufficiently incentivised to use interpreters:

It takes double as long because of going through the interpreting system. They might have to make a phone call to TIS [Translating and Interpreting Service] and wait on the line till they find the right interpreter. That all takes time as well. There's no incentive. There's also no reward for jobactive providers to recognise the additional work it takes to use an interpreter.77

72 Harmony Alliance, Submission 33, p. 1. See also Shukufa Tahiri, Fairfield Multicultural Interagency

Refugee Council of Australia, Not Working: Experiences of refugees and migrants with jobactive, Report No 03/2017, August 2017.

73 Ms Shukufa Tahiri, Policy Officer, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 59.

74 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 11.

75 Ms Shukufa Tahiri, Policy Officer, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 61.

76 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 6.

77 Mr Asher Hirsh, Senior Policy Officer, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 61.

5.57 Another issue contributing to incorrect streaming relates to the common way migrants and refugees treat engagements with Centrelink or their provider as a job interview. Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer of the Settlement Council of Australia explained that migrants often 'put their best foot forward' and 'disguise or feel like they can't share all of the true issues that are underneath the surface'.78 The Department of Jobs and Small Business acknowledged that disclosure was a particular issue for refugees and advised that it is an area the Department is watching.79

5.58 The committee also heard that reassessment was a problem for refugees.80 Ms Tahiri reported that providers were often not willing to restream refugees.81 This is compounded by the fact that people from refugee backgrounds often do not know that they can be reassessed.82

5.59 The Refugee Council expressed concerns about the potential adverse impact of 'digitisation' of employment services for refugee participants. Computer literacy is not a requirement under early arrival programs, meaning new arrivals to Australia 'can leave these programs with little or no computer literacy'.83 The committee heard that refugees had been intentionally excluded from the government's Online Employment Services Trial.84 The Refugee Council was concerned that this will mean the trial 'will not pick up needs for interpreters for refugee and other jobseekers who are classified as Stream A or B'.85 The Refugee Council noted that face-to-face servicing would still be available, but pointed out that refugees are often incorrectly assessed as 'job ready'.86 The Refugee Council submitted that it was concerned that refugees would be forced to use a system they may not understand:

RCOA [the Refugee Council of Australia] is gravely concerned for refugee clients who will be forced to use the online streaming and compliance system, without any access to interpreters and translated materials, and

78 Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 3.

79 Ms Benedikte Jensen, Group Manager, Labour Market Strategy, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 34.

80 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, Attachment p. 9.

81 Ms Shukufa Tahiri, Policy Officer, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 62.

82 Mr Asher Hirsh, Senior Policy Officer, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 62.

83 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 4.

84 Ms Shukufa Tahiri, Policy Officer, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 60.

85 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 4.

86 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 4.

without any requirements that they are digitally literate or support to ensure that they are.87

5.60 The Refugee Council emphasised that there 'is no indication that the government has any strategy in place to prepare refugee jobseekers for their digital transformation and other digitalised services'.88 A number of submitters recommended specialised employment services programs for migrants, refugees and people seeking asylum.89

Women 5.61 The committee received evidence that jobactive is not delivering equal outcomes for women and men.90 For example, although 51 per cent of participants are women, only 44 per cent of participants assisted by the

Employment Fund are women. Additionally, women make up only 40 per cent of employment placements.91

5.62 Research by GSANZ found that the jobactive model was not suited to helping single mothers find work:

Single mothers are being forced into making decisions which often work against the financial security and wellbeing of their households. This includes being forced into precarious employment rather than being supported to create a viable pathway into secure, well-paid employment and/or to pursue individual goals. Further, onerous compliance requirements often forestall active engagement in paid employment and/or other activities that could lead to financial security.92

5.63 According to GSANZ, the jobactive model is founded on 'erroneous assumptions' about participants, 'including that they are unemployed and/or disengaged':

Our research participants did not reflect this assumption, with less than one third (eight women) being unemployed. Of this group, six women felt unable to engage with paid employment for a range of viable reasons, while only two were between jobs and actively looking for work. Surprisingly over two thirds of our research participants were actively participating in paid employment, with seven in part-time and/or

87 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 4.

88 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 4.

89 See for example, Ms Shukufa Tahiri, Policy Officer, Refugee Council of Australia, Committee

Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 59; and Harmony Alliance, Submission 33, p. 2.

90 The barriers to employment experienced by women are discussed in Chapter 3 under 'Nature and

causes of joblessness in Australia'.

91 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 30.

92 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 4.

precarious employment, five starting up or operating a small business, and six employed in stable, career-oriented positions.93

5.64 GSANZ also reported that many of the women participating in their research were referred to jobactive when they were not in a position to engage in paid work. The reasons for this included 'poor physical or mental health, past or ongoing experiences of intimate partner violence, intensive caring duties, disability, and clinical diagnoses'.94

Disability 5.65 Many Australians with disability who receive of income support and that do not have access to Disability Employment Services are required to participate in jobactive. People with disability make up more than 30 per cent of jobactive

participants.95

5.66 The committee heard that the jobactive program is not tailored to meeting the needs of people with disability.96 For example, Aspergers Victoria contended that 'jobactive has no understanding of the specific issues faced by the Asperger population' and suggested that there are insufficient resources available.97 Additionally, Aspergers Victoria submitted that online platforms were 'not suitable for many Aspergers, without guidance and support'.98

5.67 Ms Angela Gormley, an individual who provided a submission to the inquiry, described how her friend, who is hearing impaired, received inappropriate treatment from his provider:

My friend had to keep telling the Jobactive Provider he is hearing impaired and cannot talk on the phone. Being constantly pushed into unsuitable jobs was upsetting him. The staff from his Jobactive Provider…kept ringing him even though he said he has trouble hearing over the phone and wanted them to send him emails… One of the staff…said to him, "I want you to listen to me because I do not want to repeat myself."99

5.68 Submitters also raised the concern that some people with disability were being referred to jobactive when they were not able to work. For example, an ex-consultant for an employment agency submitted that 'you can't enforce jobactive rules onto a client who clearly isn't able to work and yet this happens

93 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 4.

94 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 4.

95 Ms Karen Rainbow, Chief Executive Officer, Employment Services, Advanced Personnel

Management, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 56.

96 The barriers to employment experienced by people with disability are discussed in Chapter 3

under 'Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia'.

97 Aspergers Victoria, Submission 36, p. 4.

98 Aspergers Victoria, Submission 36, p. 4.

99 Ms Angela Gormley, Submission 152, p. 1.

time and time again'.100 The ex-consultant reported that most of their job 'was focussing on people who I couldn't place or help because of their disability'.101 Another consultant, Ms Kylie Wright, submitted that she had a number of clients who 'should be on a Disability Support Payment':

These are people, who even if they were given jobs would be physically unable to perform them efficiently and would lose them shortly there after.102

First Nations people 5.69 A number of submitters considered that jobactive has not been meeting the needs of First Nations people.103 According to Mr Matt Little, Chief Executive Officer of CoAct, a jobactive provider, First Nations people are being breached

more frequently under the new Targeted Compliance Framework (TCF):

Under the TCF there seems to be a pattern emerging of Indigenous jobseekers being breached more frequently—a 25 per cent higher rate—for non-attendance of appointments.104

5.70 Of the nearly 45 000 First Nations people in jobactive, 44 per cent received a demerit and 0.4 per cent received a penalty, in the first three months of the TCF. This compares to 32.6 per cent, and 0.2 per cent, for the general caseload.105

5.71 Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager of Operations at The Salvation Army Employment Plus, a provider, suggested that the removal of discretion for providers was a problem for culturally significant events:

So culturally significant events occur, and staff struggle to apply TCF appropriately in those situations. We have had situations where jobseekers will be on [cultural] business and staff don't know because the direct staff aren't necessarily across the happenings in the community, and so there are inadvertently penalties applied.106

100 Name Withheld, Submission 90, p. 1.

101 Name Withheld, Submission 90, p. 1.

102 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 3.

103 See for example, Dr Travers McLeod, Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Policy Development,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 15; Mr Matt Little, Chief Executive Officer, CoAct, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 22. Note: the barriers to employment experienced by First Nations people are discussed in Chapter 3 under 'Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia'.

104 Mr Matt Little, Chief Executive Officer, CoAct, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 23.

105 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive figures, 30 September 2018, 2018-19

Supplementary Budget Estimates (tabled 24 October 2018), p. 1.

106 Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager, Operations, The Salvation Army Employment Plus,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 32.

5.72 Mr Matt Little, Chief Executive Officer of CoAct, a provider, advised that a different approach was needed to better support First Nations people:

Greater success with Indigenous jobseekers means: having greater flexibility than jobactive currently allows; having the flexibility to find transport where Aboriginal communities are distant from labour markets; working with whole families, as our intensive consultants do; investing in deep culture competence; investing over time in partnerships with local communities that do not need to be rebuilt at every reallocation or tender procurement; and focusing on building and sustaining motivation as a primary outcome.107

5.73 Mr Michael Kolomyjec, Group Executive of atWork Australia, a provider, raised the concern that the recent changes to the Wage Subsidy will have a detrimental impact on First Nations participants:

We are very concerned that removing the quarantined access to the pool for Indigenous wage subsidies and reverting this to providers needing to access their employment funds will have a detrimental impact on the success of many Indigenous jobseekers.108

5.74 Mr Matthew Hall, the Chief Executive Officer of Sureway Employment and Training, a provider, agreed with Mr Kolomyjec:

…moving Indigenous wage subsidies back to a general pool of funds which competes with those training and support services and other specific safety needs and all sorts of things involved is actually counterintuitive to any closing the gap initiative. It's reducing funding for those critical services for Indigenous Australians.109

5.75 Mr Rod Shehan, jobactive participant, described feeling that the jobactive system was not designed for a person like himself:

…as a person that identifies as part aboriginal, and lives away from most western culturally identifiable behaviours (television, sport, drinking, socialising) I do not identify well with other mainstream society values. The jobactive system seems to be aimed at people in neatly tailored pigeon holes that suit the norms applied from western society; where most people can be identified as a target group, while leaving a fringe of others behind. This is despite the system stating that it is tailored to individual circ*mstances; but providers do not use this to assess what is required to obtain an outcome for unemployed workers.110

107 Mr Matt Little, Chief Executive Officer, CoAct, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 24.

108 Mr Michael Kolomyjec, Group Executive, atWork Australia Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 29.

109 Mr Matthew Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Sureway Employment and Training, Committee

Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 30.

110 Mr Rod Shehan, Submission 104, p. 2.

Mental health 5.76 The committee heard that the jobactive program is not well equipped to assist participants who have a mental illness or mental health problems.111 Ms Mona Saeidavi, the General Manager of Employment Services at Advanced

Personnel Management, a provider, informed the committee that mental health issues ‘are not currently being serviced appropriately’ under jobactive, which then creates further issues for the participant, especially in relation to the compliance framework.112

5.77 A jobactive participant with mental health issues described feeling that these issues were 'swept under the rug' by their provider:

My mental health problems and recent diagnosis of sleep apnoea seem to be issues constantly swept under the rug, as case managers regularly refer me to roles that are completely unsuitable. Despite the uncontrollable nature of my mental and physical barriers I am treated as if I am making excuses.113

5.78 The same participant considered that his Job Plan ignored the issues he faced.114 Another jobactive participant said they were ashamed to talk about their mental health issues with their provider because they were afraid that the consultants would 'continue to dismiss them as they previously have been'.115

5.79 According to Ms Karen Rainbow, the Chief Executive Officer of Employment Services at Advanced Personnel Management, people’s mental health issues are not always identified in the jobactive assessment process:

…people with undiagnosed mental health issues end up in the system when they haven't been completely assessed properly. Therefore, when they come into a site, someone doesn't have the knowledge to know how to deal with them.116

Mature age workers 5.80 The committee heard that mature age workers can struggle to meet the requirements imposed on them under jobactive.117 Additionally, submitters

111 The barriers to employment experienced by people with mental health issues are discussed in

Chapter 3 under 'Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia'.

112 Ms Mona Saeidavi, General Manager, Employment Services, Advanced Personnel Management,

Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 62.

113 Name Withheld, Submission 135, p. 1.

114 Name Withheld, Submission 135, p. 1.

115 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 7.

116 Ms Karen Rainbow, Chief Executive Officer, Employment Services, Advanced Personnel

Management, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 66.

117 The barriers to employment experienced by mature age workers are discussed in Chapter 3 under

'Nature and causes of joblessness in Australia'.

pointed out that jobactive services and mutual obligations are not always relevant to mature age participants who often have diminishing job prospects.118 For example, a 55 year old submitter with three degrees and 30 years of professional career experience, contented that his mutual obligation requirements did not improve his employability:

What, for example, is there about moving trees in planter pots, carving moss from paving stone joins, picking up litter from a park area, dusting and cleaning shelves, or hanging clothes on clothes hangers, that deserves the label ‘retail’ or ‘training’, and how does such manual labour make me more employable than my three university degrees?119

5.81 Another submitter, who is in his early 50's, emphasised that jobactive does not recognise the age discrimination that mature age workers experience, which makes it harder to find work.120

5.82 According to Dr Catherine Earl, Senior Policy and Research Officer from the Australian Human Rights Commission, there are few resources for providers to assist older workers:

…the jobactive staff don't have sufficient information. They're unaware of some of the programs. They don't have sufficient tools and resources and they potentially don't have sufficient training to manage these older jobseekers. One of the submissions mentioned they had training modules on disability, on mental health, and on culturally and linguistically diverse jobseekers, but not specifically on the mature cohort.121

5.83 The committee also heard that older people eligible for the Age Pension are not eligible for jobactive services. Additionally, some mature age jobseekers not receiving income support are not aware that they can access some jobactive services as a volunteer.122

Participants with tertiary qualifications 5.84 Some submitters considered that jobactive was not designed to assist participants who have tertiary qualifications.123 GSANZ reported that a woman

118 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 97, p. 1; Name Withheld, Submission 120, p. 2.

119 Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 11.

120 Name Withheld, Submission 80, p. 1.

121 Dr Catherine Earl, Senior Policy and Research Officer, Age Discrimination, Australian Human

Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 11.

122 Dr Kay Patterson, Age Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 9.

123 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 5; and Ms Angela Gormley, Submission 152,

p. 1; Mr Rohan Musch, Submission 86, p. 1.

in their study was told by her provider that she was over-qualified and 'while wishing her well, staff were unable to assist her in any practical way'.124

5.85 Similarly, a researcher with a PhD submitted that their provider was unable to provide them assistance:

[the provider was]…either unable to understand the type of work I was looking for (when asked if I was qualified to be a Researcher, my qualifications were recorded as ‘Certificate IV in P.H.D. studies’) or were unable to support me in a career change by providing career counselling.125

Committee view 5.86 It is clear that the jobactive program has categorically failed to meet the needs of participants. Even in the correct stream, participants are not receiving adequate support. Unemployed people are not a hom*ogenous group. They

have different backgrounds, needs and skills. Jobactive's one-size-fits-all approach is not good enough.

5.87 The committee considers that employment services should have sufficient flexibility to allow tailored approaches to suit different cohorts. Of course, it would not be feasible or desirable to implement different programs for all cohorts. Nevertheless, a generalist employment services program should meet the needs of its users. The government should consider trialling new approaches and implementing complementary or replacement services, and options to improve baseline services.

5.88 The committee recognises that many participants need more support to get into work, or back into work. The committee considers that the government should examine the merits of providing career counselling and support services for those who may need it, such as people who are entering the paid workforce for the first time or returning after caring for a child or family member, and people who are over 40 years of age who are struggling to reset their careers.

5.89 To support the needs of young people, the committee considers that the government should continue to work with providers that have developed expertise in labour market programs specifically targeted towards young people. Furthermore, the government should consider appropriate ways to support these providers.

5.90 The committee notes that First Nations people and people with disability or mental or physical health concerns often do not receive the support they need under jobactive. The committee considers that the government should investigate how to ensure that generalist employment services can better meet the needs of these groups of people.

124 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 22.

125 Name Withheld, Submission 144, p. 1.

Recommendation 7

Recommendation 8

5.92 The committee recommends that the government investigate options to ensure that employment services meet the needs of First Nations people and people with disabilities and other health barriers.

Recommendation 9

Spending on employment services 5.94 The committee heard that inadequate investment by the government is contributing to inadequate support for participants. A number of submitters noted that current investment in employment services is well below

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) averages.126 Ms Sally Sinclair, the Chief Executive Officer of NESA suggested that current spending is inadequate:

We are less than half of the OECD average investment…and we've also seen…year on year, end on end, a decrease in investment in Australian employment services. So, we've tracked the investment. At $1,400, an average outcome, when even the forecasts were $2,500, that's got to be saying that maybe it's time to actually have a look at these services and to put in a proper level of investment to provide the right quality of services that people are, quite rightly, saying that they expect. Stream A, no matter how you cut it, is not an adequate investment for people who are long-term unemployed, straight out of prison, homeless, with diagnosed mental health conditions, with drug and alcohol addiction—you name it.127

5.95 According to NESA, the quantum of funding available is a significant determinant of the quality and effectiveness of services. In this regard, NESA

126 See for example, Australian Council of Trade Unions, Submission 14, p. 4; Dr Peter Davidson,

Senior Adviser, Australian Council of Social Service, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 4; Mr Llewellyn Reynders, Policy Manager, Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS), Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 35.

127 Ms Sally Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer, NESA, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 76.

suggested that service requirements are generally more ambitious than funding structures.128

5.96 This was also the view of the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), which considered that good quality employment services cannot be funded within the present resources allocated to jobactive. According to ACOSS, overall funding should be at least half the average OECD level as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (an increase of approximately $500 million per annum in current dollars).129

Committee view 5.97 The committee notes that Australia's spending on employment services is low compared to OECD averages. The committee considers that the government should review the adequacy of funding levels for employment services.

Recommendation 10

5.98 The committee recommends that the government review the adequacy of funding levels for employment services.

Changing providers 5.99 When job seekers register for income support and are placed into the jobactive program, they are allocated a jobactive provider. Participants can change providers if they are unhappy with their current provider but this must be

approved by the government.130 Giving participants choice over their provider is intended to improve competition in the sector. However, some participants reported not being able to change provider. Mr Thomas Studans, a jobactive participant, had his request to change providers ignored:

I advised their floor manager that they needed to action my request for a transfer of providers as instructed. I was told “I think I know how to do my job” and directly contradicted.131

Changing providers under future employment services 5.100 The Report of the Expert Advisory Panel states that participants referred to enhanced services will be able to make an informed choice of provider based on provider expertise and performance:

ï Job seekers can choose and change their provider.

128 NESA, Submission 54, p. 13.

129 ACOSS, Submission on Future Employment Services, August 2018, www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ACOSS_submission-on-future-employment-services_FINAL.pdf (accessed 2 February 2019), p. 9.

130 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 65.

131 Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, p. 4.

ï A simple ‘report card’ gives job seekers detailed information about each provider. This report card could include feedback from other job seekers or employers.132

5.101 The report also states that processes for informed choice will involve greater scrutiny of provider performance by job seekers. This is intended to encourage greater competition between providers.133

Committee view 5.102 The committee is concerned by evidence that requests to change provider are being ignored. The committee is strongly of the view that participants should be able to change providers, and in this regard, is supportive of the

recommendation of the Expert Panel to improve the ability of participants to make an informed choice. However, the committee notes that the Expert Panel’s report does not contain substantial detail about how the issues under the current system would be addressed.

The Employment Fund 5.103 The Employment Fund is a flexible pool of funds that can be accessed by providers for reimbursem*nt of goods or services that assist participants to build experience and skills to get a job.134 When a participant is registered with

a provider, the provider is paid an amount into the fund. However, this funding is not assigned to any individual participant and can be used as needed across the provider's client base.

5.104 The Employment Fund can be used for a range of goods and services, such as:

ï accredited interpreters; ï accredited training; ï work-related clothing, hygiene packs and basic haircuts; ï driving lessons; ï non-accredited employer-required training such as pre-employment food

safety training; ï Indigenous training and mentoring; ï transport for the participant; ï medical and health related expenses if health issues are inhibiting a job

seeker’s capacity to find and keep a job; ï professional services such as drug and alcohol counselling; ï relocation assistance; ï short-term rent and crisis accommodation;

132 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 64.

133 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 65.

134 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, p. 101.

ï tools, books, equipment, and basic mobile phones; and ï cards and vouchers for food, phone calls or petrol.135

5.105 However, providers are required to ensure that goods or services they purchase for reimbursem*nt under the Fund are not specifically prohibited and also meet the following criteria:

ï provides eligible job seekers with the work-related tools, skills and experience that correspond with their difficulties in finding and keeping a job in the relevant labour market

ï provides value for money ï complies with any work, health and safety laws that may apply ï withstands public scrutiny, and ï will not bring Employment Services or the Government into

disrepute.136

5.106 During the inquiry, one of the main concerns raised about the Employment Fund was that it is often not fully utilised. Many submitters to the inquiry reported not being able to access the fund.137 According to NESA, the Employment Fund is regularly underspent.138 The Department of Jobs and Small Business advised that as at June 2018, the national average usage of employment fund credits was approximately 58 per cent.139

5.107 The committee heard that restrictions on the use of the Employment Fund have increased and the Fund is now more prescriptive.140 NESA submitted that the restrictions on access to the fund 'reduce accessibility to much needed resources to support service delivery'.141 This point was also made by Mrs Renae Lowry, the Executive General Manager of Employment and Training for genU (Karingal Inc—MatchWorks), a provider:

135 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Using the Employment Fund General Account, Guideline

Version 3.1, 8 August 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/employment-fund-general-account-guideline (accessed 21 January 2019), pp. 15-22.

136 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Using the Employment Fund General Account, Guideline

Version 3.1, 8 August 2018, p. 7.

137 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 136, p. 1.

138 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

139 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 36.

140 Mr Matt Little, Chief Executive Officer, CoAct (formerly Job Futures Ltd), Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 35.

141 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

The increased complexity and administration around the employment fund makes it almost impossible to tailor an individual approach to working with one person whose barriers are multiple and complex.142

5.108 An example of the restrictions on the use of the fund is that payments for employer required training to enable participants to take up specific roles must be approved by the Department in advance.143 NESA submitted that the time taken to write proposals and obtain approval from the Department 'reduces the responsiveness of the sector to employer needs and diminishes job seeker opportunity'.144

5.109 The committee heard that a highly restricted amount is available for a participant to obtain a licence, and the amount does not cover the costs of driving lessons. The committee also heard that 'in regional locations, nothing enhances your employability more than a driver's licence'.145 However the Department of Jobs and Small Business advised that improvements have been made in this area:

…since the employment fund was established under this contract, a number of changes have been made in relation to licences. At the start of the contract, there was a limit of $330 that could be used for driving lessons; that was increased to $1,100.146

5.110 The Department also advised that the restriction on access to funding to obtain a licence where people had lost their licence due to their own conduct had been removed.147 However the committee heard that the improvements are still insufficient to cover the costs of obtaining a licence.148

5.111 The committee also heard that the administrative burden of using the Employment Fund was significant.149 According to Ms Annette Gill, Principal Policy Advisor at NESA, restrictions on the use of the Employment Fund have increased the administrative burden for providers:

142 Mrs Renae Lowry, Executive General Manager Employment and Training, genU (Karingal Inc—

MatchWorks), Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 28.

143 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

144 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

145 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 59.

146 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 36.

147 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 36.

148 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 59.

149 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC JARVIS, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 6.

There are a lot more restrictions on what you can use the employment fund for now, as well. Some of the investments that you may want make, you have to make extra applications to the department to do things. There is more paperwork and more hurdles.150

5.112 Additionally, NESA advised the committee that use of the fund is low because providers are not incentivised to use it:

…providers do not receive compensation for the costs of arranging purchases or the significant administrative requirements in claiming reimbursem*nt (which often exceed the cost of purchase). Since the introduction of the EF [Employment Fund] in 2003, through quarantining 20% of service funds, there has been a steady increase in restrictions of EF use as well as shifting funding for previously core service costs to the EF.151

5.113 A number of providers informed the committee that consultants were cautious about using the Employment Fund in order to avoid an expense not being accepted by the Department.152 According to Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager of Operations for The Salvation Army Employment Plus, consultants have a 'fear based approach' to using the fund because 'one wrong click or one wrong recording means that the organisation is at risk of recovery of funds and compliance action'.153 This point was also made by Mr Matt Little, the Chief Executive Officer of CoAct, who said that consultants used the fund cautiously in order to ensure any spending on participants was within narrow guidelines:

…if you do push the boundary of what that individual needs, the individual staff member and the organisation is at risk of recovery. Then you get into having to justify the decision of why that purchase was made and you're justifying it to someone who's not regionally based and understands what is required in a country town but rather someone sitting in Canberra who's making a subjective decision.154

5.114 From 1 January 2019, wage subsidies are to be drawn from the Employment Fund, rather than a quarantined pool of funds. This change is discussed in more detail under 'Wage Subsidies' below. The change was a concern to providers in relation to the government's general unpredictable management of spending under the Employment Fund. It was pointed out by Ms Dianne Fletcher, the Chief Executive Officer of Sarina Russo Job Access, that providers had been spending the Employment Fund cautiously to ensure there were

150 Ms Annette Gill, Principal Policy Advisor, NESA, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 74.

151 NESA, Submission 54, p. 16.

152 See for example, Ms Kathleen Newcombe, Group Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Group,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 35; and Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager—Operations, The Salvation Army Employment Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 27.

153 Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager—Operations, The Salvation Army Employment Plus,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 27.

154 Mr Matt Little, Chief Executive Officer, CoAct, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 35.

adequate funds for the duration of the contact, however, now additional costs have been moved into the Fund:

…we entered into it in 2015 with an expectation and a forward plan… as to how much funds could be credited to the employment fund over the five-year period. We knew it was finite, so we were managing that. So, sometimes in the early parts, one spends more cautiously in order to ensure that one has more funds and sufficient funds at the end of the contract. But the rules have changed midstream and now, all of a sudden, more bills have been added to the employment fund. So, cautious management that may have built sufficient funds to manage and support the tail end of the contract where we knew we would have more challenging and more longer-term unemployed jobseekers requiring investment has actually worked against us all.155

5.115 The committee also heard that funding for the Career Transition Assistance program has to come out of the existing funding in the Employment Fund. According to Ms Kathleen Newcombe, Group Chief Executive Officer of Sarina Russo Group, this means the Career Transition Assistance pilots are struggling to attract sufficient clients:

There were no ring-fenced dollars for the pilot. Where we find it sits at the moment is that the pilots are struggling to attract sufficient clients… [D]ecisions were being made about wage subsidies versus CTA [Career Transition Assistance].156

5.116 The Department of Jobs and Small Business confirmed that funding for the Career Transition Assistance program now comes out of the Employment Fund.157 The Department estimates that the Career Transition Program will draw $296.7 million from the Employment Fund over three years from 2019-20 to 2021-22.158

5.117 Despite these concerns, according to the Department, there are adequate funds in the Employment Fund to cover wage subsidies and the other items that have been added to the Fund.159

155 Ms Dianne Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Job Access, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 35.

156 Ms Kathleen Newcombe, Group Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Group, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 36.

157 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 48.

158 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 17.

159 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 49.

Funding for goods and services under future employment services 5.118 The Expert Panel's report recommends a change from the existing Employment Fund arrangements to 'dedicated funding to solve local job seeker barriers which can be accessed without the red tape'.160 No further

information is provided about how this new funding arrangement would work.

Committee view 5.119 The committee notes that the Employment Fund can be administratively burdensome for providers to use. The committee further notes that the Fund is significantly underutilised, with just over half of available funds being

allocated. In this context, the committee supports improving the accessibility of funding for goods and services as recommended by the Expert Panel, so that the sector can remain responsive to the needs of employers and participants. The committee is of the view that the government should examine options to improve access to the Employment Fund.

Recommendation 11

5.120 The committee recommends that the government examine options to improve access to the Employment Fund.

Wage subsidies 5.121 A wage subsidy is a financial incentive for businesses to employ certain job seekers. Different wage subsidies are available to encourage employers to employ disadvantaged job seekers. Businesses can receive a subsidy of up to

$10 000 for employing participants who are 15-24 years of age, a First Nations Australian, or a person aged 50 years or over. Alternatively, businesses can receive a subsidy of up to $6 500 for employing participants who are 25-29 years of age, a principal carer parent, or a person who has been registered with an employment services provider for 12 months or more.161

5.122 During the inquiry, the committee heard that wage subsidies are to be drawn from the Employment Fund from 1 January 2019.162 This was disappointing to many submitters.163 According to the Department of Jobs and Small Business,

160 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 22.

161 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Wage Subsidies, https://jobsearch.gov.au/employer-info/wage-subsidies (accessed 21 January 2019).

162 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 35.

163 See for example, Mr Llewellyn Reyders, Policy Manager, VCOSS, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 31; and Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 58.

there is no reduction in funding.164 The Department advised that adequate funds were available in the Employment Fund to pay for wage subsidies.165 However the committee heard from some providers that this was not the case.166 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer of Joblink Plus advised that providers were not receiving a consistent message from the government:

…two years ago the government was saying, 'Please spend, spend, spend your employment fund on progressing your caseload and getting them educated,' and now the government is saying to us, now that it's encouraged us to spend it all, 'By the way, now we want you to use that employment fund that we encouraged you to spend two years ago to actually pay for wage subsidies.'167

5.123 The Department of Jobs and Small Business acknowledged that 'some providers have spent more of their employment fund credits than other providers'.168 The Department however noted that the Employment Fund credits are topped up each time a provider takes on a new participant.169 Conversely, Ms Christine Shewry from Joblink Plus pointed out that her organisation was not getting a top up of the fund to support wage subsidies because they did not have many new people coming through.170

5.124 Submitters expressed different views about the effectiveness of wage subsidies. Some strongly supported the use of subsidies to improve employment outcomes.171 Research on the use of wage subsidies in Australia and internationally indicates that they can have a positive effect on

164 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 6 December 2018 (received

2 January 2019), p. 4.

165 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 35.

166 See for example, Mr Matthew Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Sureway Employment and Training,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 30; and Ms Dianne Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Job Access, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, pp. 32, 35.

167 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 58.

168 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 35.

169 Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programs, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 35.

170 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 58.

171 See for example, Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC JARVIS, Committee

Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 6; and Mr Richard Spurrell, Executive General Manager, MAX Solutions, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 42.

employment outcomes.172 Ms Christine Shewry advocated for greater use of wage subsidies:

Evidence proves that one of the single, most effective ways to improve employment outcomes is wage subsidies—certainly in our experience. Our experience at Joblink Plus shows that, with a wage subsidy, 72 per cent of placed jobseekers achieve a 26-week outcome—in answer to your question. Without a wage subsidy, that conversion rate reduces to 66 per cent. That is significant across the whole of the program.173

5.125 The committee heard that wage subsidies were contributing to employment outcomes in the Youth Jobs PaTH program. Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business, advised that under the program, over 11 000 young people who received a subsidy have moved off income support for 26 weeks or more.174 For a discussion of the PaTH program see Chapter 3.

5.126 Others submitters emphasised that wage subsidies need to be well designed. For example, the Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS) suggested that wage subsidies must create genuine pathways to long-term employment, rather than 'merely subsidising short-term positions'.175

5.127 The Brotherhood of St Laurence, a not-for-profit organisation, submitted that wage subsidies need to be part of a broader package of supports:

Our experience and research (both local and international) shows wage subsidies by themselves are not effective, but as part of a package of support, can open up opportunities for jobseekers experiencing disadvantage to secure and sustain employment.176

5.128 The Brotherhood of St Laurence submitted that wage subsidies should be used alongside other supports, including:

ï Job-readiness training, particularly for jobseekers with limited previous work experience, such as young people, long-term unemployed, refugees and migrants (who may lack familiarity with Australian workplace culture), or skills updating (for mature aged)

ï Ongoing post-placement support to maximise the chances of a continuing employment relationship ï A focus on positions that offer the real prospect of ongoing employment

172 Jeff Borland, 'Dealing with unemployment: What should be the role of labour market programs?',

Evidence Base, no. 4, 2014, pp. 11-12.

173 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 58.

174 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

175 Mr Llewellyn Reyders, Policy Manager, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 31.

176 Brotherhood of St Laurence, additional information received 12 November 2018 (no. 2), p. 1

(emphasis in original).

ï The opportunity to participate in quality training related to the job ï Clear expectations that employers will provide a supportive work environment and develop the skills of subsidised recruits.177

5.129 Under jobactive, uptake of available wage subsidies has been low.178 The committee heard that organising a wage subsidy can be complex for providers.179 This is also an issue for businesses. According to Mr Luke Aitken, Senior Manager, Policy, from the New South Wales Business Chamber, red tape may be preventing uptake of wage subsidies by businesses:

Red tape can involve a number of different things: understanding your obligations, taking time to research what your obligations are, confirming what those arrangements need to be, calculating what the subsidies should be and checking that the requirements have been performed. A lot of that doesn't get costed by a business, but it does take time, money and energy for a business owner to comply with all of that.180

5.130 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy for SYC, a provider, suggested that the naming of wage subsidies could be improved: 'labelling a wage subsidy a very long-term unemployed wage subsidy puts employers off'.181

5.131 Another issue raised during the inquiry relates to the accessibility of wage subsidies. Dr Catherine Earl, Senior Policy and Research Officer, Age Discrimination, Australian Human Rights Commission, questioned why jobseekers are required to wait on income support for six months before they can access a wage subsidy.182

Wage subsidies under future employment services 5.132 The Expert Panel's report into the future of employment services recommends greater support for employers to trial job seekers, including through wage subsidies. In support of this recommendation, the report notes that wage

subsidies have been shown to be effective interventions for highly disadvantaged job seekers under previous employment services contracts.183

177 Brotherhood of St Laurence, additional information received 12 November 2018 (no. 2), pp. 1-2.

178 Brotherhood of St Laurence, additional information received 12 November 2018 (no. 2), p. 2.

179 Mr Richard Spurrell, Executive General Manager, MAX Solutions, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 42.

180 Mr Luke Aitken, Senior Manager, Policy, NSW Business Chamber, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 22.

181 Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC JARVIS, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 6.

182 Dr Catherine Earl, Senior Policy and Research Officer, Age Discrimination, Australian Human

Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 16.

183 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 59.

Committee view 5.133 It is clear to the committee that wage subsidies must be well-designed to ensure that they do not simply result in the creation of short term employment opportunities. Additionally, they must be designed to ensure they are not used

to fill positions that would otherwise go to another labour market participant. Furthermore, they must be straightforward for employers to access. In this regard, the committee supports the recommendation of the Expert Panel for greater support for employers to trial job seekers, including through wage subsidies, provided the support programs are well-designed and advance the interests of both employers and prospective employees.

Work experience 5.134 During the inquiry, there was support for a greater emphasis on real work experience opportunities.184 Ms Christine Shewry, the Chief Executive Officer of provider Joblink Plus, recommended a 4 week paid work trial:

Seventy-nine per cent of Joblink Plus participants in the internship programs that we have offered—and we've been fairly successful in that—get employment. We are confident that most employers, with an incentive—it doesn't have to be a large one—will be in a position to make a decision to hire within a four-week time frame.185

5.135 Similarly, My Pathway noted that real work experience may 'provide employers with more free hours in the short term but could lead to employment that reduces the reliance on welfare over the long-term'.186

Committee view 5.136 The committee notes international evidence that supportive programs achieve better employment outcomes.187 There is evidence that supportive policies get people into more stable employment.188 The committee also notes strong

submitter support for a greater emphasis on work experience. Accordingly, the committee considers that the government should consider options to encourage greater work experience opportunities for employment services participants.

184 Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training, Australian Chamber of Commerce

and Industry, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 21; My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 4.

185 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 58.

186 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 4.

187 Dr Tony Ward, Submission 32, p. 4.

188 Dr Tony Ward, Submission 32, p. 4.

Recommendation 12

5.137 The committee recommends that the government consider options to encourage greater work experience opportunities for employment services participants.

Place-based and local approaches 5.138 During the inquiry the committee heard about the benefits of place-based and local approaches for improving employment outcomes.189 For example, VCOSS submitted that place-based approaches can create jobs in areas of concentrated

unemployment. Place-based approaches 'use local knowledge to identify employment opportunities, barriers and linkages' not visible to departments.190 They also 'harness local resources across government, business, philanthropic and non-government sectors'.191

5.139 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser from ACOSS explained that having local providers is more important for communities outside the major cities:

Not all providers should be small local organisations, but it really does help if the organisation has roots and connections in a local community, especially those communities outside of the major cities. We think they're likely to be better connected with other local services and employers and more understanding of the need of unemployed people, and in a way more accountable.

A large for-profit provider, for example, is accountable to its board and its shareholders to achieve financial returns, but, when you have the small local provider—or indeed providers who specialise in assisting a group that they care about and are concerned about—that's a different dynamic on the ground.192

5.140 According to the Brotherhood of St Laurence, the jobactive model has pushed smaller community organisations out of employment services which has reduced 'opportunities for responsiveness to local circ*mstances and local collaboration'.193 The number of providers has reduced considerably over time. At the start of the Job Network program (1998) there were about 300 providers.194 There are now 42 jobactive providers.195 According to Jobs

189 See for example, Mr Andrew Cummings, Acting National Coordinator, Multicultural Youth

Advocacy Network, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 28; Jesuit Social Services, Submission 57, p. 5.

190 VCOSS, Submission 49, p. 13.

191 VCOSS, Submission 49, p. 13.

192 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, Australian Council of Social Service, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 7.

193 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission 16, pp. 3-4.

194 Jobs Australia, State of Play: Jobactive Employment Services 2015-2020 Tender Results,

www.ja.com.au/sites/default/files/final_sop_-_es_2015-2020_tender_results.pdf (accessed 9 February 2019), p. 2.

Australia, over time it has become harder for small community organisations to participate in the employment services system as 'efficiency of scale' is increasingly prioritised over 'flexibility and bottom-up innovation'.196

5.141 According to Ms Petrass, Policy Manager, Workforce Skills, from the New South Wales Business Chamber, the jobactive program fails to integrate with local programs:

…there are often locally targeted programs—local initiatives—that can assist unemployed people to develop those skills, but they're not often well integrated with the jobactive program, and there are barriers to getting these programs aligned with—or not even aligned with—to getting these programs recognised by jobactive service providers and getting people into them. We had a great example down in our Illawarra region where there's a youth employment strategy. They run a number of programs which develop some of those pre-employment skills. They had great difficulty in the beginning—it's a bit better now—getting the job service providers to even look at those programs. They had candidates lined up and they had host employers lined up, and they couldn't get jobactive support.197

Place-based and local approaches under future employment services 5.142 The Expert Advisory Panel considered that universal employment services should 'provide a framework which allows for local responses to local challenges and opportunities'.198 The Panel recommended a place-based

approach of 'regional governance arrangements (e.g. local boards/structures) and facilitators [to] support links with employers and other submitters in local areas'.199

5.143 The Panel recommended that the future system involve the following components:

Establish local groups to develop solutions to local employment issues

Provide local funds for these solutions e.g. community projects which create work experiences

Incentivise job seekers to work in seasonal employment e.g. fruit picking

Support job seekers who want to move outside of their local community to find work or take up a job.

195 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 1.

196 Jobs Australia, State of Play: Jobactive Employment Services 2015-2020 Tender Results, p. 3.

197 Ms Megan Petrass, Policy Manager, Workforce Skills, NSW Business Chamber, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 20.

198 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 25.

199 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 60.

Ensure that employment services provider funding reflects different regional circ*mstances

Seek local feedback into the employment service provider performance framework200

5.144 According to the Panel, the local groups established to develop local solutions would not replace employment services providers, but would instead work alongside them.201

5.145 From October 2018 to June 2020, the government is undertaking Regional Employment Trials in ten disadvantaged regions in Australia. Funding of $1 million has been allocated to each region. Under the Trials, 'locals work with employment facilitators and Regional Development Australia committees to develop solutions to local employment issues'.202

Committee view 5.146 The committee notes that jobactive is currently not well equipped to support place-based and local solutions for specific communities. The committee considers that the government should do more to facilitate place-based

approaches in areas of high unemployment. In this regard, the committee supports the Expert Panel's recommendation for regional governance arrangements. The committee considers that place-based approaches must however stand alongside a high-quality, universal employment services program.

Restoration of public service delivery of employment services 5.147 Many submitters to the inquiry were supportive of the full or partial restoration of public service delivery of employment services. Broadly, these submitters considered that public delivery would better meet the needs of

more disadvantaged participants, who can be left behind under a privatised system. In this context the committee notes that highly disadvantaged participants have particularly poor outcomes within the private service delivery model, with the average Stream C participant being with the program for five years.203 According to Per Capita and the AUWU, the full privatisation of employment services 'has undermined the public value of the system'.204 Per

200 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 25 (numbering omitted).

201 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 28.

202 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 26.

203 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission 16, p. 1.

204 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 61.

Capita and the AUWU provided the following testimonial from Jason, an unemployed worker in Adelaide:

I remember the old days of the CES [Commonwealth Employment Service] where you would sit down and talk to them for half an hour and they would get an idea of what you could do, what you’re about, where you would be suited and if you got a job, you probably be still in it two years later. Now you have to look for work and you have to attend your job network provider and they are two different things.205

5.148 The Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) recommended a single, unified public provider of employment services, to provide enhanced support to disadvantaged job seekers. According to the CPSU, the ongoing failure of private providers to deliver for the most disadvantaged 'only strengthens the case for Commonwealth provision of employment services to the most disadvantaged jobseekers'.206 The CPSU suggested that the public provider should be trialled first in regional areas.207

5.149 Per Capita and the AUWU recommended restoration of some market share of the employment services system to public service delivery:

Restoration of a publicly funded and operated system, particularly to address the needs of the long-term unemployed and those with significant skills gaps and other special needs, would prove a more efficient and effective model of service delivery for those job seekers who experience significant difficulty in finding and retaining work.208

5.150 According to Per Capita and the AUWU, this would 'ensure the necessary institutional supports for the training and development of staff, and restore a public service ethos that would focus on genuine assistance'.209 Similarly, the CPSU suggested that a public employment services provider would be more likely to be an employer of choice, attracting professional and well-trained staff.210 The CPSU also suggested that stronger integration with other services would be needed to help address more complex, non-vocational barriers to employment, such as homelessness and addiction.211

5.151 The CPSU suggested that the example of Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service Australia demonstrates that a successful public service option can coexist alongside other providers:

205 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 39.

206 CPSU, Submission 22, Attachment 1, p. 7.

207 CPSU, Submission 22, Attachment 1, p. 8.

208 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 61.

209 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 39.

210 CPSU, Submission 22, Attachment 1, p. 7.

211 CPSU, Submission 22, Attachment 1, p. 7.

CRS [Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service] Australia provided a good example of what the Commonwealth could do. According to an ANAO audit, over the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010, 90 per cent of respondents indicated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the support received from CRS Australia. Despite the quality of services, CRS Australia was dismantled with the outsourcing of the remaining 47 per cent of Disability Employment Services - Disability Management Service work that was delivered by CRS Australia. The past experience of CRS Australia also shows the choice of a public option can exist side by side with other providers and deliver for clients.212

5.152 The CPSU also pointed out that restoration of public service delivery would ensure that policy development is informed by on the ground experience.213

5.153 Other submitters supported complete restoration of public service delivery of employment services.214 Per Capita and the AUWU noted that restoration of public service delivery would eliminate issues of creaming and parking that occur under a privatised system.215

Committee view 5.154 Throughout the inquiry, the committee has received substantial evidence about the failings of the privatised jobactive model, particularly in regard to meeting the needs of the most disadvantaged in our community. A return to

some public service delivery of employment services could have a number of benefits for job seekers and improve the professionalisation of the industry. The committee considers that the government must seriously consider the restoration of some public service delivery of employment services for certain cohorts of unemployed people.

Recommendation 13

5.155 The committee recommends that the government review the costs and benefits of restoring public service delivery of employment services for certain cohorts of unemployed people.

212 CPSU, Submission 22, Attachment 1, p. 8 (citations omitted).

213 CPSU, Submission 22, Attachment 1, p. 8.

214 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 136, p. 2; and Name Withheld, Submission 139, p. 3.

215 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 39.

Chapter 6

Employment services consultants

I got out of this industry and role because there was no care for these clients, nor a plan to help those in need.1

Overview 6.1 This chapter examines issues related to employment services consultants. It considers the extent of engagement with employers under jobactive.

6.2 The chapter is structured according to the following topics:

ï High turnover ï Large caseloads ï Training ï Mistreatment of participants ï Engagement with employers

6.3 The committee's recommendations are set out throughout the chapter.

High turnover 6.4 There are high turnover rates in the employment services sector.2 Jobactive provider consultant turnover is 42 per cent per annum.3 This is almost three times the national average.4 The Australian Unemployed Workers' Union

(AUWU) summarised the difficult environment that many consultants work in:

Case workers themselves are in a difficult position. Some have been unsuccessful in their own job seeking efforts, having taken the position because nothing else was available. Due to the lack of adequate training provided, some cannot communicate well with people facing significant barriers to work and often adopt an attitude to which blames unemployed workers for their own unemployment. Others feel frustration with their organisations who engage in dubious business practices requiring them to act in ways contrary to their own personal value systems.5

1 Name Withheld, Submission 90, p. 2.

2 Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), Submission 27, p. 22.

3 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/i-want-work (accessed 9 February 2019), p. 21.

4 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/next-generation-employment-services-discussion-paper (accessed 4 February 2019), p. 20.

5 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 22 (citations omitted).

6.5 The committee heard that high staff turnover rates have a number of implications for service quality. The Edmund Rice Centre WA summarised these implications as follows:

The staff in the Jobactive agencies changes and rotates quickly. This leads to the inconsistent advice and an exceptionally long time for staff members to get an understanding of the client's issues and needs… The liquidity of the Jobactive workforce negates all the effort and resources spent when almost each new appointment with the client is managed by different staff members.6

6.6 According to Ms Kim Pendlebury, a jobactive participant from Melbourne, high staff turnover is extremely frustrating for participants:

…the high staff turnover within the JSPs [jobactive providers] is often incredibly frustrating. You deal with one person for a few months only to be informed on one visit that they're moving on, and you've got to get to know a new consultant. I reckon that in my almost six years I've dealt with at least half-a-dozen consultants, if not more, at one agency.7

Large caseloads 6.7 The committee heard that it is common in the industry for consultants to be managing very high caseloads.8 The average caseload is 148 participants.9 The AUWU submitted that these caseloads make it 'impossible for most case

managers to meaningfully fulfil the code of practice and the service guarantee'.10 Similarly, Jesuit Social Services observed that 'irregular meetings with a caseworker who has a high volume of clients is not likely to provide a basis for meaningful relationships or support'.11 The government has acknowledged that high caseloads make 'it difficult to provide high quality, tailored services to disadvantaged job seekers’.12

6.8 A number of submitters experienced the adverse impact of high caseloads. For example, one submitter described having group appointments:

I tried to talk to my service provider but it was not easy. The way that they approached me when they wanted me to do something was usually like this, 'do this', 'do that'. I found them hard to talk to although I tried. I found them very condescending too. My appointments were conducted in

6 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 6.

7 Ms Kim Pendlebury, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 40.

8 See for example, AUWU, Submission 27, p. 22; and Jesuit Social Services, Submission 57, p. 9.

9 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 21.

10 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 22.

11 Jesuit Social Services, Submission 57, p. 9.

12 Department of Jobs and Small Business, The Next Generation of Employment Services, Discussion

Paper, June 2018, p. 20.

groups of up to 20+ other people, in the front waiting room in front of other clients too.13

6.9 A facilitator for the Career Transition Assistance pilot program reported that all of the participants they engaged with 'described the staff members they were dealing with as ineffective not because they couldn’t do their job but because it was evident there were not enough staff available or the time for those staff to effectively support them'.14 The facilitator also reported that high turnover undermined case management:

Most participants experienced a consistent staff turn over and so cases could not be managed effectively due to new staff not being in touch with the relevant issues or up to date information. One jobactive staff member we communicated with described 2 staff members being responsible for a caseload of 800 clients.15

Training 6.10 According to some submitters, employment services consultants do not receive adequate training.16 Ms Kylie Wright, an employment consultant, advised that she had 'very limited training in most aspects of the Employment consultant

role'.17 An exception to the general trend was JobLink Plus, a not-for-profit provider, which informed the committee of its partnership with the University of New England to develop a training program for staff, based on positive psychology, and 'developing interviewing skills that provide encouragement and hope for jobseekers'.18 Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer of the Settlement Council of Australia, recommended that consultants should have cultural awareness training and specific training if they are working with certain vulnerable groups.19 Similarly, Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director of Per Capita, an Australian public policy think tank, submitted that consultants should have specific training in the service being delivered:

The requirement is for people to understand the service they are being asked to give, to understand the conditions of the local job market and to have some sensitivity around some of the other issues that people who are engaging with these services might be going through…20

13 Name Withheld, Submission 119, p. 3.

14 Name Withheld, Submission 117, p. 3 (italicisation and bold formatting omitted).

15 Name Withheld, Submission 117, p. 3 (italicisation and bold formatting omitted).

16 See for example, AUWU, Submission 27, p. 22.

17 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 2.

18 Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 60.

19 Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 6.

20 Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director, Per Capita, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 24.

6.11 There were mixed views on whether consultants should be required to have particular qualifications.21 For example, the Edmund Rice Centre WA submitted that 'the qualification level of the Jobactive staff is overwhelmingly inadequate for the role and the purpose they are to fulfil'.22 In contrast, other submitters suggested that attributes and skills were more valuable.23 Matchworks and ESG advised that when recruiting they put weight on 'life experience, experience in different industries, cultures, languages, and various related qualifications'.24 Ms Emma Dawson from Per Capita pointed out that it is unclear what particular qualification would be appropriate for consultants.25

Mistreatment of participants 6.12 Although many employment consultants do their best to assist jobactive participants, the committee heard that some participants experience disrespectful treatment. According to the Refugee Council of Australia,

mistreatment makes refugees and migrants less confident about finding a job:

Participants reported feeling disrespected and stigmatised and often threatened with having their welfare benefits suspended. Dealing with clients in this way, especially clients of a refugee and migrant background, only serves to make the jobseeker less confident in their ability to find a job and in the entire settlement process.26

6.13 Similarly, Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ) reported that while some providers are courteous, 'others engage in intimidation, threats, bullying and abusive interactions with clients'.27 GSANZ attributed this to the limited qualifications that consultants have and the fact that providers are accountable to government rather than clients.28 Ms Kylie Wright, herself a consultant, submitted that 'many employment consultants treat the job seekers like second class citizens'.29

21 See for example, Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS),

Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 2; and Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer, Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ), Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 12.

22 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 5.

23 See for example, Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy, SYC JARVIS, Committee

Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 8.

24 Matchworks & ESG, answers to questions on notice, 6 December 2018 (received

20 December 2018), p. 9.

25 Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director, Per Capita, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 24.

26 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, Attachment, p. 12.

27 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 4.

28 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 4.

29 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 2.

Committee view 6.14 The committee acknowledges the challenges that employment services consultants face in trying to assist their clients to find a job whilst also meeting the government's substantial compliance requirements. The appropriateness of

the provider's dual role of assisting and policing jobactive participants is examined in Chapter 8. The committee considers that the government should reconsider the economic imperatives that contribute to problems like high turnover and high caseloads. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.

6.15 The committee does not support requiring employment services consultants to have particular training qualifications. Requiring qualifications would impose an additional cost on a sector already burdened by compliance requirements. Additionally, the committee notes that there is a lack of consensus around what specific qualification would be appropriate for consultants.

6.16 However, the committee is of the view that the government should consider allocating additional funding for employment consultant/staff training and professional development.

Recommendation 14

6.17 The committee recommends that the government consider allocating additional funding for employment consultant/staff training and professional development.

Engagement with employers 6.18 Jobactive services are offered to employers free of charge, with financial incentives available.30 However, over time there has been a reduction in the number of employers using public employment services. Only four per cent of

employers used the jobactive system in 2018.31 In 2015 4.7 per cent of employers used public employment services while in 2011 the figure was eight per cent.32 However, Ms Dianne Fletcher the Chief Executive Officer of Sarina Russo Job Access pointed out that employers may not always be aware if their employees come through jobactive.33

6.19 There was general consensus amongst submitters that engagement with employers is important for improving employment outcomes.34 Ms Emma

30 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 1.

31 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 8.

32 KPMG, The Australian Recruitment Industry: a comparison of service delivery, August 2016, p. 19.

33 Ms Dianne Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Job Access, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 25.

34 See for example, Ms Debra Cerasa, Chief Executive Officer, Jobs Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, pp. 68-69; Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training,

Dawson, the Executive Director of Per Capita, explained that it is critical for consultants to 'work with employers to understand where the jobs are'.35 In the same way, SYC, a provider, submitted that effective engagement with employers is 'key to the success or failure of Australia's employment services'.36

6.20 The committee heard that employers find it difficult to engage with jobactive, and do not want to be contacted by multiple providers. The committee also heard that employers are burdened by a large number of irrelevant applications. This issue is considered in Chapter 7 in relation to job search requirements.

6.21 The committee also heard that consultants are aware of the need to engage with employers, however, can be constrained in doing so.37 On average, jobactive staff spend only 10.3 per cent of their time working with employers.38 Ms Kylie Wright, a consultant, who works alone in the office, informed the committee that she was not able to leave her office to go and meet with employers.39 Ms Annette Gill, Principal Policy Advisor for the National Employment Services Association, explained that providers are not directly funded to engage with employers, but do so in order to 'get an outcome and get income'.40

Employer engagement under future employment services 6.22 The Expert Panel's report into the future of employment services notes that employers 'report not having clear points of contact in the employment services system'.41 The Panel recommended coordinated, strategic outreach to

employers and a focus on building trusting relationships:

A more targeted approach to promotion will mean more employers will be connected to the digital services and list their vacancies online. Local-level

Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 17; and Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 6.

35 Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director, Per Capita, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 20.

36 SYC, Submission 25, p. 2.

37 SYC, Submission 25, p. 2.

38 Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director, Per Capita, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 20.

39 Ms Kylie Wright, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 48. See also

Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 1.

40 Ms Annette Gill, Principal Policy Advisor, National Employment Services Association, Committee

Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 73.

41 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 59.

engagement, supported by providers, will be better received by employers.42

6.23 The Panel also recommended employer access to the full pool of job seekers, via the employer's preferred channels, a free shortlisting service, and face-to-face recruitment services for employers.43

Committee view 6.24 The committee notes that employer engagement under jobactive has been poor and in decline over time. The committee considers that the Expert Panel's proposed new approach to employment services, including freeing-up

consultants to spend more time with employers, would be a marked improvement on current practices.

42 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 59.

43 Department of Jobs and Small Business, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 58.

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Chapter 7

Mutual obligation requirements

…the vast majority of job seekers want to work and some need support to realise economic inclusion goals. The employment services sector agrees that well-designed activation policies can help job seekers find work. As the reference by the OECD, research highlights activation can be very effective. However, for some job seekers with complex needs experience indicates that a work-first approach may not deliver the intended results and sets some up for failure when they are clearly not ready for employment. Job seekers who become overwhelmed by activation may also opt out through applying for a suspension of requirements.1

Overview 7.1 This chapter examines the mutual obligation requirements for jobactive participants including the Job Plan, job search requirements, and appointments. It also considers activities undertaking within the annual

activity requirement phase, including Work for the Dole (WfD) and volunteering programs and the effect of these activities on employment outcomes.

7.2 The chapter is structured according to the following topics:

ï Overview of mutual obligation requirements ï The Job Plan ï Job search requirements ï Provider appointments ï Overview of Work for the Dole and other annual activity requirements ï Work for the Dole ï Training and courses ï Approved volunteering ï Drug and alcohol treatment

7.3 The committee's recommendations are set out throughout the chapter.

7.4 The compliance framework for participants who fail to meet their mutual obligation requirements is discussed in Chapter 8.

Overview of mutual obligation requirements 7.5 Mutual obligation requirements are actions that job seekers have to perform as a condition for receiving income support. They are a form of activation policy designed to get people into work. Mutual obligation requirements are defined

in the Guide to Social Security Law:

1 National Employment Services Association (NESA), Submission 54, p. 19.

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Mutual Obligation Requirements refer to the general principle that it is fair and reasonable to expect unemployed people receiving activity tested income support to do their best to find work, undertake activities that will improve their skills and increase their employment prospects and, in some circ*mstances, contribute something to their community in return for receiving income support.2

7.6 During the inquiry, the committee heard from some witnesses that mutual obligation requirements can improve employment outcomes. In this regard, organisations such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) supported maintaining the concept of mutual obligation.3 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary for Employment from the Department of Jobs and Small Business informed the committee that mutual obligation requirements are supported by international evidence:

The policy known as mutual obligation has been in place since 1986. It's supported by international evidence that shows that activating people to look for work, and to undertake activities that will help them find work, is the most effective way of helping jobseekers transition to work.4

7.7 Whilst activation is broadly accepted as a positive influence on employment outcomes, according to the National Employment Services Association (NESA) 'the right balance in the nature and volume of activities is essential'.5 In this regard, the committee heard that requirements imposed on job seekers in Australia are amongst the strictest of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.6 Additionally, the committee heard that current mutual obligations have a high rate of non-compliance.7

7.8 Current mutual obligation requirements include:

ï entering into a Job Plan; ï undertaking job search (generally this involves applying for 20 jobs per month); and

2 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, pp. 4-5.

3 See for example, Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training, Australian

Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 19; Mr Luke Aitken, Senior Manager, Policy, NSW Business Chamber, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 21; and My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 4.

4 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

5 NESA, Submission 54, p. 19.

6 Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), Submission on Future Employment Services, August

2018, www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ACOSS_submission-on-future-employment-services_FINAL.pdf (accessed 5 February 2019), p. 20.

7 Ms Lavanya Kala, Policy Manager, Volunteering Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018,

p. 23.

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ï attending provider appointments.8

7.9 Participants can also have annual activity requirements as part of their mutual obligations. These are discussed below.

7.10 The committee heard that the current mutual obligation requirements are inflexible and reduce the ability of providers to respond to the individual needs and circ*mstances of participants.9 Ms Christina Ward, Deputy Director at the Edmund Rice Centre WA, described existing mutual obligation requirements as 'arbitrary and unilateral'.10 According to the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), 51 per cent of the people they surveyed said that their activity requirements were not suited to their circ*mstances.11

7.11 Even employer representative organisations appeared to support improving the flexibility of mutual obligations. For example, Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training from ACCI, submitted that mutual obligations 'could be measured in a wider range of ways to get the most efficient way for people to demonstrate that they're proactive in seeking employment'.12

7.12 According to some submitters, existing mutual obligations do not substantially improve employment prospects, or even undermine employment outcomes.13 For example, UnitingCare Australia submitted that mutual obligation requirements are based on a flawed assumption:

…the imposition of Mutual Obligation requirements on unemployed jobseekers is based on the assumption that individuals are able to exercise a degree of control over their situation in accepting welfare benefits. We challenge this assumption, however, in the context of our modern economy that is subject to structural unemployment, which means that for many people, there is no real alternative to accepting welfare benefits. This is especially true for unemployed people with limited skills and capacities, or those who experience forms of discrimination that further prevent them from entering and remaining in the labour market.14

8 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Understanding changes to your participation requirements,

20 October 2018, www.jobs.gov.au/understanding-changes-your-participation-requirements (accessed 22 January 2019).

9 See for example, Ms Debra Cerasa, Chief Executive Officer, Jobs Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 68; and Volunteering Australia, Submission 23, pp. 4-5.

10 Ms Christina Ward, Deputy Director, Edmund Rice Centre WA, Committee Hansard,

29 January 2019, p. 21.

11 ACOSS, Submission on Future Employment Services, August 2018, p. 4.

12 Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training, ACCI, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 19.

13 See for example, Volunteering Australia, Submission 23, p. 4; and GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 25.

14 UnitingCare Australia, Submission 24, p. 9 (citations omitted).

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7.13 This was also the view of the Youth Affairs Council of South Australia, who submitted that 'mutual obligation is a flawed concept'.15

7.14 There was overwhelming support from submitters for greater choice over activity requirements, recognising that existing mutual obligations can be inflexible and work against employment outcomes. As outlined above, there was also support for giving providers greater discretion to adjust mutual obligations. Some submitters supported streamlining and simplifying mutual obligations.16

Mutual obligation under future employment services 7.15 The report by the Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel notes that mutual obligation requirements can be inflexible.17 The Panel recommended that the future employment services system provide participants with more

choice around mutual obligations:

ï Mutual obligation requirements will be more flexible under a points based structure. ï Greater job seeker choice around the activities undertaken to get a job (job search remains a core requirement).18

7.16 The Panel recommended that job seekers be allocated a number of points to reach each month 'based on what they can do'.19 Participants would be able to meet points through a choice of activities including job search and training, 'with more points for intensive activities'.20 The Panel's report suggests that the points based system would be developed with the input of job seekers.21 The report also states that participants would need to look for work, but 'the focus will be on the quality of applications rather than quantity'.22

15 Youth Affairs Council of South Australia, Submission 29, p. 3.

16 See for example, My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 4.

17 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/i-want-work (accessed 9 February 2019), p. 67.

18 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 52.

19 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 66.

20 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 66.

21 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 67.

22 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 66.

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7.17 In support of the Panel's recommendations, the report cites an international meta-analysis which found that job search assistance 'has a positive effect on employment outcomes and greatly benefits disadvantaged job seekers'.23

Committee view 7.18 The committee notes that existing mutual obligation requirements are broadly perceived as inflexible. In this regard, the committee is supportive of the recommendation of the Expert Advisory Panel that participants be given

greater choice over mutual obligations.

7.19 However, the committee notes that the future of employment services report does not contain substantial detail on how mutual obligations would work under a future employment services system. For example, the report states that the new system would prioritise the quality of job applications over quantity, yet does not explain how the quality of applications would be assessed. There is a risk that given the assessment of job applications would be somewhat subjective, it could result in unfair and inconsistent decisions about what constitutes an acceptable application.

7.20 The committee is of the view that mutual obligations need to become more principles-based and less prescriptive, to ensure that they remain relevant to the circ*mstances of individual participants. Mutual obligations should recognise the efforts people make to become more employable and look for work, rather than imposing paternalistic and rigid requirements.

7.21 The following sections discuss existing mutual obligation requirements in greater detail.

Recommendation 15

7.22 The committee recommends that the government improve mutual obligation requirements to better promote work readiness and effective job searches.

Recommendation 16

7.23 The committee recommends that the government consider broadening the range of activities participants can undertake to meet mutual obligation requirements.

The Job Plan 7.24 Jobactive participants with mutual obligations are required to enter into a Job Plan. A Job Plan is a return to work plan that sets out a pathway towards

23 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 67, citing David Card, Jochen Kluve and Andrea Weber, 'What works? A meta analysis of recent active labour market program evaluations', Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 16, no. 3, 2018, pp. 894-931.

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employment for the individual. Under jobactive, the Job Plan is used to record a participant’s obligations and any voluntary activities. For example, the Job Plan will indicate what job search requirements the participant has. Ideally, a Job Plan should be tailored to the needs and aspirations of the participant.24 According to My Pathway, an employment services provider, the Job Plan process 'is useful in establishing the initial agreement or contract between the provider and the job seeker'.25

7.25 Return to work plans are fundamental to employment services arrangements and have evolved over past decades.26 NESA explained what is required to make a return to work plan effective:

To be effective individualised return to work plans ensure the person has agency, focus on pathways that enable the person to achieve their aspiration, adopt a holistic approach identifying vocational and non-vocational factors influencing employment prospects, and are informed by labour market conditions and opportunities. In monitoring implementation of return to work plans, the emphasis is on working in partnership with job seekers to understand what strategies are working, which are not and why, and informing the plans evolution.27

7.26 According to NESA, existing arrangements no longer reflect best practice:

To codify best practice into standard practice the Department broadened the scope of Activity Agreements to include a broader range of return to work strategies. However, in doing so some underpinning elements of this best practice were lost. One of the key benefits of separation of activation/mutual obligation requirements and individualised strategies was the clarity given to providers helping vs monitoring roles.28

7.27 In its submission on the design of jobactive, NESA contended that the design of the Job Plan no longer has a focus on a pathway to work:

…the Job Plan appears to return to the more administrative focussed functions of the old Activity Agreement. While NESA understands the need to record a job seekers mutual obligation requirements, one of the important points in the way that the Employment Pathway Plan has evolved is that it has moved past that function and is now, considered a tool for engaging job seekers in their journey to work and the activities required to help get them there. Without the focus on the pathway to work, it becomes a purely punitive and administrative function, which job seekers struggle to see the benefit of undertaking. This may have the

24 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 4.

25 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 4.

26 NESA, Submission 54, p. 18.

27 NESA, Submission 54, p. 18.

28 NESA, Submission 54, p. 18.

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unintended consequence of decreasing the motivation of job seekers to participate in work…29

7.28 Although Job Plans are intended to be tailored, the committee heard that participants are overwhelmingly given stock-standard Job Plans that do not take into account their personal circ*mstances.30 Although Job Plans can be used to record voluntary activities, this is often not done. Accordingly, one name withheld submitter questioned the point of the Job Plan 'when the conditions are presented as inflexible'.31

7.29 Ms Christine Belcher from the National Social Security Rights Network advised that most of the Job Plans they see are generic:

The majority of job plans are standard. Basically, in a nutshell, they say that the person will look for 20 jobs a month. They don't look at the person's individual situation. They don't look at their caring responsibilities, whether there are literacy or numeracy issues or what their work skills are. They are very standard. This often causes problems at a later date because the person is not able to comply with the job plan. Also, when there's been a change in circ*mstances, often the job plan is not changed to reflect that. We find that, because of the job plan not being appropriate and not being tailored to their needs, people often end up with demerit points, and, at the point that we see them, they may be cut off their payment.32

7.30 According to a jobactive participant, consultants push for the default Plan:

Even though the provider is supposed to take things like the local job market and the job seeker’s skills into account, they always just try to get you to sign a generic Job Plan that includes 20 job applications each month, and as many meetings as they feel they can force you into.33

7.31 Before signing their Job Plan, participants can have up to two business days to consider their Plan.34 However, the committee received evidence that in practice, participants are often not given any opportunity to provide input into

29 NESA, Submission 54, p. 19.

30 See for example, Ms Susan Maury, Policy and Research Specialist, Good Shepherd Australia

New Zealand (GSANZ), Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 16; Name Withheld, Submission 122, p. 2; Name Withheld, Submission 121, p. 1; and Name Withheld, Submission 135, p. 1.

31 Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 9.

32 Ms Christine Belcher, Welfare Rights Advocate, National Social Security Rights Network,

Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 54.

33 Name Withheld, Submission 118, p. 2.

34 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Job Plan and Setting Mutual Obligation Requirements

Guideline, 16 July 2018,

https://docs.jobs.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/job_plan_and_setting_mutual_obligation_requirem ents.pdf (accessed 5 February 2019), p. 8.

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their Job Plan or review the Plan.35 For example, one participant informed the committee that they were never consulted on the contents of their Job Plan:

Each time I was just told to sign it and wasn't encouraged to read it.36

7.32 Additionally, the committee heard that at times participants are threatened with payment suspension if they do not immediately sign the Job Plan.37 One participant reported that this was always their experience:

Not once during my period of unemployment did anyone from two jobactive providers do anything other than print out a cut-and-paste document, with all elements being compulsory, and demanding my signature on threat of cutting off my benefits if I did not sign on the spot. Consultants from two jobactive providers denied me any time to consider my job plans, which I think I am entitled to at law.38

7.33 Mr Poxon, a jobactive participant, described feeling that he wasn’t given time or space despite his mental health issues:

My experience of turning up was just having a job plan put in front of me and basically being told that, if I didn't sign this and whatever was on this, my payments would be cut… There's this general sense that if you step a single toe out of line—at a time when I needed a lot of time and space to get over a pretty horrible mental health episode that just wasn't given.39

7.34 Some submitters advised that their providers did not tell them the truth about their mutual obligations when they were presented with a Job Plan.40 For example, a participant who signed her Job Plan later found that what she had been told was not in accordance with jobactive guidelines.41 According to the participant, when she raised this at her next appointment, the consultant said to her “oh there is so much involved in the guidelines I don’t think you could possibly understand exactly what is required of you”.42 Another participant

35 See for example, Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, Victorian Council of Social Service

(VCOSS), Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 37; Ms Debra Cerasa, Chief Executive Officer, Jobs Australia, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 69; Ms Rozie Hart, Submission 139, p. 2; Mr Jeremy Poxon, Submission 34, p. 1; Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 3; Name Withheld, Submission 124, p. 3; Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 9; Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 5; Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 10; Mr Allan Wright, Submission 142, p. 1; Name Withheld, Submission 95, p. 1; Ms Rozie Hart, Submission 139, p. 2; and Name Withheld, Submission 136, p. 1.

36 Name Withheld, Submission 122, p. 2.

37 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 9; and Mr Milan Pospisil, Member, Australian

Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU) and private capacity, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 15.

38 Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 9.

39 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Media Officer, AUWU, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 21.

40 See for example, Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 5.

41 Name Withheld, Submission 132, p. 2.

42 Name Withheld, Submission 132, p. 2.

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was told that her mutual obligations meant she had to provide her payslips to the provider.43

7.35 The same participant reported that they were required to sign a Job Plan despite it being incorrect and not in accordance with the jobactive deed:

When I tried to have changes (to frequency of appointments) made so that they were in line with the jobactive Deed, I was told that I was wrong and that I could not make the changes. At one point, I was receiving treatment for a back injury and provided medical documentation so that I wouldn’t be placed in any inappropriate activities. Through this process, the case manager also put incorrect information into the system, including a statement that I had “low vision”. When I questioned him about this, he brushed me off by saying “well you wear glasses don’t you?”. I was then required to sign it (if I hadn’t signed it I would probably have lost the payment that I was surviving on). Later when I disputed the fact that this was included and made an official complaint, the manager of the agency implied that it was my fault it was included because I had signed it.44

7.36 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, a jobactive participant who spoke at one of the committee's public hearings, advised that he was 'forced to attend the office of his jobactive provider and fill out a new Job Plan while under medical exemption'.45

7.37 Mr Thomas Studans, another jobactive participant, submitted that his Job Plan limited the hours of work he can do:

In my situation, so that I am subject to less onerous requirements, I am forced to sign to restrict the hours I can work per week, essentially a contract ensuring restraint of my trade. This has been a specific issue when trying to get part-time work, as employers see this restriction as problematic to the staffing of their business…46

7.38 Many submitters had a negative view of the Job Plan, with one participant submitting that the Job Plan 'is not in fact a job plan, it is a compliance plan'.47 Another submitter said he felt bullied into signing the Job Plan because his provider demanded that he sign it without explaining why.48

Job Plans under future employment services 7.39 The Expert Panel’s report into the future of employment services suggests that Job Plans will be tailored to the individual job seeker’s needs and their local

43 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 2.

44 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 3.

45 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 53.

46 Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, p. 4.

47 Name Withheld, Submission 118, p. 1.

48 Mr Allan Wright, Submission 142, p. 1.

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labour market. The report also states that there would be regular reviews of job plans, ‘with agreed triggers for out-of-cycle review’.49

7.40 A crucial issue is whether the proposed future Job Plan would capture mutual obligations—however the report does not address this.

Committee view 7.41 The committee notes that many participants experience the Job Plan process as inflexible and, in some cases, threatening. While recognising mutual obligations as an important aspect of welfare policy; the committee considers

that Job Plans should be a constructive pathway for a participants' journey into sustainable employment. It is counterproductive for Job Plans to contain punitive, compliance-based requirements that become additional barriers for participants securing suitable long-term positions.

7.42 In the committee's view Job Plans must do a better job of taking into account the personal circ*mstances of participants. Job Plans should provide a pathway to sustainable employment, and should not simply specify a participant’s mutual obligations. Additionally, participants should be given sufficient time to read and fully understand their obligations under the Plan.

Recommendation 17

7.43 The committee recommends that the government investigate how it can meaningfully improve the negotiation process for, and content of, Job Plans.

Job search requirements 7.44 The standard job search requirement for jobactive participants is that they apply for 20 jobs per month. The committee heard that this requirement was not an effective means of improving people's chances of gaining employment.

Furthermore, the committee heard that existing requirements place an unnecessary burden on employers who have to review and respond to applications, at times from applicants who are not qualified for the position but who are simply seeking to fulfil their mutual obligations.

7.45 According to Ms Emma King, the Chief Executive Officer of the Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS), participants are applying for jobs they are unqualified for just to meet job search requirements.50 The AUWU advised that job search requirements can actually get in the way of effective job search:

49 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 49.

50 Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 30.

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Instead of concentrating on looking for suitable work and spending time and effort in composing a quality application there is the pressure to rush through multiple applications to meet Jobactive quota requirements.51

7.46 A jobactive participant made the same point:

I've found the strict 20 job applications a fortnight requirement to be impossible to genuinely meet, e.g. to actually apply properly to each job. There has never been any focus on how much detail is put into applying for a job, just an emphasis on getting the job-search sheet filled out. I think this has decreased my prospects of getting a job and made me put my energy into writing down fake job applications rather than spending my time creating a reasonable application for a few jobs.52

7.47 A facilitator for a Career Transition Program submitted that it seemed contradictory for them to be teaching participants how to tailor resumes and job applications when participants had to apply for 20 jobs per month, and 'a good job application for some jobs can take 2-3 days to write'.53 Likewise, Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ) pointed out that applications for executive and specialist roles can take time.54 This issue was also raised by participants who made a submission. For example, one participant noted that applications for positions they are qualified for (teaching, child care or support work) take more time and energy compared to applications for manual labour.55 The same submitter suggested that the existing job search requirements have disturbing consequences:

I occasionally come across a job I quite like the look of, one I might just be able to get, one of those odd ones for which my particular education and experience make me suitable- even permanent, full time jobs (which are rare)…but I’m already being trained to think: ‘leave it til next month, you’re going to need another 20 jobs to not get a Demerit’, or ‘do the simpler ones first. Do that one you really want if you happen to get time’.56

7.48 The problems created by the requirement for participants to lodge an arbitrary number of applications each month are particularly acute in regional areas that have a limited number of jobs available.57 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser from ACOSS informed the committee that in regional areas, existing job search requirements result in the same employers being continually approached:

51 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 16 (citation omitted).

52 Name Withheld, Submission 122, pp. 1-2.

53 Name Withheld, Submission 117, p. 1.

54 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 24.

55 Name Withheld, Submission 125, p. 7.

56 Name Withheld, Submission 125, pp. 7-8.

57 See for example, Mr Robert Stockdale, Executive Chair, Skill Hire, Committee Hansard,

29 January 2019, p. 44.

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…in country regions where there are very few jobs, the default requirement remains 20 jobs a month, and so the same employers are being approached repeatedly…58

7.49 Dr Peter Davidson from ACOSS informed the committee that jobactive providers can be hesitant to lower the number of jobs a participant has to apply for:

…providers in theory have discretion to reduce the 20 jobs to a lower number such as 15—although even 15 in some cases is too many—but they seem to be so fearful of the repercussions of seemingly going soft on people that they rarely apply that.59

7.50 The committee also heard that for long-term unemployed participants, applying for 20 jobs and receiving constant rejections can be demoralising.60 Additionally, the committee heard that for some people, the most effective way to find work was not through standard application processes.61 For example, Mr Thomas Studans, a jobactive participant with a mental illness, informed the committee that the most effective method for him to find work (networking) was not recognised for the purposes of meeting job search requirements:

The work and career I've cobbled together for myself is largely irrelevant to the welfare system as it stands. I get jobs by networking, not by making formal representations to employers, because I understand that I'm not necessarily considered a competitive candidate due to my mental health requirements. Frequently, the jobs that I apply for to satisfy Centrelink or 'jobactive' requirements are unrelated to the real and measurable work that I do, because it pays cash, or because Employment Services or Centrelink doesn't see it as 'a real job'. This arrangement is inflexible, and doesn't take into account realities of the modern labour market, let alone for those with severe mental illness who have to make do.62

7.51 As noted above, the committee heard that one of the consequences of job search requirements is that employers can be flooded with poor-quality and irrelevant applications.63 This was one of the biggest problems that employers experienced with jobactive. Some submitters pointed out that the costs of

58 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 7.

59 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 7.

60 See for example, Mr David Toscano, Team Leader, Northern Community CareWorks Ltd and

Northern Community Church of Christ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 42; AUWU, Submission 27, p. 16; and Name Withheld, Submission 125, p. 8.

61 See for example, Ms Angela Gormley, Submission 152, p. 2; and Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28,

p. 2.

62 Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, p. 2.

63 See for example, Ms Lavanya Kala, Policy Manager, Volunteering Australia, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 23; Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 30; and AUWU, Submission 27, p. 17.

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assessing job applications and matching job seekers has been shifted into business. Ms Megan Petrass, Policy Manager, Workforce Skills, from the New South Wales Business Chamber contended that the burden of reviewing large numbers of applications can be particularly problematic for small and medium enterprises.64

7.52 Ms Jenny Lambert, Director for Employment, Education and Training at ACCI, emphasised that the number of applications was frustrating for businesses, as more move to online recruiting:

A lot of employers have shifted their recruitment tasks to online, so there are a lot of employers who use the internet for their recruitment. If you're a jobseeker, these sites make it very easy to just press a button and send off multiple applications, and that can be very frustrating if you're an employer.65

7.53 Submitters broadly supported greater recognition of interviews as a way to meet job search requirements (interviews are not currently counted).66 According to Ms Lambert from ACCI, a more qualitative approach is needed:

…it's not just about the number of applications; it's also about the effort they're making to present themselves for interviews. I mean, people who turn up to five very relevant interviews could be of equal value than just putting in applications. We have always taken a view that it's the quality and the effort of the work the jobseeker's putting in, not just measured by the number of applications. 67

Committee view 7.54 Jobactive participants are expected to actively look for work. However the committee notes that the existing job search requirements are crude in their formulation and are not an effective means of getting people into work. The

committee is persuaded by evidence that existing job search requirements do not work for employers and can be punitive for participants, particularly in regional areas. Accordingly, the committee is of the view that the government should consider allowing for the default job search requirement to be adjusted in regions and for cohorts where employment prospects are well below-average. In addition, the government should consider expanding the range of activities that count towards mutual obligation requirements, including attending an interview.

64 Ms Megan Petrass, Policy Manager, Workforce Skills, NSW Business Chamber, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 18.

65 Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training, ACCI, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 19.

66 Name Withheld, Submission 125, p. 7.

67 Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training, ACCI, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 19.

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Recommendation 18

7.55 The committee recommends that the government consider allowing for default job search requirements to be adjusted in regions and for cohorts where employment prospects are well below-average.

Recommendation 19

7.56 The committee recommends that the government consider expanding the activities that people can use to meet mutual obligation requirements, including attending an interview.

Provider appointments 7.57 Jobactive participants are required to attend appointments with their provider as part of their mutual obligations and as set out in their Job Plan. In aggregate, jobactive providers schedule more than 12 million of these appointments every

year.68 Most participation failures, which result in the issuing of demerit points and income support payment suspensions, are for missing these appointments.69

7.58 The committee heard that appointments with providers are dictated by compliance requirements and often do not assist job seekers. For example, Ms Tracey Ashmore, a jobactive participant who gave evidence to the committee, described attending appointments, only to be dismissed without being seen:

Often my JSP [Job Service Provider] agent was left alone to work carrying the load for other staff who were off sick or away for weddings etc, and having to see their clients as well as her own. I would pay my much needed money for bus ticket, go to appointment to be waved at and told "I'm so busy, I'll just see you next appointment" and dismissed.70

7.59 A number of submitters emphasised that appointments can be very short. Ms Emma King reported that VCOSS has heard of examples of consultants scheduling ten minute 'back-to-back' appointments, which is 'barely time to say hello, let alone make an informed assessment'.71

7.60 The committee also received evidence that appointments can be hard to reschedule. In some cases, participants are forced to choose between attending paid work or their jobactive appointment. For example, Mr Jeremy Poxon described not being able to reschedule an appointment that conflicted with his casual work:

68 Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 30.

69 Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 30.

70 Ms Tracey Ashmore, Submission 50, pp. 1-2.

71 Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 30.

115

Because I had a casual job and because I got called into a shift, I couldn't reschedule one of my obligations with my job service provider. I called and called them days earlier to try and reschedule that appointment, which was just a catch-up appointment. I miss that appointment because I was at work, and then I received penalties from my job agent. That is indicative of my broad experience.72

7.61 GSANZ reported that perversely, participants in their study were missing paid work to attend meetings with their provider.73

7.62 Additionally, the committee heard that appointments can be expensive and time consuming for some participants to get to. Ms Wright, a jobactive provider consultant, described how difficult it was for some of her participants to get to appointments:

Some of my clients and jobseekers have to travel for 200 kilometres or for three hours just to attend a 15-minute appointment. Many of my jobseekers drive very old, inefficient cars, and some of them don't have vehicles at all and have to rely on family and friends to bring them to their appointments. I've had a couple of jobseekers who've actually been having to hitchhike to get to their appointments. One in particular was hitchhiking 80 kilometres each way. Not only is it a huge safety risk but it also means they're often spending all day on the road to attend a 15-minute appointment.74

7.63 Similarly, Ms Tracey Ashmore, who lives in a small country town without a car, has to rely on the school bus to get to appointments:

I pay $18 for return ticket into town for a 10 minute appointment (if they have time to see me) and then the rest of the time walk around town until it is time to catch school bus home.75

7.64 The committee also heard that appointments can be a particular issue for migrants and refugees because they can conflict with settlement activities including English language classes. Submitters informed the committee that participants are missing English language classes so that they can attend appointments with their provider. In this regard, Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer of the Settlement Council of Australia submitted that settlement programs should have clear priority:

…a recently arrived jobseeker who is actively engaging with their English language education should not, in our opinion, be required to choose

72 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Media Officer, AUWU, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 18.

73 GSANZ, Submission 47, pp. 18-19.

74 Ms Kylie Wright, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 46.

75 Ms Tracey Ashmore, Submission 50, p. 1.

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between the all-important English classes and their jobactive requirements.76

7.65 Mr Tebbey informed the committee that although English language classes can be counted as part of mutual obligation requirements, they are often not counted. Mr Tebbey attributed this to a lack of awareness from both providers and participants.77 Mr Tebbey submitted that due to the timing conflict between jobactive appointments and English language classes, newly arrived migrants and refugees should have more choice over when they commence jobactive:

…any arbitrary time limit to commence mutual obligation requirements for newly arrived Australians needs to be abolished. Instead, early in their settlement journey, each jobseeker from a migrant or refugee background needs to be provided with an individually tailored plan for entry into employment services, which is informed by their settlement service provider and which takes into account any specific assistance they may need to achieve settlement foundations and broader job readiness, prior to commencing the general mutual obligations.78

7.66 Mr Tebbey also suggested that providers should have more discretion to modify mutual obligations for migrants and refugees who are participating in a settlement program:

…it should be open to the jobactive provider in consultation with their settlement provider to say, 'Okay, if you are engaging with the Humanitarian Settlement Program, attending your regular appointments there, engaging with the Adult Migrant English Program, you don't need to do X, Y, Z until we've got you to a point where you're ready to do those things.'79

7.67 The compliance framework and the consequences for not attending appointments are discussed in Chapter 8.

Committee view 7.68 The committee received concerning evidence that people are missing paid work to attend appointments with their provider. In this case, the jobactive program is itself a direct barrier to employment and is not operating in

accordance with the stated intention of the program.

76 Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 2.

77 Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 3.

78 Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 2.

79 Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 4.

117

7.69 The committee notes that the Expert Panel’s proposed greater use of online self-service will benefit some participants, particularly those that need minimal or no assistance to find a job. Participants who can self-service online would not need to attend regular appointments as they would not have a provider.80 However the committee remains concerned that some issues with appointments under jobactive will continue under future employment services.

7.70 The committee also notes that existing mutual obligations can pose difficulties for humanitarian entrants and migrants who are participating in the Humanitarian Settlement Program and attending Adult Migrant English Program language classes. The committee considers that this cohort should not be missing English language classes so that they can attend appointments with their employment services provider. Accordingly, the committee considers that the government should examine ways to improve provider awareness of approved activities including English language courses for mutual obligations.

Recommendation 20

7.71 The committee recommends that the government examine ways to improve provider awareness of approved activities including Adult Migrant English Program language courses for mutual obligations.

Overview of Work for the Dole and other annual activity requirements 7.72 After their first year in jobactive, participants generally have annual activity requirements for six months of each year. These participants are required to

complete WfD or other ‘annual activities’ such as part-time work, training or voluntary work:

Job seekers are required to undertake some additional activities—such as Work for the Dole, part-time paid employment, a National Work Experience Programme placement or approved voluntary work—for six months of each year after their first year in jobactive. This six-month period is known as the Work for the Dole Phase.81

7.73 The annual activity requirements apply in addition to job search and appointment requirements.

7.74 Different age groups have different annual activity requirements:

ï People under 50 who have been in jobactive for 12 months generally have an annual activity requirement of 50 hours per fortnight.

80 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 28.

81 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Understanding changes to your participation requirements,

20 October 2018.

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ï People aged between 50 and 54 who have been in jobactive for 12 months generally have an annual activity requirement of 30 hours per fortnight. ï People aged between 55 and 59 who have been in jobactive for 12 months generally have an annual activity requirement of 30 hours per fortnight.

Alternatively, they can do 30 hours per fortnight of either: paid work, approved voluntary work, or a combination of both. ï People aged 60 to pension age who have been in jobactive for 12 months generally have an annual activity requirement of 10 hours per fortnight.

Alternatively, they can do 30 hours per fortnight of either: paid work, approved voluntary work, or a combination of both.82

Work for the Dole 7.75 WfD is the default activity for participants with annual activity requirements who have not arranged an alternative activity. WfD is managed by employment services providers, who find host organisations for participants.

Host organisations are community and not-for-profit organisations.83 Arrangements for WfD have changed since jobactive was introduced:

The beginnings of jobactive had a fairly complicated model of Work for the Dole coordinators who were responsible for developing the places, but they weren't responsible for overseeing and running them. That was referred back to a jobactive provider who took on that role for no fee…84

Employment outcomes 7.76 The committee received evidence that the WfD program is not effective at getting people into work. However this point was contended by the Department of Jobs and Small Business and some other stakeholders.

7.77 According to Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary for Employment at the Department of Jobs and Small Business, WfD helps participants to 'remain connected with the labour market while they are looking for paid work'.85 Mr Smyth advised that the purpose of WfD is to 'provide participants with work-like experiences to help them gain employability skills and build confidence

82 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Understanding changes to your participation requirements,

20 October 2018.

83 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 38.

84 Mr Richard Spurrell, Executive General Manager, MAX Solutions, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 45.

85 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

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while also giving back to the community'.86 According to Mr Smyth, most participants report positive experiences of WfD:

Almost three-quarters of participants who have completed a survey on Work for the Dole reported they were satisfied with the overall quality of their activity.87

7.78 Mr Smyth also reported that participants have an increased desire to find paid work:

Surveys of participants have consistently reported that participating in Work for the Dole increased their desire to find paid work—74.9 per cent was the result in the most recent survey.88

7.79 The Department of Jobs and Small Business surveys participants about their employment outcomes after they leave WfD:

The most recent survey showed that, of the participants who responded, 25.4 per cent were in some form of employment three months after exiting their Work for the Dole activity. Over the life of the program under jobactive 36.7 per cent who exited the program had a job placement recorded.89

7.80 Some submitters were supportive of the WfD program. For example, Mr Richard Spurrell, Executive General Manager of MAX Solutions, a jobactive provider and previous WfD coordinator, supported the concept of WfD:

Having people who are unable to gain work engaged in some productive, positive activity that connects them with social groups, with people doing similar work and with potential work sources is always seen as positive for many years.90

7.81 Despite the evidence given in support of WfD, overall the committee received overwhelming evidence that the WfD program is not effective at getting people into work.91 The committee also heard that WfD is widely perceived as

86 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

87 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

88 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

89 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

90 Mr Richard Spurrell, Executive General Manager, MAX Solutions, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 44.

91 See for example, Ms Karen Rainbow, Chief Executive Officer, Employment Services, Advanced

Personnel Management, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 56; Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 58; Ms Kylie Wright, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 46; AUWU, Submission 27, p. 33; GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 25; Name Withheld, Submission 90, p. 1; Name Withheld, Submission 95,

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punitive.92 Additionally, the committee heard that there are a limited number of activities that participants can undertake93 and people are often not made aware of alternatives to WfD.94 For example, Mr Thomas Studans submitted that when he signed up for WfD he was not made aware of alternatives.95

7.82 A 54 year old jobactive participant who completed WfD four times noted that she has never gained employment as a result.96 Similarly, Ms Kylie Wright, a consultant, informed the committee that WfD is not assisting participants in her region to find work. Ms Wright advised the committee that the activities available are 'very limited' and 'don't reflect situations which will lead to long-term employment'.97

7.83 A study commissioned by the government found that participation in WfD resulted in an additional 2 percentage point increase in the probability of job seekers having a job placement in the short term.98

7.84 According to Ms Lambert from ACCI, WfD does not give participants real work experience:

We've been suggesting for some years that Work for the Dole was rarely giving real work experience. That said, obviously there have been some participants in the program who've found it valuable. But certainly there's not been a strong feel from the employer community that it's delivering as much in terms of work readiness as more vocationally focused opportunities could.99

7.85 Mr Llewellyn Reynders, Policy Manager from VCOSS emphasised that WfD was not helpful and in some cases can be divert participants from more useful activities:

p. 2; and VCOSS, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 1.

92 See for example, Mr Llewellyn Reynders, Policy Manager, VCOSS, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 32; Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 32; Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer, Joblink Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 58; Ms Christine Belcher, Welfare Rights Advocate, National Social Security Rights Network, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 57; and Brotherhood of St Laurence, Additional Information (no 2) received 12 November 2018, p. 2.

93 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 33.

94 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 118, p. 2.

95 Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, p. 4.

96 Name Withheld, Submission 120, p. 1.

97 Ms Kylie Wright, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 46.

98 The Social Research Centre, Evaluation of Work for the Dole 2014-15, November 2015, p. v.

99 Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training, ACCI, Committee Hansard,

14 November 2018, p. 21.

121

…all the evidence shows that [participating in Work for the Dole] doesn't help. It has very poor outcomes and indeed may divert participants from more useful job search and training activities and work experience. All of the evidence that we have available suggests that we need to give people work experience in actual workplaces, rather than creating specialised programs which don't reflect real jobs and don't give them a whole lot of skills and experience in future workplaces. Nor do we understand that employers look favourably on Work for the Dole experience as a prerequisite for work.100

7.86 Mr Jeremy Poxon participated in WfD in a small country town in Victoria. Mr Poxon informed the committee that he was not given any choice of activity:

My job agent said…not only could I not choose and organise my own activity there was only one registered Work for the Dole site in town that I could go to and that was an op shop, a Salvos store. My background is in communications, journalism and editing, that kind of work—

I have a masters in writing, editing and publishing. I realise, especially now, that it is very competitive field but I told my jobactive agent that I was also willing to do office work or all sorts broader things but I got ushered into op-shop labour, just folding and sweeping out the back because it was literally the only Work for the Dole host that had been registered in the town.101

7.87 Mr Poxon describing feeling humiliated by the experience:

I got to the end of that six months and was back where I started but a lot more disheartened and, frankly, humiliated…102

7.88 Mr Poxon submitted that based on his interactions with other participants, WfD was not fit for purpose:

Just talking personally with other Work for the Dole participants at the site I was at, it certainly wasn't fit for purpose. I had a communications background. Another person had a landscaping background. I think another person there had been an office assistant. And we were all there working for the dole at the back of an op-shop. My experience was certainly not unique against the backdrop of all the calls and messages from Work for the Dole participants who call the AUWU hotline. They also describe being thrown into activities that are completely irrelevant or sometimes even counter to their interests.103

100 Mr Llewellyn Reynders, Policy Manager, VCOSS, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 32.

101 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Media Officer, AUWU, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, Committee

Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 21.

102 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Media Officer, AUWU, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, Committee

Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 22.

103 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Media Officer, AUWU, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, Committee

Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 22.

122

7.89 A WfD participant described feeling punished by the increase in his hours, which resulted in him having to attend WFD for an additional day but for only one hour:

Recently the federal government has increased my hours for work for the dole from 15 to 25. Because three full days only equates to 24 hours (3 working days * 8 hours = 24) I must now attend a fourth day for 1 single hour to make the requirement of 25. It will take me longer to get there and back than I will be there.104

7.90 The committee heard that WfD often involves menial labour.105 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, a creative artist with an associate degree in visual communications and social sciences, was required to do heavy manual labour:

It wasn't until the second week of my activity…that I got an intake form to find out what my skills and qualifications were. And that was after taking wheelbarrows up and down a four-acre property, digging trenches, clearing bush, re-fencing and doing all these other things.106

7.91 A jobactive participant submitted that her WfD experience was irrelevant to the skills required in a modern workplace. She was placed in a 'Mosaic' activity which 'consisted of menial sanding on broken tiles in a cold workshop'.107

7.92 Mr Brendan Taylor, another jobactive participant, submitted that WfD is not valued by employers:

Whenever I mention WFTD employers faces drop, some employers I’ve spoken to think WFTD is a parole requirement for people who have been released from jail…108

7.93 The committee heard that WfD can in some cases be a barrier to employment. A jobactive participant submitted that she was effectively discouraged from accepting job interviews if they clashed with WfD:

Work for the Dole and other activities (including appointments with the jobactive agency) did not make it easy to seek employment or attend interviews, in fact quite the opposite. I was made to feel uneasy about accepting job interviews as it would ‘interfere with’ WfD or an appointment and I was incorrectly told that the missed WfD days would need to be made up.109

7.94 The committee also heard from Mr David Toscano, Team Leader at Northern Community CareWorks, a WfD host in Melbourne. Mr Toscano advocated the benefits of WfD:

104 Name Withheld, Submission 95, p. 2.

105 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 146, p. 5; and Name Withheld, Submission 95, p. 2.

106 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 52.

107 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 3.

108 Name Withheld, Submission 146, p. 5.

109 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 4.

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It builds confidence. It puts them in a team environment where they can be working together, problem solving, dealing with complex issues at times and dealing with challenges, time requirements and all of these different pressures that you are going to find any work situation. They are expected to turn up on time.110

7.95 The committee heard that not all participants had negative experiences of WfD. Ms Kim Pendlebury, a jobactive participant who has undertaken WfD at CareWorks, stated that she 'never had anything but positive experiences there'.111 Ms Pendlebury considered that although WfD had given her skills in retail, it had not improved her employment prospects.112

7.96 Mr Toscano informed the committee that they do not receive much feedback on system improvements or if participants have secured employment:

…we don't get a lot of accurate feedback through the job agencies about the success stories, unless the participant volunteers that back to us. So, those feedback loops are significantly lacking, both in improvements to the system and where there are successes.113

Safety 7.97 A work health and safety assessment is required for every WfD activity, and also for each participant to identify whether an activity is appropriate for that participant.114 The Department of Jobs and Small Business advised the

committee that safety is a fundamental part of WfD and 'a priority of the program'.115 Ms Janine Pitt from the Department informed the committee that every activity is required to have adequate supervision. Depending on the circ*mstances, this can include line-of-sight supervision.116

7.98 However, the committee received concerning evidence about safety issues and inadequate redress for participants who are injured whilst undertaking WfD.117

110 Mr David Toscano, Team Leader, Northern Community CareWorks Ltd and Northern

Community Church of Christ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 42.

111 Ms Kim Pendlebury, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 40.

112 Ms Kim Pendlebury, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 44.

113 Mr David Toscano, Team Leader, Northern Community CareWorks Ltd and Northern

Community Church of Christ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 42.

114 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 39.

115 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 38.

116 Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole, Department of Jobs and Small

Business, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 39.

117 See for example, Mr Llewellyn Reynders, Policy Manager, VCOSS, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 32; Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 10; and Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, pp. 8-9.

124

An EY Report found that 36 per cent of activities did not fully meet the average safety benchmarks, scoring less than 91 per cent compliance.118 In April 2016, Josh Park-Fing, who was 18 years of age, died from a head injury when he fell from a trailer on a WfD site in Queensland. At the time of writing, the government has not released the report into his death.119 The Department of Jobs and Small Business informed the committee that WfD supervisors can themselves be volunteers.120

7.99 Mr Poxon reported that the AUWU receives contact from many WfD participants who have safety concerns:

…we get a lot of calls from Work for the Dole participants who actually fear their safety… according to the AUWU 2015-16 National advocacy hotline report about 30 per cent of the calls we got through the hotline were people with issues of Work for the Dole safety. Sadly, over the years, we've received too many calls from people who've been injured on these sites as well.121

7.100 The AUWU provided a testimonial from a participant who stated that Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was not supplied automatically for WfD participants.122 Similarly, a submitter described working in an environment without sufficient protections for participants:

…there was never enough personal protective equipment, or it was inadequate. Some jobseekers were not using the PPE due to the fact the glasses could not be seen through properly. We were not provided with dust masks for about two weeks and were sanding tiles without protection.123

7.101 Another participant described a lax attitude to health and safety at her WfD site, an op-shop:

…there was the constant potential risk of viral/bacterial/fungal infections that could be spread from donations to people. The OH&S rule was, that if you were sorting “raw” donations (meaning donations that had just come in), you had to wear gloves, but after that, it was by your own discretion. Even this rule was not entirely enforced and most of the volunteers and Supervisors chose not to wear gloves while out the back sorting, unless the inspector was coming around that day.124

118 VCOSS, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 1.

119 VCOSS, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 1.

120 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 14 November 2018

(received 25 January 2019), p. 5.

121 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Media Officer, AUWU, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 22.

122 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 30.

123 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 4.

124 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 9.

125

7.102 The same participant contracted a bacterial infection and was told by her GP that the most likely place that she had picked up the infection was from her WfD activity. She had been working in the op-shop in a heatwave just before contracting the infection:

Just before I contracted the infection, the shop air-con broke right in the middle of a heatwave, and we had to endure some 40+ degree days. The sweltering temperatures made the clothes in the shop all manky, a perfect breeding ground for bacteria. The air-con remained broken for 2 months until it finally got fixed in early autumn.125

7.103 A young woman who provided a testimonial to the AUWU stated that she was made to work with people who she 'felt were not safe for a young woman to work with alone'.126 Another female participant submitted that she was required to do a WfD placement with an organisation despite her abusive ex-partner working for the organisation.127 Another participant who did WfD with an organisation for the disabled reported having to drive clients in her own car:

I was supposed to be in the administration department, but they insisted I work with disabled people. I found on occasions that I was doing tasks that I felt untrained to do and I even drove clients in my own car to an activity which I was told later was illegal.128

7.104 A 55 year old submitter to the inquiry informed his provider about a pre-existing condition and was still placed in a WfD activity that involved hard physical labour. He experienced severe internal bleeding, induced by his WfD activity:

In November 2017 I told my jobactive provider that I had been diagnosed with a stone in my bladder which caused internal bleeding any time I moved around too vigorously. Despite telling the provider of this potentially life-threatening condition, a work for the dole requirement was imposed on me at a work for the dole host that required hard physical labour.

In December 2017 I experienced such severe bleeding that I collapsed and later was admitted to the emergency department of the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital…

The work for the dole host now claims to have no recollection of my collapse, nor is there an incident report.129

7.105 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart was 30 years old when he was injured whilst participating in WfD:

125 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 9.

126 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 36.

127 Name Withheld, Submission 123, p. 2.

128 Name Withheld, Submission 120, p. 1.

129 Name Withheld, Submission 149, pp. 11-12.

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7.106 Mr Smart described the full extent and impact of his injury to the committee:

It is classed as permanent and I have been told I am going to be dealing with this for the rest of my life. So it has been pretty catastrophic to my life. I am basically a different person because of this.131

7.107 WfD participants do not have access to insurance cover equivalent to workers compensation.132 Mr Smart noted that there is no WorkCover for WfD injuries:

I have basically been my own physiotherapist, my own doctor and my own psychologist since this occurred, because there is no WorkCover under the Work for the Dole program. Basically, I have taken out advance payments to pay for my own specialists and waited six to eight months in between.133

Undermining paid work and valuable volunteering 7.108 The committee received evidence that WfD can directly undermine paid employment opportunities. According to the AUWU, some participants are being forced to attend WfD instead of paid employment because their

employment does not meet the criteria for an outcome payment.134

7.109 Some submitters raised the concern that WfD may cause the displacement of people in paid employment and socially valuable volunteer work. Ms Kylie Wright, a consultant, informed the committee that most of the WfD activities

130 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 49.

131 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 52.

132 VCOSS, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 1.

133 Mr Michael (Mick) Smart, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 52.

134 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 33.

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in her area are activities that would ordinarily be taken up by volunteer staff.135 A submitter noted that participants who already do valuable volunteer work within established organisations are instead made to do WfD:

Some welfare recipients who are already volunteers when they have become unemployed have been told the work they are doing is not recognised by Jobactive despite having established roles and relationships within their chosen volunteer organisation, including a young man working for the regional emergency services and a person volunteering for Lifeline. It was suggested that these men participate in a work for the dole scheme instead.136

7.110 GSANZ provided the following example of a highly skilled medical librarian who has been nominated for Citizen of the Year for her municipality.137 She also ran an op-shop and was on several boards.138 However, the medical librarian's volunteering was not recognised as an approved activity:

Gloria holds a PhD and has expertise as a medical librarian and volunteers these skills at her local hospital since she is unable to work due to complex caring duties. However, her provider has said her volunteering is not authorised as meeting obligation requirements, and has told her instead to ‘volunteer’ in one of two work for-the-dole factory jobs.139

7.111 The WfD factory that the medical librarian was assigned to was a 40 minute drive away, and the librarian did not drive.140

7.112 Mr Rohan Musch, an admitted solicitor and jobactive participant who volunteers with a community legal centre, was told this was not an approved activity:

I am an admitted solicitor, I currently volunteer with a community legal centre. However, it was intimated to me that this wouldn’t meet requirements for work for the dole. I would like to know how my standing in the back end of a shop sorting dirty clothes would be more beneficial to the community than my providing free legal services to those who don’t have the ability to hire a lawyer.141

135 Ms Kylie Wright, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 47.

136 Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 11.

137 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 25.

138 Ms Susan Maury, Policy and Research Specialist, GSANZ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 17.

139 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 18.

140 Ms Susan Maury, Policy and Research Specialist, GSANZ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 17.

141 Mr Rohan Musch, Submission 86, p. 1.

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7.113 Similarly, a volunteer firefighter with 20 years' experience was told that his firefighting service was not an approved activity.142 Volunteering (as an alternative to WfD) is discussed in more detail below.

People incorrectly forced into Work for the Dole 7.114 The committee also received evidence that some participants were being incorrectly assigned to do WfD when they were in fact exempt.143 A young woman who provided a testimonial to the AUWU stated that after

undertaking WfD she discovered that she was not obliged to due to part time employment:

Later on I found out that I wasn't even legally required to do work for the dole because I was already working part time but my employment agency told me I had to!144

7.115 A jobactive participant submitted that because providers can suspend payments, they are able to coerce participants into attending activities:

I was put into 3 Work for the Dole activities while I was working a casual job and so getting a reduced rate of NewStart, which according to the jobactive deed I didn't have to do (something I only found out after doing two Work for the Dole activities… Centrelink who confirmed I wasn't obligated to do work for the dole…145

Travel and additional payments 7.116 The committee heard that travelling to WfD can impose a substantial financial cost on participations.146 It can also be difficult for participants to get to their WfD site, for example, if public transport is not available.147 Individuals who

participate in WfD are entitled to receive an extra $20.80 per fortnight.148 However, the committee heard that some WfD participants were not receiving the extra payment. One participant who provided a confidential submission advised that he had asked for the payment but never once received it. According to the participant, when he asked around, about one third of the WfD people he knows also said they have never received it.149

142 Name Withheld, Submission 133, p. 3.

143 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 135, p. 1; AUWU, Submission 27, p. 36; and Name

Withheld, Submission 122, p. 1.

144 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 36.

145 Name Withheld, Submission 122, p. 1.

146 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 95, p. 2.

147 See for example, Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p 8.

148 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Work for the Dole—information for job seekers,

https://jobsearch.gov.au/content/documents/11%20factsheet%20for%20wfd%20job%20seekers.pdf (accessed 24 January 2019), p. 2.

149 Confidential, Submission 131, p. 5.

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Committee view 7.117 The Department of Jobs and Small Business told the committee that participating in WfD gives participants an increased desire to find paid work. The committee is unsurprised by this statement: not because WfD improves

employment prospects—for many it clearly does not—but because it is obvious that a punitive WfD experience (common for many) would give participants an increased desire to be rid of the welfare merry-go-round. Being at risk of injury doing WfD would also give participants an increased desire to find paid work.

7.118 In 2016, Josh Park Fing died on a WfD site. While any work experience program involves health and safety risks, the committee is concerned that for some placements there is a lack of proper oversight of WfD.

7.119 The committee notes that current insurance arrangements for WfD are not equivalent to worker's compensation. Accordingly, the committee considers that the government should review the adequacy of insurance arrangements for WfD participants.

7.120 With regard to the evidence that WfD does not substantially improve the employment prospects of participants, the committee considers that the government must examine how to improve the employment outcomes for WfD participants. In this regard, the primary objective of WfD must be to improve the employability of participants.

7.121 The committee also considers that participants must be made aware of appropriate alternatives of WfD, particularly given the modest benefits of WfD for employment outcomes. The committee also considers that the government can do more to provide alternatives to WfD. In this regard, the committee is of the view that the government should consider extending eligibility for other labour market programs, such as Transition to Work, to allow those eligible for WfD to choose other programs (if available) as an alternative.

7.122 The committee is concerned by evidence that WfD may in some cases undermine the employment of people in paid work and socially valuable volunteer work. The committee considers that the government should investigate how to ensure that this does not occur.

Recommendation 21

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Recommendation 22

Recommendation 23

7.125 The committee recommends that the government investigate how to ensure that Work for the Dole does not in practice displace people from paid work and volunteer work.

Recommendation 24

7.126 The committee recommends that the government review Work for the Dole with a view to improving the employability of participants.

Recommendation 25

7.127 The committee recommends that the government review the safety requirements for Work for the Dole and consider whether current insurance arrangements are adequate.

Training and courses 7.128 Training under jobactive can be voluntary or compulsory. Training is compulsory if it is included in a participant's Job Plan as part of their mutual obligations. Jobactive participants can choose to undertake accredited

education and training courses to satisfy their annual activity requirements.150 Individual providers may also offer participants training arranged by the provider.

7.129 Submitters did not always indicate if the training they undertook was voluntary or part of their mutual obligations. Accordingly, issues raised concerning training are discussed in this section, although some submissions may not relate to mutual obligations.

7.130 The committee received evidence that in some cases training activities and courses have been poor quality.151 For example, one submitter described being required to participate in a course with very out-of-date material:

I was forced to undertake a “week long” course, which amounted to several unmonitored modules on a computer that I completed within a day. These modules targeted resume writing, job application skills and the

150 Department of Social Services, Social Security Guide, 3.2.10.10 Activities to Meet an Annual Activity

Requirement, http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/3/2/10/10 (accessed 30 January 2019).

151 See for example, Mr Aidan Jarvis, Submission 38, pp. 1-2.

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step by step process to apply for a job. Unfortunately the videos and software that was being used was extremely dated. In particular, when the videos referred to the internet it was clear that it was from the late 1990s or early 2000s. These videos also suggested faxing applications, which in 2015 was unfeasible. Even more ridiculous was the embarrassing excuse for a resume that the software generated and the case managers encouraged everyone to use for their job applications.152

7.131 The committee also received evidence that participants are put into courses that are below their existing skill level and/or irrelevant to helping the participants find work.153 For example, a testimonial provided by the AUWU stated that their provider made them attend a course called 'Retail Ready' even though the participant had more than 10 years' experience in retail.154 A jobactive participant submitted that they were forced to attend a workshop on writing a CV that was 'completely unnecessary' because they already had a CV written by their Alumni at Murdoch University.155 The Edmund Rice Centre WA reported that a person from a non-English speaking background with Australian tertiary qualifications was forced into inappropriate courses:

...the person was forced by the Job services Provider to attend a government-funded course which teaches people to use office equipment, full-time. This activity was inappropriate because the person already had highly developed skills with the office equipment (as well as business management skills), and the full time course activities have prevented the person from attending their small business development needs. The same person was later required to attend a two-week full-time CV writing course, developed for people with low literacy and job capacity skills. With the same Jobactive provider, the person was prescribed to attend two sessions with representatives of a cleaning company which was recruiting within the Jobactive agency. The inadequacy of the prescribed activities was specifically evident considering that the qualifications held by the person were tertiary legal qualifications. The activities also did not have a capacity to increase the person's income and interfered with the person's effort to organise their own small business. Such an approach by the Jobactive provider created instability for the person, based on un-predictability of the requirements imposed on the person, leading to giving up on developing a professional services business.156

152 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 1.

153 See for example, Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, pp. 7-8; and Ms Rozie Hart,

Submission 139, p. 2.

154 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 20.

155 Name Withheld, Submission 121, p. 1.

156 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, pp. 7-8.

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7.132 A facilitator for the Career Transition Program reported that some participants were referred to training by their provider when they did not possess the prerequisite digital literacy.157

7.133 The committee also received evidence that training requirements were in some cases directly interfering with paid employment. The AUWU reported that some jobactive participants were being forced to attend employability training instead of attending employment:

…a number of unemployed workers actually being encouraged by their employment service provider, under the threat of a penalty, to attend a employability training activity instead of attending employment as their employment does not meet the criteria for an outcome payment. The AUWU is aware of a number of unemployed workers who have lost their jobs in this fashion.158

7.134 The committee also heard that some providers were not inclined to approve training activities unless the provider received a financial benefit, such as through guaranteed employment at the end of the course.159

7.135 The Expert Advisory Panel recommended that employment services participants should be able to meet mutual obligation points through a choice of activities such as job search and training.160 According to the Panel's report, the future 'digital and data ecosystem' for employment services participants would include links to training.161 The Panel's report notes training has been shown to be an effective intervention for highly disadvantaged job seekers.162 Additionally, training can help prepare workers for 'employment in new and emerging industries with identified skills shortages'.163

Committee view 7.136 The committee notes evidence that under jobactive, some participants have been put into training that is below their existing skill level or irrelevant to improving their chances of securing meaningful employment. Additionally,

157 Name Withheld, Submission 117, p. 4.

158 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 16.

159 See for example, Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 5; and Youth Affairs Council of South

Australia, Submission 29, p. 5.

160 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 54.

161 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 50.

162 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 59.

163 Advanced Personnel Management, Submission 54, p. 3.

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the committee notes that some participants find it hard to get training approved as an activity.

7.137 The committee supports a greater emphasis on appropriate training, in line with the recommendations of the Expert Advisory Panel. The committee also supports the Panel's recommendation for greater choice of activities to meet mutual obligations, including training.

Approved volunteering 7.138 Volunteer work with approved organisations can count towards a jobactive participant's mutual obligations.164 There were different views during the inquiry about the benefits of volunteering for employment outcomes. Some

stakeholders submitted that volunteering, whilst valuable to the community, often does not improve employment outcomes. For example, one submitter suggested that volunteering only leads to more volunteering:

Volunteering does not guarantee an underemployed or unemployed person a more stable and better renumerated role, or a paid role at all. In my experience it leads to more volunteer work and eventually people become professional volunteers…165

7.139 In contrast, other stakeholders suggested that volunteering can benefit job seekers. According to Volunteering Victoria, volunteering can provide the following benefits:

ï Creates a more level playing field for rural communities where jobs, training and educational facilities are less accessible by providing greater diversity of skill development compared to traditional pathways.

ï Increase in civic engagement, social responsibility and feelings of involvement individuals out of the workforce. ï Participation in volunteering has been shown to have positive effects on mental health, by increasing civic engagement and providing a sense of

purpose. ï Simultaneously helps to improve perceptions of job seekers as those not contributing to society. ï Creation of additional community support networks. ï Participation in volunteering programs ensures higher exposure to a

greater variety of careers and professions whilst simultaneously obtaining new skills and providing benefit to the community. ï Evidence shows that those who volunteer see higher chances of employment.

164 Department of Social Services, Social Security Guide, 3.2.10.10 Activities to Meet an Annual Activity

Requirement, http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/3/2/10/10 (accessed 30 January 2019).

165 Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 11.

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ï A recent survey conducted by SEEK indicated that 95% of employers consider volunteering just as credible as paid work.166

7.140 The committee heard that the contribution people make through volunteering was not fully recognised under the current system for mutual obligations. Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research, Anglicare Australia, emphasised the important role that volunteers play in the Australian society:

We have a tendency at the moment to say, 'Only paid employment is a contribution to society,' but it doesn't really fit with our reality. At the moment, there are however many hundreds of volunteer firefighters on the frontline in Tasmania, the SES is deploying across Queensland because of floods and, on any given day in Australia, there are nearly three million Australians providing unpaid care to loved ones, which we rely on for the rest of our systems to work.167

7.141 The committee also heard that the limited number of approved organisations for volunteering meant some participants could not volunteer with their chosen organisation. Mr Thomas Studans, a jobactive participant, contended that volunteer options should 'reflect the membership of the peak bodies in each state'.168 Some submitters argued that participants should be able to source their own volunteer activities as part of their activity requirements.169 GSANZ submitted that if an organisation is not registered, the provider should make an assessment of the activity.170

7.142 The committee heard that volunteering support services organisations who assist employment services providers to try and place participants are not receiving funding for this work.171 Ms Lavanya Kala from Volunteering Australia suggested that employment services providers were passing on the work they were contracted to do to volunteer support services.172

Committee view 7.143 The committee notes that the limited number of approved organisations was an issue for some participants who were not able to volunteer with their chosen organisation.

166 Volunteering Victoria, Submission 35, pp. 2-3.

167 Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research, Anglicare Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 2.

168 Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, p. 4.

169 See for example, Volunteering Victoria, Submission 35, p. 3; and GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 25.

170 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 25.

171 Ms Lavanya Kala, Policy Manager, Volunteering Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018,

p. 27.

172 Ms Lavanya Kala, Policy Manager, Volunteering Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018,

p. 28.

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7.144 The committee also notes that there are different views on the benefits of volunteering for employment outcomes.

7.145 Earlier in this report the committee recommended that the government strengthen obligations for providers to inform participants about appropriate alternatives to Work for the Dole. This recommendation is set out above in the 'Work for the Dole' section.

Drug or alcohol treatment 7.146 Previously, jobactive participants could be granted an exemption from their mutual obligations for drug and alcohol treatment programs. This exemption was recently removed and replaced with a new policy.173 As of 1 January 2018,

participation in drug or alcohol treatment programs can count towards a participant's annual activity requirements.174 This means that participants remain on the caseload of their jobactive provider whilst undertaking treatment for drug or alcohol addiction.175

7.147 The recent policy changes also mean that participants in Streams A and B can have a drug and alcohol treatment program recognised as an approved activity. Previously, only Stream C participants could have drug and alcohol treatment as an approved activity.176

7.148 Under the new arrangements, whilst a person is receiving treatment, their obligation to look for work is suspended:

…individuals…will need to notify their job search provider that they are entering treatment, which will prompt their job search provider to alter their plan to suspend their obligation to look for work—this arrangement will stand whilst the person remains in treatment.177

7.149 Non-residential drug and alcohol treatment programs can also be included in a participant's Job Plan to meet their mutual obligation requirements.178

7.150 The committee received evidence that there have been issues with the implementation of these policy changes, including inconsistent interpretation of the new policy by jobactive providers. According to Ms Jill Rundle, Chief

173 Department of Human Services, Better Targeting of Assistance to Support Jobseekers - Budget 2017-18,

www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/about-us/budget/budget-2017-18/jobseekers/better-targeting-assistance-support-jobseekers#a4 (accessed 5 February 2019).

174 Department of Social Services, Social Security Guide, 3.2.10.10 Activities to Meet an Annual Activity

Requirement, http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/3/2/10/10 (accessed 30 January 2019).

175 Network of Alcohol and Other Drug Agencies, New Centrelink arrangements, www.nada.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/NADA-Sector-Watch_050718.pdf (accessed 31 January 2019), p. 1.

176 Department of Human Services, Better Targeting of Assistance to Support Jobseekers - Budget 2017-18.

177 Network of Alcohol and Other Drug Agencies, New Centrelink arrangements, p. 2.

178 Network of Alcohol and Other Drug Agencies, New Centrelink arrangements, p. 2.

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Executive Officer of the Western Australian Network of Alcohol and other Drug Agencies (WANADA) there was no consultation with the sector prior to the budget announcement. WANADA advised that following the announcement, consultation was limited and as a result there have been a number of unintended consequences.179

7.151 The committee heard that treatment organisations now have to negotiate with jobactive providers. Ms Rundle from WANADA provided the following example of a residential therapeutic community that now has to negotiate with 12 different providers:

When someone accesses a residential or therapeutic community, it is a full-time program for three, six or sometimes 12 months. It is quiet an intense program. With the changes, that organisation or that service has reported that they have 12 network providers that they are having to negotiate with. Some of those providers have up to three officers as well. They don't just have a single person who they are negotiating with. They have a number of people who they are having to work with.

7.152 According to Ms Rundle, as a result of the changes, people are receiving inappropriate Job Plans and having their payments suspended whilst in residential care:

…plans requiring them to continue looking for work even though they are in this intensive treatment program. They have had requests for additional medical certificates. They typically have, in the past, provided medical certificates. They've been required to attend multiple external meetings as well, despite being in this residential, intensive, full-time program.

…in some cases people accessing the treatment services have had their payments suspended while they're in residential care. For people accessing residential care, a contribution of their benefits goes towards covering food, transport and the costs of living in those facilities. Having their payments cut obviously impacts on services, but of course, primarily, it significantly impacts on the wellbeing of the clients accessing those services.180

7.153 The committee heard that some providers have a lack of awareness about drug and alcohol issues. Ms Rundle advised that providers are in some cases not recognising medical certificates that identify the need for alcohol and other drug treatment.181 Additionally, after treatment, some providers have been finding participants inappropriate work, such as in a pub, which could trigger a relapse.182

179 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, Western Australian Network of Alcohol and other Drug

Agencies (WANADA), Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 33.

180 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, WANADA, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 28.

181 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, WANADA, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 29.

182 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, WANADA, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 30.

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7.154 The committee also heard that the new policy has had a detrimental impact on rehabilitation and treatment service quality. Ms Rundle advised that staff of treatment organisations are now 'spending up to 30 per cent of their time just dealing with the jobactive processes of their clients'.183 Anglicare provided the following example:

…a staff member providing housing support services to a client advised both they and the client’s drug and alcohol counsellor spend considerable time every appointment discussing and supporting the client to meet their jobactive requirements. The constant work to meet these requirements and the threat of suspension of payments means the client and their support staff cannot focus on the fundamental work of improving their mental health, recovery from addiction and maintaining their housing.184

7.155 WANADA informed the committee that some alcohol and other drug services have experienced a reduction in service demand since the introduction of the policy changes. According to WANADA, one organisation reported 'a 2.1% reduction in clients treated at the service since 1 July 2018 and approximately 8% decrease in client attended occasions of service over the same period (i.e. “did not attend” when an appointment was made)'.185

7.156 WANDA also advised that some non-residential services have reported 'tensions between mutual obligations and treatment':

There are examples of Job Active Providers requiring individuals to access alcohol and other drug services as a mutual obligation without consultation with the service to assess treatment readiness. This has presented barriers in achieving optimum treatment outcomes. This, in turn, has presented difficulties for counselling staff who have increased non-motivational/resistant clients who need to attend treatment sessions to secure their welfare benefits. Job providers are not clinicians, or able to determine treatment needs. Referrals to treatment services should be for assessment only.186

7.157 According to Ms Rundle, there have also been multiple instances of jobactive providers and Centrelink seeking changes to medical certificates to remove or amend the identification of alcohol and other drug issues:

People have reported that their job network providers have been saying, 'Just put down that they have a mental health problem. Just change it.' They have actually been contacting GPs as well to make these amendments.187

183 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, WANADA, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 28.

184 Anglicare Australia, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received 8 February 2019),

p. 1.

185 WANADA, answers to questions on notice, 29 January 2019 (received 6 February 2019), p. 1.

186 WANADA, answers to questions on notice, 29 January 2019 (received 6 February 2019), p. 1.

187 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, WANADA, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 28.

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7.158 Ms Rundle suggested this may be happening because it is easier to satisfy obligations due to mental illness.188

7.159 The Department of Jobs and Small Business advised that it had not been made aware of any allegations of providers contacting doctors seeking amendments to medical certificates to record mental health issues rather than alcohol or drug problems.189

Committee view 7.160 The committee notes that the new policy for drug and alcohol treatment has had a number of implementation issues, including inconsistent application of the policy by providers. The committee considers that the government must

take immediate action to ensure providers are correctly applying the new policy.

7.161 The committee is also concerned about reports that doctors are being inappropriately pressured to change medical certificates due to the recent policy changes. The committee considers that the government should investigate these reports.

Recommendation 26

Recommendation 27

188 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, WANADA, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 28.

189 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 23.

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Chapter 8

Targeted Compliance Framework

…it's very hard to give a hand up with the same hand that you slap someone down with.1

Overview 8.1 For jobactive participants, access to welfare payments and jobactive services is conditional on participants continuing to meet the mutual obligation requirements discussed in Chapter 7. Demerit points and financial penalties

can be imposed when participants do not meet their mutual obligation requirements.

8.2 This chapter examines the impacts and consequences of the compliance framework for jobactive participants. The chapter is structured according to the following topics:

ï Overview of the Targeted Compliance Framework ï An overemphasis on compliance ï Negative impacts of the compliance framework ï Complexity of the compliance framework ï Impacts of compliance on work readiness ï The proper role of providers ï Reasonable excuse rules ï The future of compliance

8.3 The committee's recommendations are set out throughout the chapter.

Overview of the Targeted Compliance Framework 8.4 On 1 July 2018, the Targeted Compliance Framework (TCF) commenced, replacing the previous compliance framework.2 The TCF is the mechanism for enforcing mutual obligation requirements:

The TCF is comprised of three zones: Green Zone, the Warning Zone and the Penalty Zone. All job seekers will start in the Green Zone and, so long as they meet all their Mutual Obligation Requirements, they will remain in this zone. Where a job seeker commits a Mutual Obligation Failure they will move to the Warning Zone. If they continue to be non-compliant, they will be in either the Warning Zone or the Penalty Zone.3

1 Mrs Renae Lowry, Executive General Manager Employment and Training, genU (Karingal Inc—

MatchWorks), Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 33.

2 The TCF applies to participants in jobactive, Disability Employment Services and ParentsNext.

3 Department of Jobs and Small Business, 'Targeted Compliance Framework',

https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/targeted-compliance-framework (accessed 17 December 2018).

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8.5 Under the previous framework, compliance decisions were made by the Department of Human Services (DHS) based on reports of non-compliance from providers. The previous framework therefore gave providers discretion over whether to report non-compliance.4 Under the TCF, this discretion has been removed and responsibility for compliance has largely been shifted to providers. Providers are now responsible for applying demerits for any failures to meet the mutual obligations set out in the participant's Job Plan. For example, a demerit would apply for a missed appointment or if the participant did not apply for the required number of jobs. A participant can also incur a demerit by 'behaving inappropriately during an appointment or activity or by acting in any manner than can be judged as threatening a potential offer of employment'.5

8.6 The Department of Jobs and Small Business informed the committee that the TCF is 'designed to encourage job seekers to engage with their employment services provider and take personal responsibility for managing and meeting their [mutual obligation requirements]'.6 The Department advised that the TCF gives greater support to jobactive participants who are 'genuinely trying to meet their obligations', while also imposing 'strong penalties for the small number of job seekers who persistently and deliberately do not meet their mutual obligation requirements'.7

8.7 As at 30 September 2018, three months into the TCF, 32.6 per cent of the caseload had at least one demerit point resulting in support payment suspension, with 665 participants already in the 'penalty zone' resulting in support payment cancellation or reduction.8

8.8 Since then, the proportion of participants being financially penalised or having their payments suspended has increased. As at 31 December 2018, 42.5 per cent of the caseload had at least one demerit point resulting in support payment suspension, with 4101 participants in the penalty zone.9

8.9 Disturbingly, more than half of all Indigenous participants have at least one demerit (as at 31 December 2019). Despite Indigenous people making up only

4 National Social Security Rights Network, Budget 2017 - New compliance system,

www.nssrn.org.au/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Budget-2017-new-compliance-system.pdf (accessed 5 February 2019), p. 1.

5 Per Capita and the Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), Submission 5, p. 6.

6 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 5.

7 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 5.

8 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive figures, 30 September 2018, 2018-19

Supplementary Budget Estimates (tabled 24 October 2018), p. 1.

9 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 5.

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about 13 per cent of the jobactive caseload, Indigenous people make up almost 28 per cent of people in the penalty zone.10

8.10 Homeless people are also overrepresented in the compliance data. More than half of all homeless participants have at least one demerit. Despite making up only 11 per cent of the caseload, homeless people make up almost 20 per cent of people in the penalty zone.11

An overemphasis on compliance 8.11 The committee received substantial evidence that there is an unwarranted overemphasis on compliance under jobactive. Since the introduction of jobactive in July 2015, 461 771 financial penalties have been imposed (as at

28 November 2018).12

8.12 Although stakeholders recognised the need for a compliance framework, most considered that the TCF represented an overemphasis on compliance. For example, the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) considered there was a need for compliance systems 'to get people engaged with the labour market and effectively searching so that they don't give up', however 'the level of prescription is far too great' under the TCF.13

8.13 The committee received evidence that the penalties imposed have 'a significant rate of error':

…of the penalties imposed during the 2015-16 year, around 50% were found by Centrelink to have been imposed in error, meaning that close to a million unemployed workers that year were penalised when they had done nothing wrong.14

8.14 This high error rate was a major concern for the Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU):

The evidence plainly shows, unemployed workers are having their payments withdrawn and reduced due to no fault of their own. Unfair penalties are so rampant in employment services that the dysfunctional and punitive system has become a national emergency.15

10 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 5.

11 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 5.

12 This figure does not include demerit points. Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to

questions on notice, no 21, 6 December 2018 (received 2 January 2019), p. 4.

13 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), Committee

Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 3.

14 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 6.

15 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 36.

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8.15 A number of submitters detailed personal experiences of having payments suspended due to administrative errors.16 The following case from the Edmund Rice Centre WA illustrates the impact of errors on participants:

A 25 years old single lady, refugee from Myanmar approached the caseworker as her Centrelink payment was suspended due to a missed Jobactive appointment. With the help of an interpreter in the ERCWA [Edmund Rice Centre WA], it was established that the client arrived 6 months ago in Australia, and never missed any appointment. When the client went to Centrelink to re-install her payment, the Centrelink referred the client back to the Jobactive agency. The agency explicitly refused to talk to the client, and told her to go back to Centrelink. The assisting ERCWA caseworker eventually insisted that the Jobactive employee checks their record. It was established that the client actually attended the appointment, but the service provider failed to update the client's data in the system.17

8.16 Jobactive providers are able to remove demerit points in cases where the demerit has been applied in error.18 However, the committee heard that it can be difficult to undo an incorrectly applied suspension. According to Mr Johnny Windus, National Advocacy Coordinator for the AUWU, providers are not willing to acknowledge their mistakes:

With nine out of 10 complaints that we received on the phone line, they were cut off for no reason—none at all. Again, most of the time now, with the demerit points system, even when you go in to re-engage, they will reaccess your money and they will put you back on benefits, but they will still leave your point sitting there. You will still have one, two or five demerit points sitting there for whatever you've done, although they have said that you were not guilty of it. They just leave it there. It is too much of a problem. That's because we have a system where that job service provider now needs to write something in writing as to how they made a mistake to have that removed, and they're not willing to do it. They just totally not willing to do it. You can ring the Department of Jobs and Small Business and complain. You go around and around in a circle, and it doesn't matter. It is just left there.19

8.17 Ms Kylie Wright, an employment services consultant, was castigated by her employer for attempting to resolve compliance errors in her own time:

Due to my own stress and anxiety levels exacerbated by this new compliance system, I have on occasions neglected to result [record]

16 See for example, Mr Aidan Jarvis, Submission 38, p. 2; and Mr Robbie Buckmaster, Submission 103,

p. 1.

17 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 9.

18 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 3.

19 Mr Johnny Windus, National Advocacy Coordinator, AUWU, and private capacity, Committee

Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 11; see also Ms Leela James, Coordinator Community Relief and Resilience, Western Australian Council of Social Service, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 6.

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appointments correctly, or neglected to add comments, or load other required information into the system, and have lay in bed at night worrying about what I have forgotten, so have gone into the office the next day, in my own time to fix what has been missed so as not to cause the job seeker any compliance issues. I have been castigated by my employer for doing this. I have also had job seekers contact me on my time off worrying because they have been unable to attend things in their diary or unable to enter their job search due to system errors etc, so again I have gone into the office in my own time to assist them and have been castigated by my employer.20

8.18 The committee also heard that the TCF does not allow room for error, as reported by ACOSS:

… we're hearing a few things. One is that the timing of decision-making, both of providers and of Centrelink, to suspend payments, where, for example, someone hasn't attended an appointment, is very fine-tuned. So there isn't much room for error, and if there are glitches in IT systems or someone records something incorrectly and says they didn't attend when they did, for example, people are having their payments suspended all of a sudden without the opportunity to talk to the provider, to talk with Centrelink, as they previously had.21

8.19 This point was also noted by Mr David Toscano of Northern Community CareWorks, a Work for the Dole host, who gave evidence to the committee:

They apply the demerits before they ask questions about what's going on. We had an unfortunate situation with a clerical error within our office— our admin team are human and they do make mistakes. They marked one person in one line above as 'present' and the person below as 'absent'. The following day we found out that that person who had been marked 'absent' had been notified that they were being cut off from their payments. Thankfully, their payments were not due for another week. We were able to rectify that the following day.22

8.20 The committee heard that the government recently restricted the power of Centrelink to overturn penalties, despite the high rate of errors. As noted by Per Capita and the AUWU, until 1 July 2018, 'Centrelink had the power to overturn penalties imposed by providers if it judged them to be unfairly punitive'.23

8.21 Jobactive participants' appeal rights are considered separately in Chapter 9.

Committee view

20 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 3.

21 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 3.

22 Mr David Toscano, Team Leader, Northern Community CareWorks Ltd and Northern

Community Church of Christ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 47.

23 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 38.

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8.22 The committee is of the view that the new TCF arrangements are unnecessarily burdensome and prioritise a punitive compliance approach over meaningful employment outcomes. This is strongly demonstrated by the evidence of the Department of Jobs and Small Business which shows that almost half of all jobactive participants have been found to be non-compliant. Additionally, the number of people in the penalty zone has gone from 665 in the first three months of the TCF to over 4000 three months later. Furthermore, the astonishingly high error rate of 50 per cent during the 2015-16 year clearly demonstrates the real risk of participants being unfairly punished. These errors have real-life consequences for jobactive participants, including the suspension of support payments.

8.23 Additionally, the committee considers that it is unacceptable that administrative errors by providers can result in payment suspensions with no recourse to Centrelink. The committee considers that in certain circ*mstances Centrelink must have discretion over penalties, including demerits. The government's punitive approach to delivering employment services does not provide value for money for taxpayers nor opportunities for decent and stable jobs for unemployed Australians.

Recommendation 28

Negative impacts of the compliance framework 8.25 A number of submitters raised concerns about the severe consequences of the TCF and supported the cessation of the TCF.24 These stakeholders highlighted the negative impacts of the TCF for particular groups. For example, the

committee heard that the compliance framework was particularly punitive for single mothers and inhibited 'efforts to become self-reliant'.25

8.26 A number of submitters considered that the TCF was overly punitive. The Refugee Council of Australia expressed concerns that the TCF is more punitive than the previous system. For example, in cases where payments were previously suspended for non-compliance, they are now cancelled.26 The Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) reported concerns about the

24 See for example, Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer, Good Shepherd Australia

New Zealand (GSANZ), Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 12; and AUWU, Submission 27, p. 57.

25 Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer, GSANZ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 13.

26 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 3.

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'injudiciousness of decisions when customers are not capable of meeting or understanding the obligations and who are incapable of understanding the metrics of the new system'.27

8.27 Dr Tony Ward, a Fellow of the University of Melbourne, noted that the implicit rationale for the tougher compliance framework is that 'people need to be pushed into job search activities'.28 Dr Ward submitted that recent studies indicate that 'any toughening of compliance rules can be counter-productive, especially for more disadvantaged workers'.29

8.28 Dr Ward drew the committee's attention to existing international evidence of the negative impacts of punitive compliance frameworks. For example, a comparison of policies across 25 European welfare states found a 'correlation between the harshness of the work-related sanction and the risk of severe material deprivation'.30 This pattern was also found in the UK where new tougher sanctions for unemployment support recipients merely 'increased the numbers of people in severe hardship, having to rely on food banks', rather than encouraging more employment activity.31

8.29 Jobactive participants who provided a submission reported a range of negative impacts of the compliance framework.32 One submitter described the compliance system as 'like a discipline and corrections system' and emphasised the adverse impact it had:

Coupled with the enduring demands of Centrelink, it impacts my self-esteem causing me to experience anger and frustration which on one occasion, when a Centrelink worker suggested that "if I didn't like the system I could always just get a job", my rage was expressed explicitly and resulted in being banned from entering Centrelink offices for 6 months. To be reduced to blind rage is a devastating outcome, it has deeply shaken my sense of self control and has impacted on the range of jobs I am now confident to apply for. I often feel debilitated and handle adversity increasingly poorly.33

27 Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer, Community and Public Sector Union

(CPSU), answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 2.

28 Dr Tony Ward, Submission 32, p. 2.

29 Dr Tony Ward, Submission 32, p. 2.

30 Dr Tony Ward, Submission 32, p. 5, citing Anja Eleveld, 'Activation policies: policies of social

inclusion or social exclusion?', Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, vol 25. No 3, 2017, p. 277.

31 Dr Tony Ward, Submission 32, p. 5, citing Rachel Loopstra, Aaron Reeves et al., 'Austerity,

sanctions, and the rise of food banks in the UK', British Medical Journal, 350: h1775.

32 See for example, Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 6.

33 Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 12.

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8.30 A number of stakeholders emphasised that payment suspensions can be highly stressful for participants. One participant described the framework as 'extremely stressful to handle'.34 The following testimonial is illustrative:

I received several Centrelink suspensions for not attending appointments. This advice invariably arrived by text message at 17.05 asking me to call the office urgently (though my Provider's office closed at 17.00). The suspensions were received despite me always giving my Provider more than 24 hours’ notice prior to my appointment that I would not be able to make the appointment (due to work or job interviews). This was often distressing as the text messages would arrive on a Friday at 17.05, leaving me with a weekend of worrying about why I’d been suspended.35

8.31 In addition, the committee heard that the compliance framework can be harmful to the mental health of participants. Mr Robbie Buckmaster, a jobactive participant, described the impact of the framework on his health:

The stress from being cut off and having threatening appointments eventually led to my having panic attacks. I was terrified of being watched. I could imagine my every day life being construed as non-compliance and my payments being suspended at random. I had internalised the compliance nature of the mutual obligations and it aggravated my depression. My life was spiraling out of control.36

8.32 Another participant submitted that the compliance system was 'literally driving people to suicide':

I was physically and emotionally exhausted, and I couldn’t see any way out of my personal problems. In February 2018, I tried to take my own life. It was after this attempt, that I saw a new GP and was taken out of Stream A and into DES/DSM [Disability Employment Services]. But the damage was already done. I have absolutely no faith or respect for the Jobactive system. I have continually been put down, embarrassed, humiliated and made to feel like a failure by system.

The current Jobactive compliance framework paints the job seeker as “the enemy” that needs to be controlled and coerced into behaving appropriately. The vast majority of job seekers want to do the right thing by their Jobactive Providers, yet it is the Providers who are abusing the system, not the job seekers.37

8.33 The committee heard that the compliance framework can also result in severe financial hardship for participants. This point was emphasised by the Edmund Rice Centre WA:

Considering that the recipients of the New Start Allowance are people living below the poverty line (which in practical terms means that they are

34 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 10.

35 Name Withheld, Submission 144, p. 3.

36 Mr Robbie Buckmaster, Submission 103, p. 1.

37 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 10.

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unable to cover costs of everyday living, accommodation and basic needs), any irregularity in the Centrelink payments will, inevitably, result in severe hardship. One of the most obvious examples of such hardship is [a] client defaulting on their rent and being evicted.38

8.34 Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ) interviewed 26 single mothers and found that 24 of the 26 participants experienced 'issues beyond their control in meeting compliance at one point or another as a result of ambiguous interpretations of policy by providers':

In each case, it was the responsibility of the client to rectify the situation and ensure that payments were reinstated. While providers often gave reassurance that the funds would be reimbursed, they did not seem to realise that their clients had no buffer even for a short delay in receiving payments. This was one of the most stressful and anxiety-provoking aspects of the policy for the women in our research, and the reason why they self-monitored to a high degree to ensure they remained compliant.39

8.35 The committee received evidence that severe hardship can occur irrespective of whether the penalty was appropriately applied. Mr Aidan Jarvis, a participant, was told that an appointment was voluntary and then had his payment cut for missing the appointment. This had severe consequences:

In this process of my payment being cut, my rent went so far in arrears that I was almost evicted. Clearly, the landlord wouldn't want to renew my lease, so when that ran out, I became homeless, couch-surfing for months. I'm worried that I have been blacklisted in the private rental sphere, and I will never be able to find a rental again, without the assistance of government bodies and charities.40

8.36 One submitter, Ms Mallory Allen, was effectively forced off income support because the compliance framework was incompatible with casual work and study:

I was doing three days of TAFE and the rest of my days were at work.

This made going to the job agency appointments impossible. Not to mention I was still putting in 10 job searches a month, I tried to discuss with Sureway the problems I was having.

I didn’t have any time to come to the appointments they were making me. I didn’t understand why I needed to look for a job when I already had one.

I went in to Sureway and they were very rude and said they couldn’t do phone interviews and if I missed another appointment my payment would be suspended. Due to how many hours I was working I wasn’t getting any payment anyway but felt I needed to keep my Youth allowance as I only had causal work that could be very unreliable at times.

38 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 10.

39 GSANZ, "Outside systems control my life": The experiences of single mothers on Welfare to Work,

October 2018, p. 15.

40 Mr Aidan Jarvis, Submission 38, p. 2.

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I then decide to speak to Centrelink about what other options I had. They were not helpful and told me I needed to put in a complaint, and they couldn’t do anything. After this I had to ask them to cut off my benefit because there wasn’t any way I could keep up with their requirements. This was a little scary because I wasn’t sure if I lost my work what I would do with no other income.41

8.37 Ms Ruth Bretherton, a jobactive participant, pointed out that financial penalties can result in severe hardship for the whole family of a participant:

So if someone has their payments cut or suspended, it is very often not only the recipient who is affected, but other family members as well who rely on the recipient for support, including children and older family members.42

8.38 Mr Daniel McIntyre, another jobactive participant, suggested that the compliance framework was itself acceptable but was not applied correctly:

It is my feeling that the Job Seeker Compliance Framework is in and of itself acceptable. There is however, in my experience; a systemic deliberate reliance on certain sections of the framework which favour enforcement whilst simultaneously ignoring elements which are protective of the rights of the jobseeker.43

8.39 The National Social Security Rights Network submitted that the primary issue with the compliance system is that the financial penalties cannot be waived:

We are concerned that people experiencing crises, such as the onset of psychiatric mental illness or exposure to family violence, may struggle to remain engaged with their required job activities and lose access to income despite their vulnerabilities.44

Committee view 8.40 The committee recognises the need for an appropriate and responsive compliance framework. However, the committee is concerned by the severe consequences of the TCF, particularly for vulnerable groups. Specific issues

and consequences of the TCF are discussed below.

Complexity of the compliance framework 8.41 A number of submitters raised concerns about the complexity of the TCF. Ms Ruth Bretherton described the framework as 'quite difficult to navigate'.45 Similarly, the National Social Security Rights Network reported that 'most

41 Ms Mallory Allen, Submission 94, pp. 1-2.

42 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 10.

43 Mr Daniel McIntyre, Submission 168, pp. 3-4.

44 National Social Security Rights Network, Submission 3, p. 2.

45 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 10.

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people are very confused about the demerit system and don't understand it'.46 The National Social Security Rights Network gave evidence to the committee about discussions with a group of jobactive participants about the TCF:

All of them were totally confused and had no understanding… Most of the people didn't understand how to use that new job app that discusses everything…

A lot of people are having to reapply because they're not understanding what they're meant to do, and there have been difficulties with the provider saying, 'I can't make an appointment for you till a later date.' In the meantime the rent hasn't been paid. And because we do tenancy at this agency, we've seen a lot of people with notices for termination because they haven't been paid and they have already been two weeks behind in their rent and this final episode causes a termination notice.47

8.42 The Refugee Council of Australia submitted that the 'complexity and strictness of the rules add to the anxiety of people trying to meet their other settlement needs including learning English'.48 The Refugee Council has previously highlighted the inappropriateness of the compliance framework for refugee and humanitarian entrants, who may not be able to read English.49

8.43 The complexity of the TCF is also an issue for employment services consultants. Ms Kylie Wright, a consultant, had the following to say:

Since July first [2018] when the new Compliance rules have been introduced, I have struggled greatly with trying to learn the new system of Demerit points and penalty zones, along with the new reporting requirements and compliance changes. I have had very limited training in most aspects of the Employment consultant role, and these changes have made my job an unpleasant experience.50

8.44 Jobactive providers also experience difficulty with the complexity of the TCF. The committee heard from the provider Advanced Personnel Management, who considered that the TCF was 'convoluted':

It's very much geared towards legislation and, as a result, it creates a lot of work and noise and red tape, and for an employment consultant or someone at the front end to service a client can take up to 45 minutes.51

46 Ms Christine Belcher, Welfare Rights Advocate, National Social Security Rights Network,

Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 54.

47 Ms Christine Belcher, Welfare Rights Advocate, National Social Security Rights Network,

Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, pp. 54-55.

48 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, pp. 3-4.

49 Refugee Council of Australia, Submission 58, p. 15.

50 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 2.

51 Ms Mona Saeidavi, General Manager, Employment Services, Advanced Personnel Management,

Committee Hansard, p. 62.

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8.45 This point was also made by Ms Dianne Fletcher, the Chief Executive Officer of Sarina Russo Job Access, who advised that the risk of making an inadvertent error is an additional stress on staff:

…this contract has seen increased complexity, more administration than intervention, devolution of legislative decision-making in the context of the TCF… So the other aspect of compliance, which gets no visibility in any of the dialogue, is our own staff's obligation to comply with the deed. This also causes significant stress to our staff, because an inadvertent human error, which we all make, can mean that the organisation they work for is penalised financially…and can place the contract at risk.52

8.46 Ms Fletcher also pointed out that the expectation that consultants are qualified to understand legislation and apply penalties under the TCF was problematic:

…there's an expectation that providers are legally qualified and understand the ins and outs of the social security legislation, which is indeed very complex. But we are asked to apply penalties, and the documentation that is prepared around those penalties will then be submitted to the AAT [Administrative Appeals Tribunal] and the SSAT [Social Security Appeals Tribunal]... So we are asking people whose main emphasis in coming to work every day is to get someone a job to effectively write a document and a submission that are of legal standard to withstand the SSAT and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.53

Committee view 8.47 The committee is of the view that the TCF is overly-complex. It is unclear to the committee that the complexity of the TCF is justified.

Impacts of compliance on work readiness 8.48 As noted above, the Department of Jobs and Small Business informed the committee that the TCF is 'designed to encourage job seekers to engage with their employment services provider'.54 Despite this, the committee received

overwhelming evidence that the compliance framework does not improve the work readiness of participants. For example, Ms Wright submitted that the TCF 'does absolutely nothing toward assisting people find employment'.55 Similarly, GSANZ submitted that:

Our respondents were unanimous in their disdain for the compliance framework to assist them in any way. They described it as a 'tick and flick' exercise that was monitored for the benefit of the jobactive provider to ensure their compliance with government policies. Its rigid nature meant

52 Ms Dianne Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Job Access, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, pp. 27-26.

53 Ms Dianne Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Job Access, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 33.

54 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 5.

55 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 4.

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that, even when providers were courteous or showed concern, they were required to adhere to the framework to the detriment of client outcomes. Requirements were often irrelevant and unnecessary and seemed designed to keep already over-stretched women 'busy' rather than achieving any tangible outcome.56

8.49 The AUWU submitted that the TCF 'functions to make receiving an unemployment benefit a humiliating, enraging, depressing and hopeless experience', which prevents people from participating in social life, including work:

Diminished resilience and cynicism born out of negative experience becomes a gross disadvantage for unemployed workers and can alienate them from positive life chances. Three decades worth of social and community sector research by credible institutions and scholars exposes how negative affect prevents people from participating positively in social life, including work.57

8.50 The committee received concerning evidence that the compliance framework can operate as a direct barrier to employment, as participants are forced to turn down or lose work in order to avoid a penalty. The AUWU provided the following testimonial from one of its members:

It seems the only way to stop these job providers from trying to harass me is to turn down work so I can jump through their inflexible hoops that don't lead me to employment anyhow.58

8.51 GSANZ found that perversely some of the women interviewed were leaving paid employment to attend meetings.59 A number of examples were provided:

Bille…would call to reschedule meetings when she received a commission for paid work that clashed with the time; perversely, instead of congratulating her on the job, she was lectured about non-compliance and threatened with having her payments cut…

Jo had to continue to apply for positions even after being offered a full-time role with a delayed start; while Jess had all her payments cut after she missed a meeting that was scheduled last-minute by her provider because she was working. Several women reported leaving paid employment to attend meetings in order to stay compliant.60

8.52 GSANZ reported that the issue occurred even when participants were exempt from meetings:

56 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 26.

57 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 39.

58 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 43.

59 Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer, GSANZ, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018,

p. 16.

60 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 26.

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Gayle was technically exempt from attending monthly meetings because she was on a contract for 30 hours per week. However she continued to attend meetings because she found her payments were cut if she did not.61

8.53 The committee also received evidence that participants have experienced difficulty meeting compliance demands whilst undertaking tertiary studies.62

Committee view 8.54 The committee notes evidence that participants are turning down paid work in order to avoid receiving a demerit point. The committee considers that it is highly inappropriate that the compliance framework can in practice take

precedence over genuine employment opportunities.

The proper role of providers 8.55 Under the TCF, jobactive providers have a dual role in both helping and policing participants. The committee heard that these two roles are inconsistent with each other and can undermine the ability of providers to

build a relationship with participants and provide meaningful support.63 For example, the Settlement Council of Australia submitted:

…we have repeatedly heard reports of the negative impact the current compliance model has on the relationship between the job seeker and their service provider.64

8.56 The Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS) commented on the need to build a trusting relationship:

We want people to be able to build up a relationship with the people that they're working with to be able to get them back into work, but at the same time they are the ones who are dishing out the punishment because people can't comply. There is a mismatch there which makes it very hard to build a trusting relationship between the two. Having that encouragement and so-called assistance to get back into work, we know there isn't enough of that at the moment.65

8.57 Under the TCF, providers are given 'complete authority' to impose payment suspensions, without government oversight.66 The AUWU submitted that the

61 GSANZ, "Outside systems control my life": The experiences of single mothers on Welfare to Work,

October 2018, p. 52.

62 GSANZ, "Outside systems control my life": The experiences of single mothers on Welfare to Work,

October 2018, p. 42.

63 See for example, Jesuit Social Services, Submission 57, p. 10; Public Service Research Group, UNSW

Canberra, Submission 41, p. 3.

64 Settlement Council of Australia, Submission 30, p. 10.

65 Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS), Committee

Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 32.

66 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 38.

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power 'makes any form of trusting relationship between unemployed workers and case managers impossible'.67 Similarly, ACOSS reported that 'in many cases, people feel as though their consultant is like their parole officer'.68

8.58 This point was also made by the UNSW Canberra Public Service Research Group:

Delegating authority to jobactive [providers] to suspend jobseekers' income support payments for non-compliance escalates risk of harm both for frontline staff and jobseekers. More broadly, it destroys trust between employment consultants and their clients, who need to work together to achieve employment outcomes.69

8.59 According to Mr Matthew Hall, the Chief Executive Officer of Sureway Employment and Training, trust between consultants and participants can be completely severed by the new powers:

…in a lot of incidents that trust is severed and irreparable. It may take a single instant to generate that severity of reaction, so in a very small town where you take away the one way a person has to put food on the table, through that compliance, the trust is severed.70

8.60 The committee received substantial evidence that the new powers have led to an increase in participant aggression towards consultants.71 The CPSU advised that provider staff 'struggle with the impact of customer aggression' and are not receiving support.72 The CPSU also reported on the flow on impacts to Centrelink staff, as the new powers for providers have:

… led to an increase in agitated and aggressive customers calling through to the Participation Solutions Team, who are the relevant Centrelink team, to try to overturn suspension and cancellations.73

8.61 The CPSU submitted that participant aggression is pronounced in cases of payment suspensions, 'despite public servants having no control'.74 According

67 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 38.

68 Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 8.

69 Public Service Research Group, UNSW Canberra, Submission 41, p. 3.

70 Mr Matthew Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Sureway Employment and Training, Committee

Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 34.

71 See for example, Ms Sally Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer, National Employment Services

Association (NESA), Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 71; Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer, CPSU, answers to questions on notice, 1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 1; and Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager—Operations, The Salvation Army Employment Plus, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 27.

72 Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer, CPSU, answers to questions on notice,

1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 1.

73 Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer, CPSU, answers to questions on notice,

1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 1.

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to Ms Dianne Fletcher, the Chief Executive Officer of Sarina Russo Job Access, staff can also be reluctant to formally record participant aggression because it can have an adverse impact on a participant's record.75 Mrs Karena Newland, the Chief Operating Officer of Sureway Employment and Training, advised that the new compliance framework was causing problems for staff in the small towns they operate in:

When a jobseeker can perceive any action taken under the framework negatively, regardless of if we were actually responsible for the action, our staff can be targeted by disgruntled clients both inside our premises as well as whilst carrying out their personal lives in their community. When serious incidents do occur, where staff are threatened with harm to themselves or even self-harm by a jobseeker, staff can be fearful to venture out in their personal lives.76

8.62 The committee heard that the ability to impose payment suspensions may give providers too much power over participants:

The fact that the providers have the ability to tell Centrelink to suspend payments means that they can coerce jobseekers into attending activities. For instance, I was put into 3 Work for the Dole activities while I was working a casual job and so getting a reduced rate of NewStart, which according to the jobactive deed I didn't have to do…

It seems these are no consequences for the providers when they give false information and jobseekers feel they have to comply with whatever the provider asks them for fear of being cut off from Centrelink…77

8.63 One participant observed that the major problem with putting under-skilled people into position of power is that 'they generally overreach that power'.78 Ms Wright, an employment services consultant, was also concerned about the new powers granted to jobactive providers:

I found some of the “Language" used in the training online manual from Centrelink to be concerning. Telling some consultants that we now have “Power” to enforce compliance, is just not an acceptable practice when considering the personalities of many people who do this type of work. Many employment consultants treat the job seekers like second class citizens already. Power will ultimately be abused by some.79

74 Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer, CPSU, answers to questions on notice,

1 November 2018 (received 19 November 2018), p. 2.

75 Ms Dianne Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer, Sarina Russo Job Access, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 34.

76 Mrs Karena Newland, Chief Operating Officer, Sureway Employment and Training, Committee

Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 30.

77 Name Withheld, Submission 122, p. 1.

78 Name Withheld, Submission 69, p. 2.

79 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 2.

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8.64 For one submitter, their main reason for choosing to coming off Newstart was that they did not want to deal with their provider:

I still feel furious with them for the stress they caused me by the punitive, ill-equipped and aggressive way that they dealt with me.80

8.65 A number of submitters, including some providers, expressed strong support for the separation of the compliance function from the supportive function of providers, and the restoration of public sector responsibility for monitoring compliance.81 The Settlement Council of Australia submitted that this would allow providers to focus on 'supporting and advocating for their client'.82 The CPSU submitted that compliance decisions should be made by the Department of Human Services, who can provide a 'consistent approach' delivered by trained staff.83

8.66 The committee also heard from some organisations that deliberately chose to not be jobactive providers or otherwise be involved in the program. For example, Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research at Anglicare Australia, stated that Anglicare chose not to work with the jobactive program because of its rigidity:

Anglicare Tasmania doesn't formally work with the jobactive program because it's so rigid, in terms of requirements of people and providers, that they couldn't actually leverage the resources out of it effectively and just said, 'It doesn't work. We better do it ourselves.'84

8.67 Similarly, Professor Shelley Mallett, Director of the Research and Policy Centre at the Brotherhood of St Laurence, advised that the Brotherhood of St Laurence chose not to be a jobactive provider:

We made an absolute decision not to engage in jobactive. We looked scrupulously at the evidence both from former versions of Job Services as well as through our experience of providing innovative practices over several decades and decided that it was not a contract that was fit for

80 Name Withheld, Submission 144, p. 4.

81 See for example, Public Service Research Group, UNSW Canberra, Submission 41, p. 3;

Ms Karen Rainbow, Chief Executive Officer, Employment Services, Advanced Personnel Management, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 66; Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 2; Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, pp. 1-2; Per Capita Australia and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 7; and VCOSS, Submission 49, p. 7.

82 Settlement Council of Australia, Submission 30, p. 10.

83 Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer, CPSU, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 27.

84 Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research, Anglicare Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 4.

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purpose for enabling people, particularly the most disadvantaged, to get into jobs.85

Committee view 8.68 The committee notes the view of the UNSW Public Service Research Group, the AUWU and others that giving providers the role of policing participants is incompatible with their supportive role. Giving responsibility for the entire

compliance framework to a public sector body could improve the oversight of the system. Accordingly, the committee is of the view that the government should consider the merits of transferring responsibility for the compliance framework to the Department of Human Services or another public body.

Recommendation 29

Reasonable excuse rules 8.70 Currently, it is up to providers to determine whether a participant has a 'valid reason' for a failure to meet their requirements.86 The committee heard that the government has recently tightened the 'reasonable excuse' rules for missing an

appointment or other activity and has taken away the previous discretion for providers to not record a breach.87 Additionally, drug and alcohol related illnesses can no longer be considered by providers in making a decision.88 Ms Kylie Wright, an employment services consultant, summarised the changes:

Under the new compliance rules, there is no longer “Discretionary” reason for missing an appointment.

Working is no longer listed as an acceptable excuse for missing an appointment. Homelessness is only able to be used ONCE within a term of unemployment.

Everything the job seeker does such as appointments, medical appointments, school activities, work rosters, are all expected to be entered into the job seekers shared diary, which is accessible by the consultant. If a job seeker misses an appointment for any reason which is not showing in

85 Professor Shelley Mallett, Director, Research and Policy Centre, Brotherhood of St Laurence,

Committee Hansard, 1 November 2019, p. 10.

86 Department of Social Services, 3.1.13.90 Reasonable Excuse, Social Security Guide, 4 February 2019,

http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/3/1/13/90 (accessed 5 February 2019).

87 National Social Security Rights Network, Budget 2017 - New compliance system, p. 1

88 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 37.

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their shared diary, they are expected to be listed as DNAI [did not attend with an invalid reason] and face compliance demerit points.89

8.71 Ms Wright submitted that the new framework made it very hard to do her job:

I have been on stress leave for the last 6 weeks due to my own anxiety over the job (and Bullying by my employer) and the new compliance changes, as I have been informed that I am too soft on people and have to start to get tough. Basically I am not allowed to show any discretion or compassion toward these people who I know and have lived in the same community as for many years.90

8.72 The committee received substantial evidence that the reasonable excuse rules are inappropriately restrictive. The AUWU provided the following testimonial from a jobactive participant:

Attended to a critical incident with a neighbour. He needed an ambulance, [I] was told that if I didn't make appointment I would be suspended. I refused to leave him [the critical injured neighbour] and was suspended…91

8.73 The committee also heard that the removal of exemptions makes it more difficult to take into account the individual circ*mstances of a participant 'to ensure that vulnerable clients do not suffer'.92 The removal of provider discretion was a concern for a number of submitters.93 Mr Spurrell, Executive General Manager of MAX Solutions, explained the impact:

Up until July [2018] staff had much more discretion in how they applied that compliance regime. A lot of that discretion has been removed, so they are somewhat powerless. Someone either attended an appointment or they didn't. That result has to be entered on the same day as the appointment. They can't make efforts to try to contact the person the next day to see why they didn't attend. It has to be entered that day. If it's not entered that day, they didn't attend.94

8.74 The committee heard that providers generally do not first check for a reasonable excuse before imposing a penalty. The suspension is effectively

89 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 2.

90 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 3.

91 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 44.

92 Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer, CPSU, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 25.

93 See for example, Ms Debra Cerasa, Chief Executive Officer, Jobs Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 November 2018, p. 69; Ms Sally Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer, NESA, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 71; and Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, pp. 1-2.

94 Mr Richard Spurrell, Executive General Manager, MAX Solutions, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 39.

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automatic.95 The committee also heard that it can be difficult for participants to provide prior notice that they will miss an appointment. The AUWU reported that 83.1 per cent of respondents to a survey indicated that their job agency did not contact them on the day of their penalty to see if they had a reasonable excuse.96 This can be particularly problematic for casual employees, as illustrated by the following testimonial:

As a casual employee I receive offers of work early in the morning, at short notice. There are times when an offer of work coincides with a job service provider (JSP) appointment. I am already at work when the JSP opens their office. I phone them after work to tell them why I missed the appointment. By then I am already suspended and receiving texts from the job service provider and Centrelink. I queried why I was suspended when I had a reasonable excuse and was told suspension is automatic. So every time I go to work and miss the JSP appointment I receive all the texts to tell me I am suspended. I heard there is going to be a demerit point system so I could lose demerit points too.97

8.75 A number of participants that made a submission experienced this issue. One submitter reported that they always made contact with their provider to let them know they were working however they would still have their payment suspended.98 Another participant, Mr Jeremy Poxon, explained how he felt punished under the current system for doing the right thing:

A few weeks ago, I was cut off my payments for "failing to attend an appointment" with my agent. I was unable to attend that appointment, because I had been called in, last minute, to work a shift at my casual job - a job I got, mind you, without any help from a job agent. I tried to call and call my agency but nobody there ever answers the phone. (I brought this up at a later date and my JSP said they're too understaffed to answer the phones). Because I couldn't get through to re-schedule my appointment (i.e. my compliance demand) I received a text message to say that I was immediately stripped of payments.99

8.76 One participant reported that their provider demanded a medical certificate while they were still in hospital being treated, and threatened a breach of requirements for not providing the certificate by close of business.100

8.77 Ms Wright, an employment services consultant from a remote area of Tasmania, gave evidence about her reasonable approach to missed appointments and the negative way this is perceived by her employer:

95 See for example, Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 8.

96 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 40.

97 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 44.

98 Name Withheld, Submission 119, p. 1.

99 Mr Jeremy Poxon, Submission 34, p. 1.

100 Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 15.

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If a job seeker misses their appointment, I will call them after about 20 minutes and ask them why they have not attended. Many people genuinely forget, or on occasion find they have been called in to work unexpectedly, or have sick children, or are unwell themselves, or have no fuel or phone credit, and were unable to contact me. Often I will find that they have called my Launceston office the day before and left a message, but the message had not been passed on to me. On most occasions the job seekers come in to the office later in the day and attend the appointment with no issues. If they are unable to attend and I believe that their reason is acceptable, I will reschedule their appointment to a more suitable time. If I am unable to contact them and do not hear from them within a reasonable time I will DNAI them. I think this is a very fair way of performing my role.

I am been told by my employer that I am “Too nice to people” that I need to “Toughen up”. I have been told that I have an “Unusually high level of compliance” and that I must be letting people get away with too much.101

8.78 Ms Wright informed the committee that the TCF reduced her 'ability to show compassion and discretion and actually talk to them [jobactive participants] and find out what the real reasons are' for missing an appointment.102

8.79 Ms Wright gave evidence that participants are only able to use homelessness as a reason 'once during their entire term of unemployment'.103 Ms Wright observed:

If you are homeless you have no fixed address. You have no reliable source of power, internet, phone service etc. How on earth are you expected to be reminded of an appointment, or notified of a change of appointment.104

8.80 However this was contradicted by the Department of Jobs and Small Business, who advised that it does not mandate the timeframes or number of times for which homelessness can be used as a reasonable excuse for missing an appointment.105 This may point to a lack of consistent application or a lack of understanding by some providers about the policy.

8.81 GSANZ recommended that missing a meeting 'should not lead to sanctions unless it is a chronic issue'.106

Committee view

101 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 1.

102 Ms Kylie Wright, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 49.

103 Ms Kylie Wright, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 48.

104 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 2.

105 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no 20, 6 December 2018

(received 2 January 2019), p. 2.

106 GSANZ, "Outside systems control my life": The experiences of single mothers on Welfare to Work,

October 2018, p. 19.

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8.82 The committee notes evidence that the existing reasonable excuse rules can be restrictive and lead to disproportionate and at times harsh outcomes for participants. Accordingly, the committee is of the view that the government should ensure the reasonable excuse rules protect the welfare of unemployed people.

Recommendation 30

8.83 The committee recommends that the government ensure the 'reasonable excuse' rules protect the welfare of unemployed people.

The future of compliance 8.84 The Employment Services 2020 Report prepared by the Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel recommends that the future compliance framework include both rewards and penalties. The rationale for recommending rewards

is that 'job seekers will be incentivised to remain actively engaged throughout their journey towards employment'.107

8.85 The report also recommends automating compliance, stating that it 'is smarter to automate compliance'.108 The report suggests that automating compliance will reduce the administrative burden on jobactive participants and providers.109

Committee view 8.86 The committee supports the Expert Advisory Panel's recommendation for the compliance framework to include rewards to incentivise participants. The Panel's report acknowledges that very few participants are wilfully and

persistently non-compliant.110 However the committee is concerned that the Panel's report does not give sufficient consideration to the need to reduce the punitive nature of current compliance requirements.

8.87 The committee acknowledges the time and cost savings associated with automating compliance. However the committee is concerned that the significant issues plaguing the Targeted Compliance Framework have not been acknowledged in the Panel's report. If not carefully implemented, it is likely that the automation of compliance would have disastrous and often unfair consequences for participants. For example, under the current system

107 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/i-want-work (accessed 5 February 2019), p. 57.

108 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 4.

109 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 38.

110 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 57.

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administrative errors by providers can result in payment suspensions with no opportunity to comment before the suspension is applied and no recourse to Centrelink. Given the government's poor record of rolling out automated systems, for example the robo-debt debacle and the online census failure, the committee considers that any automation must be fully tested by providers and participants before proceeding.

Recommendation 31

8.88 The committee recommends that the government conduct thorough testing of the new online compliance system before implementation is rolled out nationally.

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Chapter 9

Complaints and appeals

…often poorly trained, poorly paid frontline staff are being given the responsibility to decide whether a person has their income cut off or whether there are punitive measures that build towards, ultimately, a cut-off of income, with no opportunity then for the jobseeker to appeal.1

Overview 9.1 This chapter examines the appropriateness of existing complaints and appeals processes under jobactive and considers the need for an employment services ombudsman.

9.2 The committee's recommendations are set out throughout the chapter.

Overview of complaints and appeals processes 9.3 If participants are in the penalty zone of the Targeted Compliance Framework, their first financial penalty results in a 50 per cent loss of payment. A second penalty results in a 100 per cent loss of payment. A third penalty results in a

four week cancellation of income support.2 Participants can appeal these financial penalties via the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.3

9.4 In contrast, demerit decisions are not decisions made under social security law, so the normal appeals process under the Social Security Act 1991 does not apply.4 The National Social Security Rights Network summarised the current process for appealing a demerit decision:

ï If a person disagrees with the recording of a demerit, they first should seek a review from their employment services provider. ï If they are unsatisfied with the outcome of that discussion, they can contact the Department of Jobs and Small Business' (DJSB) National

Customer Service Line. This line deals with complaints from people engaged with employment service providers. ï After a demerit point issue is raised with a DJSB staff member of the National Customer Service Line, DJSB will look at the record and

1 Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director, Per Capita, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2019, p. 20.

Note: Appeal here is used to refer to appealing to a court or tribunal. Participants can appeal demerit decisions via the Department of Jobs and Small Business.

2 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Targeted Compliance Framework, 16 July 2018,

https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/targeted-compliance-framework (accessed 8 February 2019), pp. 15-16.

3 Per Capita and the Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), Submission 5, p. 38.

4 National Social Security Rights Network, Submission 3, p. 2.

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reasons. They may contact the provider to ask that they review the demerit point record. ï If the person is still not satisfied with the outcome (i.e. the demerit point remains), they can attempt to escalate the matter within DJSB. The DJSB

may step in and override decisions if there are clear issues with the demerit point.5

Appropriateness of the complaints and appeals processes 9.5 Some submitters argued that the current processes for complaints and appeals are ineffective and can be inaccessible.6 For example, some participants suggested that feedback given to the Department of Jobs and Small Business

can be ignored.7 This point was contradicted by My Pathway, a jobactive provider, who suggested that the complaints system 'appears to be working sufficiently, and we are not aware of significant adverse job seeker service that is going unresolved'.8

9.6 However the committee heard that in some cases, participants are left to resolve issues directly with their provider, as illustrated by the following AUWU member testimonial:

I rang [The Department of Employment customer service line] to complain that I was being suspended automatically when I go to work and miss a job service provider appointment. They told me I had to make my complaint to the job service provider itself. They offered no support. They said it was between me and the job service provider.9

9.7 Submitters reported that some participants may be hesitant to challenge the decisions of their provider, due to the threat of further sanctions if they are perceived as a troublemaker.10 A participant submitted that it is common practice for providers to tell participants that whatever occurs is 'standard procedure and compulsory, and that if they don't do whatever the JSP has asked then they will be reported to Centrelink and their payments will stop'.11

9.8 Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ) informed the committee that only a few women in their study took the initiative to file a formal complaint,

5 National Social Security Rights Network, Submission 3, p. 2.

6 See for example, Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 6; Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 15;

Mr Daniel McIntyre, Submission 168, p. 5; Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 11; and Name Withheld, Submission 144, p. 4.

7 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 16; Name Withheld, Submission 114, pp. 4-5.

8 My Pathway, Submission 31, p. 5.

9 AUWU, Testimonial Survey [Name Withheld] 29 July 2017, Submission 27, p. 48.

10 See for example, Mr Daniel McIntyre, Submission 168, p. 5; Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 6.

11 Mr Brendan Taylor, Submission 146, p. 6.

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despite 'many complaints of a range of negative and even abusive behaviours'.12 The following example is illustrative:

Ingrid…describes interactions with her provider that belittled her intelligence, minimise the value of her master's degree, and subjects her to sexual harassment. She contemplated filing a complaint but did not feel up to the additional stress this would add to her life.13

9.9 The committee heard that in some cases, participants may have limited recourse when their provider does not act in accordance with their requirements.14 One submitter reported that they were ignored and discouraged from making a complaint:

I made a complaint by email to the manager of the JSP [Job Services Provider] and received no response. I then contacted the JSP explaining that the deed of service requires that the agency has a complaints process and that I am required to be able to make a complaint. I was advised to make a complaint to Centrelink. When I attended Centrelink to lodge my complaint the Centrelink officer at first refused to take the complaint. I asked to speak to the manager and was told that the officer who refused to take my complaint was the manager…

Eventually I managed to convince the manager to let me speak with DHS [Department of Human Services] over the phone. The DHS officers attempted to convince me to not make a complaint and told me that I was the person that was in the wrong. When I insisted on a complaint the DHS officer told me I’d already told her what happened and that was good enough. I asked to speak to her manager and again had to argue to make an official complaint which I eventually did however since making the complaint…in January 2017 I have received no response in regards to it.15

9.10 This evidence illustrated a common issue reported by a number of submitters of blame shifting between Centrelink, the jobactive provider, the Department of Human Services and the Department of Jobs and Small Business.16

9.11 The committee also heard that there is limited information for participants about avenues to challenge decisions. The Edmund Rice Centre WA submitted that there was a lack of transparency with regard to the internal and external complaints process.17 Similarly, a submitter described the appeals process as 'difficult to understand and enact'.18 One participant reported that their

12 Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand (GSANZ), Submission 47, p. 28.

13 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 28.

14 Mr Daniel McIntyre, Submission 168, p. 6.

15 Mr Daniel McIntyre, Submission 168, p. 5.

16 See for example, Mr Daniel McIntyre, Submission 168, p. 5.

17 Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 11.

18 Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 12.

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previous provider 'actively refused to explain any appeals process' and that their current provider ignored their request to explain the process.19 In this regard, participants indicated a desire for better access to information about making a formal complaint.20

9.12 Another issue raised by stakeholders was that participants may have to endure having their payments cut off while they appeal a decision, which can mean 'months of surviving while being cut off from payments or support'.21 This further disincentives the use of the appeals process, as highlighted by one submitter:

Because people are cut off from welfare prior to being able to appeal, the process is made more difficult. Appeal options should be available on caution and have a reasonable timeframe to achieve so recipients can avoid protracted periods of destitution.22

9.13 One recipient suggested allowing participants access to payments while they appeal a decision, to avoid this situation.23

Committee view 9.14 The committee notes concerns from various submitters about the current process for complaints and appeals. The committee considers that the government must examine the appropriateness of existing appeal rights and

how to improve the accessibility of the appeals and complaints processes.

9.15 The committee considers that it is vital that participants are made aware of their rights and informed of the complaints and appeals processes. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure that participants are not inappropriately discouraged from making a complaint or pursuing an appeal in suitable circ*mstances.

9.16 The committee notes calls for payments to be reinstated while a decision is being reviewed, and considers that a maximum turnaround period for complaints and appeals would be appropriate to reduce financial hardship.

Recommendation 32

9.17 The committee recommends that the government examine the appropriateness of existing appeal rights for participants and how to improve the accessibility of the appeals and complaints processes.

19 Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 16.

20 GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 28.

21 Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 16.

22 Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 12.

23 Name Withheld, Submission 149, p. 16.

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Recommendation 33

9.18 The committee recommends that the government implement a maximum turnaround period for the handling of complaints and appeals from participants.

Employment services ombudsman 9.19 There was strong support from organisations for the creation of an employment services ombudsman to assist participants with disputes.24 For example, the Settlement Council of Australia submitted that:

…given the importance of this [employment] service (both in terms of the quantum of funding provided and the contribution that successful outcomes can make to Australia's economy) a sufficient level of independent oversight and accountability is crucial. An employment services ombudsman is a suitable method of achieving such oversight.25

9.20 Participants also supported the creation of an ombudsman.26 One submitter suggested that the lack of an ombudsman or other external body can make it hard for participants to find solutions to their problems:

The lack of an independent or external complaints resolution department makes it hard for jobseekers to find solutions to their problems as they need to rely on their agency to provide accurate information. Agencies often provide misleading information as they stand to benefit from the jobseeker being misinformed.27

9.21 Another participant submitted that in addition to assisting jobactive participants, an ombudsman would 'take some strain off the Department' and 'remove the possibility of bias' coming from Departmental staff.28 However some stakeholders considered that an ombudsman, whilst valuable, was merely a 'band-aid' solution.29

Committee view 9.22 The committee considers that an employment services ombudsman may assist participants in resolving complaints and bring more accountability into the system.

24 See for example, Edmund Rice Centre WA, Submission 40, p. 11; GSANZ, Submission 47, p. 8;

National Social Security Rights Network, Submission 3, p. 3; and National Employment Services Association, Submission 54, p. 21; and Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 7.

25 Settlement Council of Australia, Submission 30, p. 11.

26 See for example, Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 11; Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 5.

27 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 5.

28 Ms Ruth Bretherton, Submission 163, p. 11.

29 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 46; Mr Thomas Studans, Submission 28, p. 5.

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9.23 The committee considers that the effectiveness of employment services should be regularly independently evaluated. For example, by using data on the profiles of local labour markets, unemployed people, the assistance offered to people and feedback from service users. This evaluation could be done by an ombudsman or another body.

Recommendation 34

9.24 The committee recommends that the government consider establishing an employment services ombudsman, to provide an independent review mechanism.

Recommendation 35

9.25 The committee recommends that the effectiveness of employment services be regularly independently evaluated.

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Chapter 10

Outcome driven funding

I got out of this industry and role because there was no care for these clients, nor a plan to help those in need. It was best practice to intentionally suspend a client’s payments because they wanted the client to come into the office to capture their employment details so that we would claim that we actually had anything to do with helping this individual finding their own job… It was always about money and nothing to do with helping these people.1

Overview 10.1 This chapter examines the outcome-based funding arrangements for jobactive providers. The chapter is structured according to the following topics:

ï Overview of funding model ï Precarious employment and churn ï Creaming and parking ï Fees for training and other programs ï Outcome payments and payslips ï Other impacts on service delivery

10.2 The committee's recommendations are set out at the end of each section.

Overview of funding model 10.3 Jobactive providers operate under a primarily outcome-based payment model. Providers receive outcome payments when a participant has remained in employment for four, 12 and 26 weeks.2

10.4 In addition, providers receive some funding upfront, unconnected to outcomes. These administration fees range from $250 to $438 depending on the participant.3 The proportion of funding received up-front has reduced in comparison to previous Job Services Australia contracts.4

1 Name Withheld, Submission 90, p. 2.

2 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 37.

3 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive deed 2015-2020, 18 July 2018,

https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/jobactive-deed-2015-2020-incorporating-gdv-no-7-changes (accessed 9 February 2019), p. 165.

4 Jobs Australia, State of Play: Jobactive Employment Services 2015-2020 Tender Results,

www.ja.com.au/sites/default/files/final_sop_-_es_2015-2020_tender_results.pdf (accessed 5 February 2019), p. 1; see also, Department of Jobs and Small Business, The next generation of employment services, Appendices,

https://docs.jobs.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/the_next_generation_of_employment_services_app

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10.5 For an outcome payment to be made, a job seeker must earn enough income over the relevant period to reduce their income support payments or work a certain number of hours. Providers can receive full or partial payments:

A full employment outcome payment to the employment service provider will only be paid when a job seeker earns enough to reduce their income support by 100 per cent. A partial outcome payment is paid when a job seeker’s income support is reduced by 60 per cent.5

10.6 Outcome fees vary significantly depending on a range of factors including the stream of the participant and period of unemployment. Increased payments for more disadvantaged job seekers are designed to incentivise providers to get these participants into work. Additionally, a 25 per cent loading applies to payments to providers who operate in regional locations.6 The average outcome payment is approximately $1 400 according to the National Employment Services Association (NESA).7

10.7 Providers cannot claim an employment outcome for a Stream A participant if the job placement occurred in the first three months of assistance.8

10.8 The outcome driven funding model has been an element of employment services for two decades, although aspects of the model have changed.9 An outcome-based model is designed to focus providers on achieving results, however paying for employment outcomes can have high deadweight costs because the value-add of providers is difficult to measure.10 This is because providers receive their outcome payments regardless of the degree to which they contributed to the participant securing work.11

endices_acc.pdf (accessed 5 February 2019), p. 82.

5 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no 21, 6 December 2018

(received 2 January 2019), p. 4.

6 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/i-want-work (accessed 9 February 2019), p. 62.

7 Ms Sally Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer, National Employment Services Association (NESA),

Committee Hansard, 1 November 2019, p. 76.

8 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no 20, 6 December 2018

(received 2 January 2019), p. 2.

9 NESA, Submission 54, pp. 13-14.

10 Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), Submission on Future Employment Services,

August 2018, www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ACOSS_submission-on-future-employment-services_FINAL.pdf (accessed 2 February 2018), p. 54.

11 Subject to the exception of Stream A participants securing work in their first three months of

participation.

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10.9 The committee heard that there is insufficient up-front funding under the current model. NESA submitted that there is an over-emphasis on funding employment outcomes:

…the growing degree to which outcome payments are required to subsidise delivery of up front, core and prescribed services; has become excessive.12

10.10 According to the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), an over-emphasis on funding outcomes has a number of adverse effects including 'parking' and 'creaming' (these issues are discussed in more detail below). Additionally, the lack of up-front funding can be harmful to the viability of smaller not-for-profit providers, reducing provider diversity.13

10.11 The committee heard that the current model focusses on short-term employment outcomes.14 According to Social Ventures Australia, the current system is based on 'a narrow conception of what constitutes a positive outcome'.15 Some stakeholders were supportive of a broader framework of payments to recognise improved job readiness. For example, the Smith Family suggested that overcoming personal barriers, career plans and skill development could be part of measureable outcomes.16 A similar approach was advocated by Social Ventures Australia:

…alternative measures of employment outcomes, such as cumulative weeks of employment over a twelve-month period. This kind of analysis will become increasingly similar with better use of Government administrative data rather than relying on the service provider to collect the data. Using these kinds of metrics will also better reflect the experience of people moving in and out of work or taking part-time or seasonal work and help understand strong and weak attachment to the labour force.

For a job seeker with complex needs, the trajectory from engagement, changing of habits and behaviours, learning and consolidation of skills, testing and embedding skills as well as managing complex needs, might be best measured over a period closer to 60 weeks.17

10.12 Along similar lines, the Smith Family suggested that medium and longer-term employment outcomes should be measured:

12 NESA, Submission 54, pp. 13-14.

13 ACOSS, Submission on Future of Employment Services, August 2018, p. 54.

14 See for example, Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Adviser, ACOSS, Committee Hansard,

20 November 2018, p. 5; and Mr Peter Defteros, Acting Senior Policy Manager, Jobs Australia, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 73.

15 Social Ventures Australia, Submission to Future Employment Services, 10 August 2018,

www.socialventures.com.au/assets/SVA-Submission-Future-Employment-Services.pdf (accessed 2 February 2019), p. 22.

16 The Smith Family, Submission 11, p. 10.

17 Social Ventures Australia, Submission to Future Employment Services, 10 August 2018, p. 22.

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…measuring job placements should include whether the candidate was able to sustain employment over the medium to longer-term. In focusing on outcomes, reasons for termination should also be measured, such as the individual’s performance, the employer’s approach, and the impact of broader economic conditions.18

10.13 During the inquiry there were some misconceptions that providers are incentivised to impose demerit points.19 Providers do not receive a payment or benefit from compliance activity. Instead they are required to apply the compliance framework or they risk sanctions under the jobactive deed.20

Funding model under future employment services 10.14 The Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel recommended a payment model that balances higher up-front payments with outcome payments linked to performance.21 According to the Panel, higher up-front payments ‘will mean

providers can immediately invest more in job seekers, leading to better outcomes’.22 The Panel's report notes that higher up-front payments are used in the Transition to Work program and ‘are considered to be a key reason for the program’s success’.23

10.15 The Panel also recommended that payments be adjusted for regional and local variation. According to the Panel, this will ensure providers are ‘appropriately resourced to deliver high quality services to job seekers, regardless of their location’.24 In support of this, the Panel noted that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has emphasised that ‘boosting job creation, productivity and inclusion will not be achieved without taking into account local and regional characteristics’.25

18 The Smith Family, Submission 11, p. 10.

19 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 136, p. 1.

20 NESA, Submission 54, p. 14.

21 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 62.

22 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 62.

23 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 62.

24 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 62.

25 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 62 (citation omitted).

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10.16 The Panel’s report also recommended a reduction in participant churn by assisting them to gain sustainable employment.26 However the report is not clear on how this would be achieved.

Precarious employment and churn 10.17 When defending jobactive's overall performance, the government often states that the program has achieved more than 1.2 million job placements since 2015.27 However, when participants cycle in and out of short term work, their

provider can continue to receive outcome payments. According to the Department of Jobs and Small Business, they have policies and rules to prevent providers moving participants through a series of jobs to receive repeat payments.28 Yet the Department's own data indicates that from 1 July 2015 to 31 August 2018, providers have received multiple outcome payments for placing the same 4,765 people in seven or more different jobs.29 In the 2017-18 financial year, the majority of job placements that providers were paid for did not achieve a 26 week outcome.30

10.18 During the inquiry, the committee heard that the jobactive payment structure incentivises short term and precarious employment over longer term, sustainable employment. The committee was told often that participants are pushed into any job, rather than a job that meets their needs and aspirations. Submitters emphasised that often these short term jobs do not last, for example, because they are incompatible with the circ*mstances of the participant, or because the job was never going to last (for example, seasonal employment). For example, Ms Imogen Ebsworth, the Director of Policy and Research from Anglicare Australia submitted that the work-first focus does not support long term employment:

…there's quite a lot of evidence that throwing people into insecure work and churning them through casual positions actually diminishes their skills and ability to stay in meaningful work and to stay employed.31

26 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 39.

27 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no 21, 6 December 2018

(received 2 January 2019), p. 5.

28 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 37.

29 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, Supplementary Budget

Estimates 2018-19, SQ18-000519, p. 2.

30 Approximately 41 per cent of job placements achieved a 26 week outcome in 2017-18. See

Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no 23, 14 November 2018 (received 25 January 2019), p. 23.

31 Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research, Anglicare Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, pp. 1-2.

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10.19 According to ACOSS, outcome-based funding leads to providers under-investing in interventions that assist participants over the medium and long-term:

Evaluations of outcomes-based employment services programs in which there is little or no specification of service inputs (in Australia and elsewhere) have found that this usually leads to service standardisation rather than innovation, with most providers concentrating on the least costly (and least risky) path to a short-term employment outcome: supervised job search (often supplemented by motivational strategies). Under these conditions, providers usually under-invest in more substantial (and costly) help, even where this may substantially improve medium to long-term results.32

10.20 Additionally, these short term and precarious jobs are more likely to leave the participant underemployed, meaning that if they do not earn enough, they are still on income support and have the added challenge of negotiating part time or casual employment whilst also continuing to meet their mutual obligations. For example, the AUWU provided the following testimonial from a participant whose provider pushed them to apply for other jobs instead of investing in the job they had:

I found myself a job after 8 or more years unemployed. I am now employed but underemployed. I find I am still struggling financially so need to keep going to my agency. They then pushed me to apply for other jobs and not invest in the one I found.33

10.21 The committee heard that in some cases short term employment can be beneficial for the participant because they gain work experience and the job may lead to another opportunity. Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business emphasised the value of short-term work:

Many unemployed people use part-time or short-term work as a steppingstone to full-time employment, and short-term jobs as a pathway to longer-term employment. A departmental analysis and international research has shown that short-term jobs can provide participants with work experience and work habits that help them to move into sustained employment…

To support this, jobactive providers can claim up to four four-week outcomes for any jobseekers within a year.34

10.22 Yet, the committee heard that as a consequence of the incentives towards short term and precarious employment, participants often churn through jobs, frequently leaving and returning to the jobactive program as they gain and

32 ACOSS, Submission on Future Employment Services, August 2018, p. 55.

33 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 13.

34 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 37.

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then quickly lose employment. This point was noted by Ms Ebsworth from Anglicare Australia:

It [jobactive's incentive structure] has also created a system where any job will do and people are forced into work that's not appropriate for them, which means that they pop straight back out. They are churned back into the system. That just costs us all more, and it's demoralising.35

10.23 According to Mr Andrew Cummings, Acting National Coordinator of the Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network, the incentive to churn participants means that the aspirations of participants are not supported:

…those very low amounts of money encourage that churn mentality of, 'We have to keep churning people through in order to recover the cost it takes for us to deliver the service.'36

10.24 The Department of Jobs and Small Business advised that it does not collect data on whether job placements under jobactive are full-time or part-time.37

Committee view 10.25 The committee is concerned by the evidence that jobactive's payment structure incentivises providers to push participants into short term and precarious employment quickly, in order to receive an employment outcome payment.

The funding structure means that providers benefit from participants cycling in and out of precarious jobs. In short, the model rewards churn.

10.26 The committee recognises that short term and casual employment does benefit some participants by giving them work experience and exposure to employers. The committee also notes the view of many submitters that the funding model places too much emphasis on short term employment, often at the expense of sustainable employment that meets the needs and aspirations of participants. The committee is of the view that the attainment of short term and casual jobs should not come at the expense of more sustainable employment. Certainly, participants should not be pushed into precarious employment or ‘set up to fail’ in a job that they will not be able to keep because of their personal circ*mstances, such as caring responsibilities or reduced work capacity. The committee is strongly of the view that it is inappropriate that providers have such strong incentives to push people into work that won’t last, just so the provider can get an outcome payment.

35 Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research, Anglicare Australia, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 2.

36 Mr Andrew Cummings, Acting National Coordinator, Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network,

Committee Hansard, 20 November 2018, p. 30.

37 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 16.

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Recommendation 36

Creaming and parking 10.28 The committee heard that the funding model encourages providers to focus on some participants and ignore others. As noted by Ms Emma Dawson, the Executive Director of Per Capita, participants who are easy to place are

'creamed' by providers.38 Other participants are 'parked', meaning they do not receive assistance from their provider.39 According to data from the Department of Jobs and Small Business, as at 31 August 2018, 64.9 per cent of job seekers have been on the caseload for at least 12 months, and 19.6 per cent for at least five years.40 Additionally, the average time on the caseload for Stream C participants is five years.41 Based on 2016 and 2017 data, just over a quarter of Stream C participants leave income support and return between six and twelve months later.42

10.29 According to ACOSS (and as previously noted), an over-emphasis on funding for job outcomes has the adverse effects of 'parking' and 'creaming'.43 The UNSW Canberra Public Service Research Group submitted that providers are incentivised to minimise spending on participants who are less likely to achieve employment:

Achieving employment outcomes for jobseekers not only generates income for jobactive providers but positions them for success in future tenders for government business. That is a powerful incentive for them to minimise the cost of servicing the jobseekers least likely to be employed in an over-supplied labour market, regardless of flow-on effects.44

38 Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director, Per Capita, Committee Hansard, 1 November 2018, p. 23.

39 See for example, Mr Ewan McDonnell, Submission 165, p. 1.

40 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, p. 78.

41 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission 16, p. 1.

42 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 2.

43 ACOSS, Submission on Future Employment Services, August 2018, p. 54.

44 Public Service Research Group, UNSW Canberra, Submission 41, p. 2.

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10.30 Similarly, the Accountable Income Management Network pointed out that the funding model is not incentivising providers to address barriers to employment:

In 2015, the Centre for Policy Development’s analysis of jobactive found that, according to the Department of Jobs and Small Business’s own data, job seekers who were struggling with multiple and complex disadvantage (Stream C) had very poor outcomes in the program. Stream C job seekers were less than half as likely as the most employable participants (Stream A) to find work within the first 3 months of the program.45

10.31 According to the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, jobactive provides 'little financial incentive for service providers to assist jobseekers with high levels of disadvantage'.46 This point was also made by Mr Michael Kolomyjec, Group Executive of atWork Australia, a jobactive provider, who suggested that the existing model 'is not sufficient to meet the investments needed to support training and find jobs' for Stream C participants.47

10.32 However not all submitters considered that there was insufficient attention given to participants in Streams B and C. An ex-consultant for a private employment agency advised that the company she worked for was focussed on Streams B and C who bring in more money:

The company I worked for…was a for profit provider therefore we were focused mainly on Stream B and C clients those who brought in more money for the company. We barely looked at the Stream A clients as they were deemed job ready yet still a huge portion of clients from this category are still unemployed…48

Committee view 10.33 The committee notes evidence that the funding model can encourage providers to focus on participants who are easier to place, despite greater outcome payments for participants who have been assessed as harder-to-place.

10.34 As discussed in Chapter 5, the Expert Panel recommended that 'job ready' participants no longer have a provider and instead self-service in an online environment. The committee considers that this substantial change would reduce the opportunities for providers to take advantage of participants who are easier to place and ignore harder-to-place participants. Nevertheless, the

45 Accountable Income Management Network, Submission 45, p. 2 (citations omitted).

46 Professor Jeff Borland, Professor Mark Considine et al., What Are Best-Practice Programs for

Jobseekers Facing High Barriers to Employment?, Policy Brief No. 4/16, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 2016, p. 5.

47 Mr Michael Kolomyjec, Group Executive, atWork Australia Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard,

1 February 2019, p. 29.

48 Name Withheld, Submission 90, p. 1.

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committee considers that funding arrangements must ensure that there are sufficient incentives to ensure that harder-to-place participants receive adequate attention and support from their provider.

Recommendation 37

Fees for training and other programs 10.36 According to the Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), the funding model incentivises providers to push for billable non-work activities rather than focussing on helping people to gain employment:

…this outcome driven approach has created perverse financial incentives for employment service providers to churn unemployed workers into easier and more reliable income-producing outcomes, such as employability training, Work for the Dole, and job search programs, which have little to no effect in helping people gain employment.49

10.37 For example, the AUWU suggested that the funding model can incentivise a provider to preference training over a participant attending genuine employment:

This outcome driven system has led to a number of unemployed workers actually being encouraged by their employment service provider, under the threat of a penalty, to attend an employability training activity instead of attending employment as their employment does not meet the criteria for an outcome payment. The AUWU is aware of a number of unemployed workers who have lost their jobs in this fashion.50

10.38 According to one submitter, their provider ran 'bogus' courses through a subsidiary in order to claim fees from the government.51 Another submitter, an ex-consultant, advised that it was best practice to 'fudge' the number of job seekers in Work for the Dole to get more money.52

10.39 The quality and appropriateness of training programs is discussed in Chapter 7.

Committee view 10.40 The committee notes evidence that, in some cases, providers are incentivised to prioritise non-work activities for which the provider can claim a fee. The committee also notes that these activities can directly conflict with genuine

49 Australian Unemployed Workers' Union (AUWU), Submission 27, p. 49.

50 AUWU, Submission 27, p. 16.

51 Name Withheld, Submission 136, p. 1.

52 Name Withheld, Submission 90, p. 2.

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employment opportunities which do not result in an outcome payment. The committee considers that such perverse incentives must be eradicated from the system, particularly for activities that do not help people get into employment.

Recommendation 38

10.41 The committee recommends that the government review funding arrangements for non-work activities to ensure integrity in the system.

Recommendation 39

10.42 The committee recommends that the government review the funding model to ensure it promotes activities that improve the employability of participants.

Outcome payments and payslips 10.43 According to the Department of Jobs and Small Business, 23.3 per cent of job placements are currently sourced by providers.53 However, many submitters advised that they secured employment without the assistance of their

provider, but then their provider was still able to claim an outcome payment associated with the employment. For example, Ms Kylie Wright, a consultant, advised that all the employment claims from her office were created by participants finding their own employment; however her employer (the provider) has continued to make claims based on this and has received outcome payments.54 Another submitter reported that her provider received an outcome payment for a job she got before even engaging with her provider:

I received confirmation of a position in New Zealand which I had applied for and been interviewed for before attending the Jobactive agency, who claimed a kickback against my securing of that job.55

10.44 The committee received evidence that providers have sought payslips from participants so that the provider can claim an outcome payment.56 In some cases, participants reported being repetitively harassed by providers for payslips.57 For example, Ms Rozie Hart, who sustained a workplace injury and retrained at her local TAFE, submitted that her provider harassed her for payslips despite not assisting her to find work:

53 Based on data for 1 July 2018 to 31 December 2018. Department of Jobs and Small Business,

answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received 8 February 2019), p. 25.

54 Ms Kylie Wright, Submission 71, p. 1.

55 Name Withheld, Submission 48, p. 9.

56 See for example, Name Withheld, Submission 119, p. 3.

57 Mr Ewan McDonnell, Submission 165, p. 1; Name Withheld, Submission 144, p. 2.

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I have never received any assistance from a Jobactive Service Provider that led to a job, let alone an interview. Every time I secured another work contract, my provider harassed me for copies of my payslips…58

10.45 The committee received concerning evidence that some providers were threatening participants who were still on jobactive, including with payment suspension, if they did not provide their payslips.59 For example, a researcher with a PhD reported being repeatedly threatened by her provider, who was 'overtly focussed' on obtaining her payslips:

ï On my first refusal to provide payslips, I was told in person that I would be cut off from Centrelink benefits would be suspended if I refused to comply.

ï I was told that they would find me some work as a cleaner if I refused to comply. I told them that this was good news as I was looking for work. I never heard back from them about any work—as a cleaner or otherwise.

ï I was taken out of a training program (‘Back on Track’) that I was obligated to attend by my provider on two occasions to discuss my unwillingness to provide payslips.

ï When I requested support to undertake further training (TESOL training), I was told that my Provider would be unable to assist me in accessing any opportunities as I had not given my payslips to my provider. This was reflective of a general unwillingness to support access to work that is likely to be longer term.

ï As I was leaving one appointment at my provider, I was told to wait for a one-on-one meeting with a senior staff member. He demanded my payslips, telling me again that if I failed to provide them, then my Centrelink benefits would be cut off.60

10.46 Additionally, some participants reported that providers lied to them—telling them it was part of their mutual obligations to provide the payslips. For example, a submitter from Victoria reported that she was told she had to provide her payslips as part of mutual obligations:

I had case managers ask for personal documents and pay slips, using ‘mutual obligations’ as a justification. When I asked for proof that mutual obligations included providing these documents, I was provided with a statement from the 1991 Act that stated there were mutual obligations.61

10.47 The submitter advised the committee that she was threatened for not providing payslips:

58 Ms Rozie Hart, Submission 139, p. 2.

59 See for example, Ms Mandy Spacek, Submission 76, p. 1; and Name Withheld, Submission 144, p. 2.

60 Name Withheld, Submission 144, p. 2.

61 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 2.

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I was bullied and threatened with intimidatory behaviour, including deliberate refusal to accept work as a legitimate reason to not attend an appointment - I have emails showing that I informed the employee that I was working and an email reply stating that he would say I didn’t have a valid reason if I continued my refusal to supply payslips.62

10.48 Providers have also used inducements such as gift cards to get payslips from participants.63 The committee also received evidence of providers contacting employers directly to request payslips. The AUWU reported that it has heard of a number of cases of people losing their jobs due to providers harassing their employer 'every day for them to hand over the relevant payslips'.64 The Department of Jobs and Small Business advised that providers are not permitted to contact an employer without the permission of the job seeker.65 Additionally, the Department advised that if providers are found to have contacted an employer without permission, 'the Department addresses this through its contract management processes for managing provider performance'.66

Committee view 10.49 The committee is concerned by evidence that participants are being harassed by providers for payslips in cases where the provider did not assist the participant to secure work. Yet the committee notes that under the current

payment structure, and with the limited oversight of jobactive providers, it is not surprising that this practice would occur.

10.50 The committee also notes evidence that some providers are contacting employers to seek payslips without the permission of participants, which they are not permitted to do. The government must take action to prevent this from occurring.

Recommendation 40

10.51 The committee recommends that the government take additional action to prevent providers from contacting employers to obtain payslips without the permission of the participant.

62 Name Withheld, Submission 114, p. 5.

63 Rick Morton, 'Accused job services firm eyes NDIS', The Australian, 2 November 2017,

www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/industrial-relations/accused-job-services-firm-eyes-ndis/news-story/cd06b997e07505fd9f1b97e180e5a011 (accessed 2 February 2019); see also Mr Ewan McDonnell, Submission 165, p. 1.

64 AUWU, Submission 16, p. 16.

65 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no 21, 6 December 2018

(received 2 January 2019), p. 5.

66 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, no 21, 6 December 2018

(received 2 January 2019), p. 5.

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Other impacts on service delivery 10.52 The committee received evidence that jobactive's outcome driven funding model has impacted on service delivery. According to the Youth Affairs Council of South Australia, some providers have cut staff numbers 'which has

dramatically increased caseloads and has led to a significant decrease in the services delivered to clients'.67 Per Capita and the AUWU submitted that contracts should be restructured to incentivise staff to have constructive engagements with participants.68

10.53 The committee heard that the funding model, although providing a regional loading, can make it difficult to achieve outcomes in regional areas. According to Mr Matthew Hall, Chief Executive Officer of Sureway Employment and Training, issues in regional locations (transport, limited availability of specialist service supports, long waiting lists, environmental factors and small populations) can affect a provider's ability to deliver outcomes under an outcome based model. Mr Hall suggested that the financial loading for regional job outcomes is insufficient to account for regional challenges:

Unfortunately…a financial loading does not create a bus service or magically generate a mental health specialist.69

10.54 The quality of service provision under jobactive is discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

Committee view 10.55 As noted in Chapter 5, service quality under jobactive has been poor, especially for particular groups and the most disadvantaged participants. The committee notes evidence that the outcome driven funding model is

contributing to inadequate servicing. Accordingly, the committee is of the view that the government should examine options to ensure the funding model promotes high-quality service provision to participants and employers.

67 Youth Affairs Council of South Australia, Submission 29, p. 1.

68 Per Capita and AUWU, Submission 5, p. 63.

69 Mr Matthew Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Sureway Employment and Training, Committee

Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 30.

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Recommendation 41

10.56 The committee recommends that the government examine options to improve the funding model to ensure that it promotes high-quality service provision to participants and employers.

Senator Gavin Marshall Senator Deborah O'Neill

Chair Member

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Coalition Senators' Dissenting Report

1.1 The majority report ignores one simple fact: jobactive - whilst far from perfect - has performed well and at a lower cost compared to previous programs.

1.2 Around 50 per cent of job seekers are in work three months after participating in jobactive1 - compared to 42.5 per cent for the last three years of the Job Services Australia model.2

1.3 Importantly, these employment outcomes are proving to be sustainable with 81.5 per cent of jobactive participants still in employment three months after their job placement.3

1.4 Coalition Senators recognise that while the current system has achieved results, delivering around 1 000 job placements every day,4 there is room for improvement and more can be done, particularly to help those Australians facing significant barriers to employment. To this end, the Government is undertaking the most significant review and redesign of Australia’s employment services system since the privatisation of services in 1998.

1.5 While the committee has recognised the recommendations of the Expert Advisory Panel, commissioned by the Coalition Government, it is disappointing the committee has not recognised the extensive consultation process undertaken by the Panel to inform the design of a new employment services model. The Expert Advisory Panel, with support from the Department of Jobs and Small Business, conducted 23 face-to-face consultation sessions around the country which were attended by 560 unique stakeholders. In addition, they conducted in excess of 500 one-on-one interviews through an intensive user-centred design process, which incorporated a mixture of current job seekers, individuals who found employment through jobactive, employment services providers and employers. An additional 450 submissions were received on the panel’s discussion paper.5

1 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 3.

2 Coalition slams Labor's welfare changes, SkyNews, 8 January 2019,

https://www.skynews.com.au/details/_5986993500001 (accessed 14 February 2019).

3 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 37.

4 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 37.

5 Employment Services Expert Advisory Panel, I want to work: Employment Services 2020 Report,

December 2018, https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/i-want-work (accessed 14 February 2019), p. 75.

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1.6 It is clear that the Coalition Government is serious about eliminating problems in the current system and is designing a system which delivers for those whom it’s designed to benefit - job seekers and employers.

1.7 As the Department of Jobs and Small Business noted in their most recent evidence before the committee, since the delivery of the Expert Panel’s report, the Government has undertaken further targeted consultation with stakeholders, including job seekers.6

1.8 Coalition Senators note that the committee has largely delivered a report which does not present any value-add beyond the extensive work program currently underway which actually ensures a future fit employment services system which delivers results for those who need it most.

Labour Market 1.9 The Coalition Senators note that the committee has chosen to perpetuate false claims made by the ACTU and others regarding the level of ‘insecure’ work in the economy. Australian Bureau of Statistics data7 shows that:

ï the percentage of employees who are casuals has been relatively stable over the last two decades, and was 25.3 per cent in November 2018 compared to a peak of 25.5 per cent in 2004;

ï the proportion of Australian workers who are independent contractors has remained broadly stable over the last decade (and has reduced from 8.7 per cent in 2016 to eight per cent in 2018);

ï the proportion of employees on fixed-term contracts has been stable at around four per cent since 2004; ï the use of labour hire as a proportion of all employees has been stable at less than two per cent over the last decade.

1.10 These trends have also recently been confirmed by Mr Guy Debelle, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, noting:

The share of people working as independent contractors has declined a little over the past decade, the share of people working casual jobs is also little changed. The labour account data reports information on workers with more than one job. It suggests that secondary jobs - i.e. filled by people who also have a primary job - account for around 6 per cent of total jobs, which hasn't changed much over the past five years.8

6 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 39.

7 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Characteristics of Employment, Australia, August 2018, cat. no. 6333.0,

29 November 2018.

8 Mr Guy Debelle, The State of the Labour market, 17 October 2018,

https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2018/sp-dg-2018-10-17.html (accessed 14 February 2019).

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Compliance 1.11 The Targeted Compliance Framework has resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of job seekers receiving financial penalties, while providing job seekers with clearer, more consistent expectations and giving them greater

personal responsibility for their personal compliance.9 The new framework provides additional opportunities for job seekers, providers and the Department of Human Services to discuss the job seekers’ personal circ*mstances and ensure that their job plan is not putting unreasonable burdens on the job seeker.10

1.12 Coalition Senators note evidence provided to the committee that the new compliance system has seen a 95 per cent reduction in financial penalties applied to job seekers.11

1.13 Given demerits expire over time, to be at risk of incurring a financial penalty a participant generally needs to have five failures without a valid reason within six months. Coalition Senators note that job seekers will be assessed by both their provider and Centrelink before reaching this point to ensure that they are not being persistently penalised for mutual obligation expectations which are not appropriate for their circ*mstances.12

1.14 Coalition Senators further note that the committee’s report incorrectly states that 665 participants had received a payment cancellation or reduction as a result of being in the ‘penalty zone’ as at 30 September 2018. A closer reading of the tabled evidence shows that, in fact, 541 of those individuals had not received any financial penalty under the TCF, being instead in the ‘red zone’ without having incurred any demerits in that zone; and that 124 job seekers had actually received a financial penalty under the new compliance framework.13

1.15 Coalition Senators note that the committee’s report erroneously conflates the Targeted Compliance Framework with the former compliance system. The Targeted Compliance Framework was introduced to address the high rate of error in provider reports to the Department of Human Services by creating

9 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 14 November 2018, p. 30.

10 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Explainer: Targeted job seeker compliance framework,

26 June 2018, https://www.jobs.gov.au/newsroom/explainer-targeted-job-seeker-compliance-framework (accessed 14 February 2019).

11 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, p. 39.

12 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Explainer: Targeted job seeker compliance framework,

26 June 2018.

13 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Jobactive figures, 30 September 2018, 2018-19

Supplementary Budget Estimates (tabled 24 October 2018).

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consistent expectations for job seekers and not applying permanent financial penalties for first time non-compliance.14

1.16 Evidence from the Department of Jobs and Small Business also noted that the Targeted Compliance Framework has removed administrative burden from providers eliminating the highly intensive and transactional arrangements relating to previous compliance arrangements such as submitting a variety of different non-compliance reports to the Department of Human Services.15 Further evidence suggests that there is no undue administrative burden associated with the lifting of demerits:

To remove the demerit the provider accesses the job seeker’s compliance history page in ESS Web, selects the relevant non-compliance event, then selects “manually remove demerit” check box. The provider records the reason for removing the demerit, clicks save and the demerit is removed.16

Work for the Dole 1.17 Coalition Senators note the committee has perpetuated incorrect misrepresentations of the findings of an independent safety audit undertaken by Ernst & Young at 200 Work for the Dole sites. The compliance findings are

not a safety benchmark. The average compliance score applying Ernst & Young’s assessment tool was 91 per cent with 64 per cent of activities meeting or exceeding this average score. By extension, this means that 36 per cent of activities were under the average score.17

1.18 Further, Coalition Senators note evidence from the Department of Jobs and Small Business that work health and safety is a fundamental requirement of the Work for the Dole program. It continues to be a priority focus area for the department in managing the program.18 Jobactive providers are contractually obliged to meet all relevant Commonwealth, state and territory work health and safety legislative requirements and ensure that all the activities are carried out in a safe manner. The rate of reported injury under the program is low at around one per cent - compared to around four per cent in paid work.19

14 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Explainer: Targeted job seeker compliance framework,

26 June 2018.

15 Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment, Department of Jobs and Small Business,

Committee Hansard, 1 February 2019, pp. 37-38.

16 Department of Jobs and Small Business, answers to questions on notice, 1 February 2019 (received

8 February 2019), p. 3.

17 Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, 29 May 2017,

p. 116.

18 Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, 29 May 2018, p. 73.

19 Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, 29 May 2018, p. 74.

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1.19 The Department of Jobs and Small Business has noted previously that they are providing a level of assurance about work health and safety that is in excess of the level of assurance at ordinary worksites.20 Ernst & Young noted in their independent audit report that “the Department has rigorous work health and safety obligations under the jobactive Deeds…”21

1.20 As per the evidence provided to the committee, Work for the Dole is an activation program, not a .job-matching program. It provides valuable work-like experiences to help participants gain the skills, experience and confidence to move from welfare to work, while giving back to the community.22

Senator Slade Brockman Senator James Paterson

Deputy Chair Member

20 Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, 29 May 2017,

p. 116.

21 Ernst & Young, Work Health and Safety Aggregated Onsite Audit Report, June 2016,

https://docs.jobs.gov.au/documents/work-health-and-safety-aggregated-site-audit-report-june- 2016 (accessed 14 February 2019), p. 2.

22 Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, 19 October 2016,

p. 26.

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Australian Greens Senators' Additional Comments

1.1 The Australian Greens are supportive of the recommendations in the Majority Report but consider more needs to be done to address the issues raised during this inquiry.

1.2 The inquiry clearly demonstrates that the jobactive system is not fit for purpose and is failing unemployed workers. We are particularly concerned that the jobactive system is being undermined from the outset because the government is prioritising compliance over genuine assistance.

1.3 The Government’s approach to employment services has meant that providers are more focused on enforcing compliance rather than assisting people into fulfilling employment pathways, particularly since the introduction of the Targeted Compliance Framework (TCF).

1.4 Through the inquiry process the committee has overwhelmingly heard that the focus is on punishing people for minor infractions, rather than looking at the individual and addressing the barriers they face.

1.5 The relationship between employment providers and people looking for work has significantly deteriorated following the introduction of the TCF because it is no longer the Department imposing penalties for non-compliance, it is a job provider who they have regular contact with.

1.6 Since jobactive started in July 2015, 5.2 million penalties have been imposed on people looking for work. Half of those penalties were overturned by Centrelink. Under the TCF the capacity for Centrelink to overturn penalties no longer exists, raising concerns about how many of the penalties applied by providers are in fact in error.

1.7 The high rate of penalties applied demonstrates the punitive nature of the Government’s approach to income support, where people are losing payments because they can’t make a job appointment or access Centrelink, often because they are living in poverty or face other barriers to employment.

1.8 Poverty is a barrier to employment so 'punishing' people by taking away their income ultimately defeats its own purpose.

1.9 We are concerned that employment consultants aren’t required to have any formal qualifications and are working in stressful environments. They have the power to apply sanctions, including suspending and cutting the payments of vulnerable people with little to no training. The churn rate in this sector is at around 40 per cent which points to systemic problems.

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1.10 The jobactive model, the low rate of Newstart, mutual obligations requirements and the TCF are exacerbating existing mental health issues and have left people feeling there is little hope for the future and are causing distress and humiliation.

1.11 People are applying for jobs just to be compliant and businesses and providers are left paper shuffling for the sake of compliance.

1.12 With little oversight, the Government is outsourcing its responsibilities to private contractors who make millions of dollars to implement ineffective and punitive programs that ultimately punish people on income support.

1.13 The Government has taken an ideological approach to unemployment, framing it as a personal moral failing of individuals rather than addressing the systemic issues such as poverty, intergenerational trauma and job market conditions.

1.14 Jobactive and mutual obligation requirements are blunt instruments, a one size fits all approach that does not work and is causing harm. We need an approach that fits individual circ*mstances and barriers, particularly for young people, older Australians, disabled people and First Nations peoples.

1.15 Australia is a party to seven core international human rights treaties, one of which is the right to social security contained in article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Despite this, our social safety net is consistently eroded and people on income support are a target for savings.

1.16 Australia currently spends well-below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average on employment services and there is a strong case for more investment in this sector.

Urgent increase to Newstart and Youth Allowance 1.17 Until poverty is recognised as a barrier to employment by both major parties it will be difficult to fully resolve the issues that have been raised through the jobactive inquiry process.

1.18 It is widely accepted by the business and social services sector that poverty is a barrier to employment and that the current rate of Newstart and Youth Allowance is too low.

1.19 Even with the most supportive employment service provider, if people cannot eat, pay their rent, afford transport or access online services they will be very limited in their capacity to engage with the system and find employment.

1.20 Despite being the second wealthiest country in the world, poverty rates have remained entrenched at a high level, with 3 million people including 739 000 children living below the poverty line.

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1.21 Increasing Newstart and Youth Allowance by $75 a week would significantly help people struggling to try to make ends meet, and is one of the measures we need to take to address poverty and unemployment.

1.22 Newstart is no longer a transitional payment as is so often claimed by the Government. 46 per cent of people on Newstart are on the payment for more than two years and there are just not enough jobs to go around. Conservative assessments show that depending on qualification levels there is as low as one job available for every 8 applicants who are unemployed or underemployed. Yet, people looking for work are left to languish on payments of less than $40 a day.

1.23 Evidence was presented to the inquiry that people are stealing food after having their payments cut off.1

1.24 We already know that people on Newstart are food insecure and living below the poverty line. When their payments are suspended or cancelled, sometimes because they couldn’t afford to get to an appointment in the first place, they are left in a desperate situation.

1.25 Newstart must be urgently increased so that those who cannot find work or are facing barriers to employment are not condemned to live in poverty.

Recommendation 1

1.26 That Newstart and Youth Allowance be immediately increased by $75 a week.

1.27 That an independent body be established to provide regular, independent advice to the Government and Parliament on income support payment rates.

Drug and alcohol addiction 1.28 Changes to drug and alcohol rules and mutual obligation requirements brought in with the Welfare Reform legislation have made things worse for people with addiction accessing the social safety net, and were opposed by the

Greens.

1.29 It is the Australian Greens' view that the committee recommendation that the Government take steps to improve provider awareness of recent policy changes for participation in drug or alcohol treatment programs counting towards annual activity requirements do not go far enough in assisting people on income support dealing with addiction.

1.30 The draconian TCF, removal of exemptions for drug or alcohol dependence, and changes to what qualifies as a reasonable excuse means that addiction is not treated as a health issue. It enforces compliance measures on people with

1 Western Australian Council of Social Service, Opening Statement, p. 1 (tabled 29 January 2019).

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addiction, who are worse off and face significant risk of further disadvantage. These Welfare Reform measures should be reversed.

1.31 Concerning evidence was presented by peak drug and alcohol body the Western Australian Network of Alcohol and other Drug Agencies about the impact of the recent changes for people with drug and alcohol addiction on income support in residential treatment:

People who are accessing services are receiving inappropriate job plans. Those are plans requiring them to continue looking for work even though they are in this intensive treatment program. They have had requests for additional medical certificates. They typically have, in the past, provided medical certificates. They've been required to attend multiple external meetings as well, despite being in this residential, intensive, full-time program. In terms of the impact on the staff of services, while previously it was dealt with through the assessment process for a residential program, now welfare workers are spending up to 30 per cent of their time just dealing with the jobactive processes of their clients. There are multiple instances where the job network providers and Centrelink have sought changes to medical certificates to remove or amend the identification of alcohol and other drug issues. People have reported that their job network providers have been saying, 'Just put down that they have a mental health problem. Just change it.' They have actually been contacting GPs as well to make these amendments. That's just to make it easier, I suppose, for them to process this.2

1.32 The changes are resulting in welfare support officers having to spend up to 30 per cent of their time on administration activities related to mutual obligation, rather than providing supports to the individual.

1.33 The Greens are deeply concerned by reports that jobactive providers are asking doctors to change client’s diagnosis.

1.34 Drug and alcohol treatment is complex, and recovery, treatment and future employment is being hindered by employment providers being forced, in many cases, to treat addiction as a compliance issue rather than a health issue.

Recommendation 2

1.35 That welfare reform measures relating to removal of exemptions for drug or alcohol dependence are reversed.

1.36 That additional funding for training for job providers in assisting people on income support with addiction is made available.

1.37 That activity exceptions are allowed for people diagnosed with or people seeking treatment for an alcohol or drug addiction.

2 Ms Jill Rundle, Chief Executive Officer, Western Australian Network of Alcohol and other Drug

Agencies, Committee Hansard, 29 January 2019, p. 28.

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Mutual Obligations 1.38 There has been overwhelming evidence presented throughout this inquiry, and many other Senate inquiries including into the Cashless Debit Card, Community Development Program and Robo-Debt, regarding the negative

impact of mutual obligation is having on people on income support.

1.39 There was significant evidence presented to this inquiry from income support recipients who have had payments cut for a variety reasons that demonstrate the barriers people face in the current system, including:

ï not being able to get in touch with Centrelink both in person or through telephone or online services; ï insufficient income to attend appointments or use online services from home; ï no public transport in the region; ï child care obligations; ï cultural obligations; ï no phone credit; ï Centrelink or job provider losing their records; ï unable to reach job providers; ï inaccurate advice given by job provider or Centrelink; and ï language barriers to using Centrelink services and lack of interpretation

services.

1.40 Uniting Care said in their submission:

We note that the imposition of Mutual Obligation requirements on unemployed jobseekers is based on the assumption that individuals are able to exercise a degree of control over their situation in accepting welfare benefits. We challenge this assumption, however, in the context of our modern economy that is subject to structural unemployment, which means that for many people, there is no real alternative to accepting welfare benefits. This is especially true for unemployed people with limited skills and capacities, or those who experience forms of discrimination that further prevent them from entering and remaining in the labour market. It is our view that equitable welfare policy should acknowledge that the need for support to compensate for structural unemployment, rather than attribute joblessness solely to the personal failings of jobseekers. Employment policies and programs should therefore be developed in a way that acknowledges this, so as to reflect true mutuality—it is imperative that where obligations are accepted by income support recipients, there are realistic alternatives that provide meaningful employment opportunity and choice.3

3 Uniting Care Australia, Submission 25, p. 8.

196

1.41 Recent research on welfare conditionality in the United Kingdom shows that mutual obligations are consistently ineffective in facilitating paid work.4 It demonstrated that mutual obligations result in negative behaviour change and outcomes, such as disengagement from the social security system, increased poverty and exacerbated poor health.5

1.42 We note that the Majority Report points out the significant problems with mutual obligations but it does not go far enough in calling for reform to these punitive measures.

Recommendation 3

1.43 That a framework of true mutuality is developed that ensures unemployed workers are getting the support they need, but are not punished for being unable to find employment when there is a low supply of jobs.

1.44 That any new system introducing mutual obligations ensures that it is the Government agency that imposes any penalties, not employment services providers

Targeted Compliance Framework 1.45 The committee heard troubling evidence from submitters about the harsh impact of penalties imposed under the TCF. The Australian Greens did not support the introduction of the TCF and the evidence presented to the inquiry

has shown the problems with this approach. The TCF should be abandoned. The Majority Report does not go far enough in its recommendations regarding the compliance framework. There was overwhelming evidence presented to the committee that the Targeted Compliance Framework is a barrier to employment and is keeping people in poverty.

Recommendation 4

1.46 That the Government immediately abandon the Targeted Compliance Framework.

Incorrect streaming 1.47 The committee heard extensive evidence about unemployed workers being placed in an incorrect stream under jobactive. As pointed out in the Majority Report, the process for streaming is rudimentary. This results in many people

being inappropriately assessed and therefore unlikely to receive the appropriate level of support.

4 Professor Peter Dwyer, Welfare conditionality: key messages from the UK WelCond project, 2018,

http://acossevents.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Welfare-conditionality-sanctions-support-and-behaviour-change-Peter-Dwyer.pdf (accessed 14 February 2019), p. 5.

5 Professor Peter Dwyer, Welfare conditionality: key messages from the UK WelCond project, 2018, p. 6.

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1.48 The assessment process needs to change to more accurately identify strengths and barriers and ensure that unemployed workers feel more comfortable disclosing personal barriers. The Australian Greens believe that changes to the streaming process cannot wait and must occur as soon as possible.

Recommendation 5

1.49 That a new stream is developed for long term and very long term unemployed workers which provides additional support and special assistance.

1.50 That the process is immediately changed so that current jobactive participants are placed in the correct stream.

Job Plans and job search requirements 1.51 The committee heard evidence that unemployed workers are overwhelmingly given standardised Job Plans which are not tailored to their individual circ*mstances. This is concerning given Job Plans are part of a participant’s

mutual obligation requirements.

1.52 The Australian Greens recognise that setting an arbitrary number of jobs to apply for each month is not improving people’s chances of gaining employment.

Recommendation 6

1.53 That jobactive providers negotiate Job Plans in good faith, that are individualised, include long term employment goals and training, and reflect changes to individual circ*mstances.

1.54 That a default approach to job search requirements be applied for everyone accessing employment services, in recognition that each person will have different skills, barriers and needs, and that this tailored approach is reflected in Job Plans.

Employment services consultants 1.55 Employment services consultants play an essential role in helping unemployed workers find work. Under jobactive, consultants experience large caseloads, inadequate training, time constraints, and high staff turnover rates. The

Australian Greens are concerned about the qualifications of employment services consultants and the quality of the training they receive.

1.56 The Australian Greens disagree with the committee’s view that employment services consultants should not be required to have particular qualifications.

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Recommendation 7

1.57 That a minimum standard of skills and training for all employment services consultants be immediately introduced.

1.58 That the development of a vocational training course or tertiary education course for employment services consultants be investigated.

Public service delivery of employment services 1.59 The Australian Greens are supportive of the public service delivering employment services for unemployed workers who face fewer barriers to finding a job. The committee received evidence that specialised services by

not-for-profits, such as the Brotherhood of St Laurence and the Victorian Council of Social Services, are having a positive impact for those that face complex and multiple barriers.

Recommendation 8

1.60 That employment services be restored to the public service for unemployed workers who are job ready and face minimal barriers.

1.61 That significant investment is made in specialised services for unemployed workers who face complex and multiple barriers to be delivered by the not-for-profit sector.

Disability 1.62 The committee heard evidence that jobactive is not tailored to meet the needs of unemployed workers with disability. Submitters to the inquiry described how some people with disability are being referred to jobactive who are

unable to work. It is clear some of these people should have been receiving a Disability Support Pension. The Australian Greens are concerned about the number of people who are being denied a Disability Support Pension and forced onto Newstart because of changes to the impairment tables and the so-called program of support.

Recommendation 9

1.63 That the Disability Support Pension impairment tables are reformed to ensure people are properly assessed and provided with income support payments that meet their needs and circ*mstances.

Young unemployed workers 1.64 The Australian Greens do not support programs like the Youth Jobs PaTH program. These programs exploit young people by paying them less than the minimum wage and replacing paid jobs.

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Recommendation 10

1.65 That access to a program of individualised support is offered to all young people, such as transition to work, and extended to people who are under 25 years old.

Older unemployed workers 1.66 The committee heard from older Australians who struggled to find work and faced multiple barriers to employment. This is exacerbated by the lack of understanding and training for employment services consultants around

supporting older unemployed workers.

Recommendation 11

1.67 That a specialised stream be established for older unemployed workers that provides access to appropriate training and recognises their qualifications and work experience.

Humanitarian entrants and migrants 1.68 The committee heard a lot of disturbing evidence about the inadequacy of services and support for humanitarian entrants and migrants, including people missing English language classes to attend jobactive appointments.

This is a perverse outcome given the importance of English language skills in securing employment.

1.69 The Australian Greens strongly support jobactive providers having the discretion to alter mutual obligations for humanitarian entrants participating in the Humanitarian Settlement Program and attending English language classes. We also support the improvement of services for humanitarian entrants and migrants overall in recognition of the additional barriers these people face to employment.

Recommendation 12

1.70 That humanitarian entrants and migrants are given more flexibility over when they start jobactive, including staggering the commencement of services and mutual obligations, especially if they are engaging in the Humanitarian Settlement Program or English language classes.

1.71 That participants can more easily reschedule appointments with jobactive providers, especially when appointments conflict with paid employment or activities that improve employment outcomes such as English language classes.

1.72 That eligibility of employment services is extended to provisional visa holders or permanent residents where needed.

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1.73 The Australian Greens are concerned that some newly arrived migrants, such as those with provisional visas, are excluded from employment services.

Independent surveys 1.74 The committee heard evidence from the Department of Jobs and Small Business that unemployed workers are generally satisfied with the quality of jobactive services.6 However, this is contradicted by the lived experience of

unemployed workers interacting with the jobactive system. This raises the question about how comfortable unemployed workers are to provide their true opinions on jobactive if they know the Department is undertaking the survey.

Recommendation 13

1.75 That an independent body be established to monitor the quality of employment services. This would be separate to the committee’s recommendation for an ombudsman to resolve complaints.

Work for the Dole 1.76 The overwhelming amount of evidence received in the inquiry highlighted that the Work for the Dole program is not effective at helping people into work. The Work for the Dole program does not recognise people’s

qualifications and can be a barrier to finding employment. It is not fit for purpose and does not significantly improve people’s chances at finding short or long term employment.

1.77 The Australian Greens believe the Majority Report does not go far enough in its recommendations around the Work for the Dole program.

Recommendation 14

1.78 That the Work for the Dole program be abolished.

Online compliance 1.79 The Australian Greens note the committee’s view that any online compliance system must be fully tested, both with providers and unemployed workers participating in the program, before proceeding.

6 Department of Jobs and Small Business, Submission 55, p. 3.

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Recommendation 15

1.80 That the Government takes a cautious approach when undertaking implementation of a new online compliance system.

Senator Rachel Siewert Substitute Member

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Appendix 1

Submissions and Additional Information

Submissions 1 Northern Community CareWorks Ltd 2 Australian Human Rights Commission 3 National Social Security Rights Network 4 Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network 5 Per Capita Australia and the Australian Unemployed Workers' Union 6 Melbourne Unitarian Peace Memorial Church 7 Darebin Progress Association 8 Children and Young People with Disability Australia 9 Anglicare Australia 10 Blue Sky Pilbara

ï 10.1 Supplementary submission

11 The Smith Family 12 Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia 13 WEstjustice Community Legal Centre 14 Australian Council of Trade Unions 15 Jobs Australia 16 Brotherhood of St Laurence 17 Australian Council of Social Service 18 Australian National Audit Office 19 Dr Katherine Moore 20 Global Sisters 21 yourtown 22 Community and Public Sector Union 23 Volunteering Australia 24 UnitingCare Australia 25 SYC

26 Ms Harriet Adams 27 Australian Unemployed Workers' Union 28 Mr Thomas Studans 29 Youth Affairs Council of South Australia 30 Settlement Council of Australia 31 My Pathway 32 Dr Tony Ward 33 Harmony Alliance 34 Mr Jeremy Poxon 35 Volunteering Victoria 36 Aspergers Victoria

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37 Mr Joel Reynolds 38 Mr Aidan Jarvis 39 Mr Andrei Meltser 40 Edmund Rice Centre WA 41 Public Service Research Group, University of New South Wales 42 Social Ventures Australia 43 Mr Robert Kuys 44 Mr Marcus L'Estrange 45 Accountable Income Management Network 46 Confidential 47 Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand 48 Name Withheld 49 Victorian Council of Social Service 50 Ms Tracey Ashmore 51 Mr Michael Smart 52 Mr Russell Miles 53 Advanced Personnel Management 54 National Employment Services Association 55 Department of Jobs and Small Business 56 Youth Action 57 Jesuit Social Services 58 Refugee Council of Australia 59 Mr Rodrigo Kendrick 60 Dr Arthur Chesterfield-Evans 61 Beacon Foundation 62 Confidential 63 Dr John Paterson 64 Confidential 65 Confidential 66 Mr Brenton Thomas 67 Mr Arthur Burgif 68 Confidential 69 Name Withheld 70 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 71 Ms Kylie Wright

ï 71.1 Supplementary submission

72 Name Withheld 73 Name Withheld 74 Name Withheld 75 Mr Jason Clark 76 Ms Mandy Spacek 77 Ms Karen Jennings 78 Mr Anthony Boza

205

79 Name Withheld 80 Name Withheld 81 Mr Peter Brammer 82 Name Withheld 83 Ms Tracey Smallwood 84 Name Withheld 85 Ms Jing Chen 86 Mr Rohan Musch 87 Ms Linda Paterson 88 Mr Alfred Coolwell 89 Mr John Cummins 90 Name Withheld 91 Mr Ewen Kloas 92 Name Withheld 93 Confidential 94 Ms Mallory Allen 95 Name Withheld 96 Name Withheld 97 Name Withheld 98 Name Withheld 99 Mr Thomas Dolmark 100 Mr Glenn Levett 101 Confidential 102 Confidential 103 Mr Robbie Buckmaster 104 Mr Rod Shehan 105 Mr Clifford Fraser

ï 105.1 Supplementary submission

106 Name Withheld 107 Ms Sharon Upton 108 Name Withheld 109 Name Withheld 110 Mr David Howarth 111 Mr Marcus Liddle 112 Name Withheld 113 Ms Melanie Barbaro 114 Name Withheld 115 Name Withheld 116 Name Withheld 117 Name Withheld 118 Name Withheld 119 Name Withheld 120 Name Withheld

206

121 Name Withheld 122 Name Withheld 123 Name Withheld 124 Name Withheld 125 Name Withheld 126 Confidential 127 Confidential 128 Confidential 129 Confidential 130 Confidential 131 Confidential 132 Name Withheld 133 Name Withheld 134 Name Withheld 135 Name Withheld 136 Name Withheld 137 Name Withheld 138 Name Withheld 139 Ms Rozie Hart 140 Inspire Global Group 141 Mr Michael Dempsey 142 Mr Allan Wright 143 Name Withheld 144 Name Withheld 145 Ms Dawn Murphy 146 Mr Brendan Taylor 147 Confidential 148 Confidential 149 Name Withheld 150 Name Withheld 151 Name Withheld 152 Ms Angela Gormley

ï 152.1 Supplementary submission ï 152.2 Supplementary submission

153 Confidential 154 E-Focus 155 Confidential 156 Confidential 157 Confidential 158 Name Withheld 159 Centre for Policy Development 160 Name Withheld 161 Mr Stephen Piuk

207

162 Mr Timothy Phillips 163 Ms Ruth Bretherton 164 Mr Robert Turner 165 Mr Ewan McDonnell 166 Ms Susan Carew 167 Miss Ashley Barnes 168 Mr Daniel Mcintyre 169 Mr Troy Ashwin

Additional Information 1 Letter of clarification from the Australian Unemployed Workers Union to evidence provided at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received 2 November 2018.

2 Additional information provided by the Brotherhood of St Laurence on 12 November 2018. 3 Additional information provided by the Brotherhood of St Laurence on 12 November 2018. 4 Additional information provided by the Brotherhood of St Laurence on

12 November 2018. 5 Additional information provided by the Australian Council of Social Service on 4 December 2018. 6 Additional information provided by the Australian Council of Social Service

on 4 December 2018. 7 Additional information provided by the Department of Social Services on 11 January 2019. 8 Additional information provided by yourtown on 22 January 2019. 9 Additional information provided by Skill Hire WA on 29 January 2019. 10 Additional information provided by the Department of Jobs and Small

Business on 4 February 2019. 11 Additional information provided by the Australian Medical Association on 7 February 2019. 12 Additional information provided by Anglicare Australia on 12 February 2019. 13 Additional information provided by the Royal Australian College of General

Practitioners on 12 February 2019.

Answer to Question on Notice 1 Answer to question on notice by Advanced Personnel Management, asked by Senator Siewert at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received 15 November 2018.

2 Answer to question on notice by Joblink Plus, asked at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received 16 November 2018. 3 Answer to question on notice by Good Shepard Australia New Zealand, asked by Senator O'Neill at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018;

received 19 November 2018.

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4 Answer to question on notice by SYC, asked at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received 19 November 2018. 5 Answer to question on notice by the Victorian Council of Social Service, asked at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received

19 November 2018. 6 Answer to question on notice by the Community and Public Sector Union, asked at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received

19 November 2018. 7 Answer to question on notice by Yourtown, asked at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received 20 November 2018. 8 Answer to question on notice by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and

Industry, asked at a public hearing in Canberra on 14 November 2018; received 21 November 2018. 9 Answer to question on notice by Jobs Australia, asked at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018; received 21 November 2018. 10 Answer to question on notice by the Department of Social Service, asked at a

public hearing in Canberra on 14 November 2018; received 30 November 2018. 11 Answer to question on notice by the National Social Security Rights Network, asked at a public hearing in Terrigal on 20 November 2018; received

3 December 2018. 12 Answer to question on notice by the Department of Social Service, asked at a public hearing in Canberra on 14 November 2018; received 5 December 2018. 13 Answer to question on notice by Volunteering Australia, asked at a public

hearing in Canberra on 14 November 2018; received 14 December 2018. 14 Answers to written questions on notice by yourtown, asked by Senator O'Neill on 6 December 2018; received 18 December 2018. 15 Answers to written questions on notice by Matchworks ESG, asked by

Senator O'Neill on 6 December 2018; received 20 December 2018. 16 Answers to written questions on notice by Joblink Plus, asked by Senator O'Neill on 6 December 2018; received 20 December 2018. 17 Answers to written questions on notice by SYC, asked by Senator O'Neill on

6 December 2018; received 20 December 2018. 18 Answers to written questions on notice by Jobs Australia, asked by Senator O'Neill on 6 December 2018; received 21 December 2018. 19 Answers to written questions on notice by MAX Employment, asked by

Senator O'Neill on 6 December 2018; received 2 January 2019. 20 Answers to written questions on notice by the Department of Jobs and Small Business, asked by Senator Siewert on 6 December 2018; received

2 January 2019. 21 Answers to written questions on notice by the Department of Jobs and Small Business, asked by Senator O'Neill on 6 December 2018; received

2 January 2019.

209

22 Answers to written questions on notice by the Salvation Army, asked by Senator O'Neill on 6 December 2018; received 11 January 2019. 23 Answers to questions on notice by the Department of Jobs and Small Business, asked at a public hearing in Canberra on 14 November 2018; received

25 January 2019. 24 Answers to questions on notice by the Western Australian Network of Alcohol and other Drug Agencies, asked at a public hearing in Perth on

29 January 2019; received 6 February 2019. 25 Answers to questions on notice by the Sarina Russo Group, asked at a public hearing in Canberra on 1 February 2019; received 7 February 2019. 26 Answers to questions on notice by the Department of Jobs and Small Business,

asked at a public hearing in Canberra on 1 February 2019; received 8 February 2019. 27 Answers to questions on notice by Anglicare Australia, asked at a public hearing in Canberra on 1 February 2019; received 8 February 2019.

Tabled Documents 1 Information paper tabled at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018 by Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer with Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand.

2 Report tabled at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018 by Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer with Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand.

3 Report tabled at a public hearing in Melbourne on 1 November 2018 by Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer with Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand.

4 Opening statement tabled at a public hearing in Canberra on 14 November 2018 by Ms Lavanya Kala, Policy Officer with Volunteering Australia.

5 Opening statement tabled at a public hearing in Terrigal on 20 November 2018 by Mr John Asquith OAM, Chairman of the Community Environment Network.

6 Opening statement tabled at a public hearing in Canberra on 20 November 2018 by Mr Asher Hirsch, Senior Policy Officer with the Refugee Council of Australia.

7 Medical certificate tabled at a public hearing in Perth on 29 January 2019 by Mr Alan Bateson. 8 Personal documents tabled at a public hearing in Perth on 29 January 2019 by Mr Milan Pospisil. 9 Opening statement tabled at a public hearing in Perth on 29 January 2019 by

Mr Chris Twomey, Research and Policy Development Leader, Western Australian Council of Social Service.

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Appendix 2

Public Hearings and Witnesses

Thursday, 1 November 2018 Victoria Ballroom North Park Royal Hotel Melbourne Airport Melbourne

SYC ï Mr Michael Clark, Director of Corporate Strategy ï Mr Nicholas Jarvis, Regional Manager

Brotherhood of St Laurence ï Professor Shelley Mallett, General Manager, Research and Policy ï Ms Sally James, Head of Youth Programs

Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand ï Ms Stella Avramopoulos, Chief Executive Officer ï Ms Susan Maury, Policy and Research Specialist

Australian Unemployed Workers' Union ï Ms Anne Maxwell, Administration Officer & General Member of Committee of Management ï Mr Jeremy Poxon, Media Officer

Per Capita Australia ï Ms Emma Dawson, Executive Director

Community and Public Sector Union ï Mr Osmond Chiu, Senior Policy and Research Officer

Victorian Council of Social Service ï Ms Emma King, Chief Executive Officer ï Ms Llewellyn Reynders, Policy Manager

Northern Community CareWorks Ltd ï Mr David Toscano, Team Leader

Mr Shae Dwyer, Private capacity

Ms Kim Pendlebury, Private capacity

Mr Russell Miles, Private capacity

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Ms Tracey Ashmore, Private capacity

Mr Michael Smart, Private capacity

Advanced Personnel Management ï Ms Karen Rainbow, Chief Executive Officer, Employment Services ï Ms Mona Saeidavi, General Manager, jobactive

yourtown ï Mr Brendan Bourke, Head of Client Services

Joblink Plus ï Ms Christine Shewry, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director

National Employment Services Association ï Ms Sally Sinclair, Chief Executive Officer ï Ms Annette Gill, Principal Policy Advisor ï Ms Vanessa Puopolo, Policy Advisor

Jobs Australia ï Ms Debra Cerasa, Chief Executive Officer ï Mr Peter Defteros, A/g Senior Policy Manager

Wednesday, 14 November 2018 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Settlement Council of Australia ï Mr Nick Tebbey, Chief Executive Officer

Australian Human Rights Commission ï Dr Kay Patterson, Age Discrimination Commissioner ï Dr Catherine Earl, Senior Policy and Research Officer, Age Discrimination

Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry ï Ms Jenny Lambert, Director, Employment, Education and Training

Volunteering Australia ï Ms Lavanya Kala, Policy Manager

213

Department of Jobs and Small Business ï Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary, Employment ï Ms Benedikte Jensen, Group Manager, Labour Market Strategy Group ï Ms Marsha Milliken, Group Manager, Quality, Integrity and Evidence

Group ï Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole Group ï Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth & Programmes Group ï Mr Nicholas Dowie, Branch Manager, Active Labour Market Assistance

Branch ï Mr Derek Stiller, Branch Manager, Employment Services, Reporting and Analysis Branch

Department of Social Services ï Mr Brenton Philp, General Manager, Welfare and Housing Policy

Department of Human Services ï Ms Rosemary Deininger, General Manager, Participation and Disability Division

Tuesday, 20 November 2018 Macmasters Room Crowne Plaza Pine Tree Lane Terrigal

Australian Council of Social Service ï Dr Peter Davidson, Senior Advisor

Community Environment Network ï Mr John Asquith, Chairman

NSW Business Chamber ï Mr Luke Aitken, Senior Manager, Policy ï Ms Megan Petrass, Policy Manager, Workforce Skills

Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network ï Mr Andrew Cummings, A/g National Coordinator ï Mr Narayan Khanal, Youth Ambassador

ET Australia ï Mr Tony Mylan, Chief Executive Officer

MAX Employment ï Mr Richard Spurrell, Executive General Manager of Performance, Analytics and Quality

214

Ms Jaki Wilson, Private capacity

Ms Kylie Wright, Private capacity

National Social Security Rights Network ï Ms Chris Belcher, Welfare Rights Advocate

Refugee Council of Australia ï Mr Asher Hirsch, Senior Policy Officer ï Ms Shukufa Tahiri, Policy Officer

Tuesday, 29 January 2019 Anglesea 2 Room Mercure Hotel 10 Irwin Street Perth

WA Council of Social Service ï Mr Chris Twomey, Leader, Policy Development and Research ï Ms Leela James, Coordinator, Community Relief & Resilience

Mr Alan Bateson, Private Capacity and Member of the Australian Unemployed Workers Union

Mr Ben Burns, Private Capacity

Ms Shirley Menegola, Private Capacity

Mr Kevin Piggot, Private Capacity

Mr Milan Pospisil, Private Capacity

Mr Johnny Windus, Private Capacity and Member of the Australian Unemployed Workers Union

Edmund Rice Centre WA ï Ms Christina Ward, Deputy Director

Western Australian Network of Alcohol & other Drug Agencies (no submission) ï Ms Jill Rundell, Chief Executive Officer ï Mr Ethan James, Manager, Advocacy and Research

Wirrpanda Foundation ï Ms Lisa Cunningham, Chief Executive Officer ï Mr Jarrad Oakley-Nicholls, Executive Leader, Employment Services

215

Skill Hire ï Mr Rob Stockdale, Executive Chair ï Mr Richard Kiel, General Manager

216

Friday, 1 February 2019 Committee Room 2S1 Parliament House Canberra

Anglicare Australia ï Ms Imogen Ebsworth, Director of Policy and Research

Youth Action ï Ms Jacqui McKenzie, Policy and Advocacy Manager

Centre for Policy Development ï Dr Travers McLeod, Chief Executive Officer

CoAct ï Mr Matthew Little, Chief Executive Officer

Sarina Russo Job Access ï Ms Dianne Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer ï Ms Kathleen Newcombe, Group Chief Executive Officer

Salvation Army Employment Plus ï Mr Kieren Kearney, General Manager, Operations, Employment Plus ï Mr Thomas Austin, Manager, youth services in Queensland, NSW and the ACT

Matchworks ï Mrs Renae Lowry, Executive Director

AtWork Australia ï Mr Michael Kolomyjec, General Manager

SureWay Employment and Training ï Mr Matthew Hall, Chief Executive Officer ï Mrs Karena Newland, Chief Operating Officer

Department of Jobs and Small Business ï Mr Nathan Smyth, Deputy Secretary Employment ï Mr Greg Manning, Group Manager, Youth and Programmes Group ï Ms Benedikte Jensen, Group Manager, Labour Market Strategy Group ï Ms Janine Pitt, Group Manager, Activation and Work for the Dole Group ï Ms Marsha Milliken, Group Manager, Quality, Integrity and Evidence

Group

Department of Social Services ï Mr Brenton Philp, Group Manager, Welfare and Housing Policy Group

217

ï Mrs Mary McLarty, Branch Manager, Payment Structures Branch

Department of Human Services ï Ms Rosemary Deininger, General Manager, Participation and Disability Division

Education and Employment References Committee—Jobactive: failing those it is intended to serve—Report, dated February 2019 (2024)